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program that subsidizes part-time work during economic downturns. Using administrative data, I document
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return to full-time work, and (iii) short-time work is not associated with a long-term loss in earnings. I develop
a model that is consistent with these facts. The model features search frictions, aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks, human capital, and an intensive margin. Productivity shocks differ in duration and magnitude, and
when hit by an adverse temporary productivity shock, firms can curtail their losses by reducing working
hours. Using the estimated model, I find that short-time work was important in reducing job loss during the
recession. However, the welfare gains are modest, because workers who would have been laid off without
short-time work are workers for whom the earnings loss associated with unemployment is low.
In the second paper, I investigate how policy expectations interact with the employment effects associated
with minimum wage increases. I provide evidence from federal and state minimum wage increases in the U.S.
that minimum wage increases result in substantial negative employment effects when the increases are
unanticipated and no employment effects when they are anticipated. The effects of unanticipated increases are
further exacerbated when the increases are indexed to inflation. I then develop an equilibrium search model in
which workers and firms have rational expectations of the future evolution of the minimum wage. Using the
estimated model, I show that policy expectations are quantitatively important to understand the impact of
minimum wage increases on employment.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN LABOR ECONOMICS
Jan Tilly
Hanming Fang
This dissertation consists of two papers. In the first paper, I study the employment
and welfare effects of short-time work in Germany during the recession between 2008
and 2010. Short-time work is a government program that subsidizes part-time work
during economic downturns. Using administrative data, I document that (i) take-up
of short-time work is increasing in experience and tenure, (ii) almost all short-time
workers return to full-time work, and (iii) short-time work is not associated with a
long-term loss in earnings. I develop a model that is consistent with these facts. The
model features search frictions, aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, human capital,
and an intensive margin. Productivity shocks differ in duration and magnitude, and
when hit by an adverse temporary productivity shock, firms can curtail their losses
by reducing working hours. Using the estimated model, I find that short-time work
was important in reducing job loss during the recession. However, the welfare gains
are modest, because workers who would have been laid off without short-time work
are workers for whom the earnings loss associated with unemployment is low.
In the second paper, I investigate how policy expectations interact with the employ-
ment effects associated with minimum wage increases. I provide evidence from federal
and state minimum wage increases in the U.S. that minimum wage increases result in
substantial negative employment effects when the increases are unanticipated and no
employment effects when they are anticipated. The effects of unanticipated increases
v
are further exacerbated when the increases are indexed to inflation. I then develop
an equilibrium search model in which workers and firms have rational expectations
of the future evolution of the minimum wage. Using the estimated model, I show
that policy expectations are quantitatively important to understand the impact of
minimum wage increases on employment.
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Chapter 1: Extended Summary
This dissertation consists of two papers in which I study the effects of two different
policy instruments — short-time work and minimum wages — on the labor market.
In the first paper, I study the employment and welfare implications of the wide-
spread take-up of short-time work in Germany during the recession between 2008
and 2010. Short-time work is a labor market policy that pays benefits to workers
who temporarily work fewer than their regular hours. Short-time work is meant
to prevent layoffs during temporary downturns. The purpose of this paper is (i)
to quantify how many jobs were saved by short-time work, (ii) to determine if the
existence of the policy made workers better off, and (iii) to investigate how the govern-
ment should optimally combine unemployment insurance benefits and short-time work
during recessions.
One of the main obstacles in studying short-time work in Germany is the lack
of data. The usual administrative data sources do not record short-time take-up.
Instead, short-time workers are simply recorded as full-time employees. I overcome
this by assembling a new administrative dataset of the universe of workers in the
metropolitan area of Nuremberg that includes detailed information on short-time
work. This dataset merges data obtained from firms’ applications for short-time
work with individual workers’ social security records.
Using this dataset, I document three facts. First, take-up of short-time work is
increasing in experience and tenure. Second, almost all short-time workers return to
full-time work when their short-time work spell ends. Third, short-time workers do
not experience long-term effects on earnings or employment. In contrast, I document
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that laid off workers experience a long-term loss in earnings and that this loss is largest
for workers who are experienced and have high tenure at the time of the layoff.
I develop and structurally estimate an equilibrium life-cycle model that is consis-
tent with these facts. The model features search frictions, aggregate and match-
specific productivity shocks, general- and firm-specific human capital, and an inten-
sive margin. In the model, firms and workers experience match-specific productivity
shocks that differ in magnitude and duration.
Worker-firm matches are hit by productivity shocks that differ in magnitude and
duration. During recessions, productivity shocks tend to be worse in magnitude but
shorter in duration than in normal times. Each period, workers and firms observe
the magnitude and expected duration of their current productivity shock. Firms
then decide whether to keep the worker employed and for how many hours. Workers
decide whether to stay employed or quit. Ordinarily, the firm’s ability to reduce
working hours is limited, because the worker can quit, in which case she receives
unemployment insurance benefits and searches for a different job. With short-time
work, working reduced hours becomes more attractive to workers.
Workers with substantial firm-specific human capital are unlikely to quit or be fired
in response to a temporary shock. This explains why short-time take-up is increasing
in tenure and why these workers experience severe earning losses when they do lose
their jobs (e.g. due to a persistent adverse match productivity shock). Workers with
little firm-specific human capital have little to lose from unemployment. When hit by
an adverse temporary productivity shock, these workers separate from their employer
instead of waiting for their current match productivity to improve. For these workers,
the earnings loss associated with unemployment is small.
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I estimate the model using indirect inference. According to my estimated model,
short-time work was responsible for decreasing the unemployment rate by 1.3
percentage points in 2009, i.e. about one in five short-time workers (short-time take-
up equalled 6% in 2009) would have been unemployed. The welfare benefits of the
policy are small but positive. Measured in consumption equivalents, the average
worker values the policy at about 1.0% of her annual income in 2009. The combined
cost to the government and firms totals about 0.7% of the average worker’s annual
income.
I use the estimated model to study what combination of unemployment insurance
benefits and short-time compensation maximizes the average worker’s welfare. When
searching over different replacement rates for the two policy instruments, I take into
account that the government needs to adjust payroll taxes to balance its budget. I
find that unemployment insurance should be slightly less generous than it is in the
data. In contrast, short-time work should be considerably more generous than it is
in the data.
In the second paper, I study the extent to which policy expectations affect how
minimum wage increases impact the labor market. In contrast to short-time work,
the minimum wage is a widely known policy instrument and its usefulness is hotly
debated. Many papers have been written on the effects of minimum wages on employ-
ment. These papers usually ask how much a one dollar increase in the minimum wage
affects the employment rate. In my paper, I quantify how policy expectations shape
the employment effects associated with minimum wage increases.
I focus on two aspects of policy expectations. First, some minimum wage increases
are anticipated, whereas other increases come as a surprise. For instance, the 2007
increase in the federal minimum wage was passed in May 2007 and implemented in
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three steps in July 2007, July 2008, and July 2009. The initial passing of the minimum
wage increase by Congress was a surprise to most firms and workers; the subsequent
increases were not. Second, minimum wages are mostly in nominal terms, which
means that the real value of the minimum wage decreases over time. This renders
many minimum wage increases essentially temporary, especially when workers and
firms can expect that no further increase is on the horizon. However, this is not true
for all states. Some U.S. states index their minimum wages to inflation, i.e. minimum
wages are automatically increased with inflation every year.
I provide evidence from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to show that the magni-
tude of employment effects associated with recent minimum wage increases in the U.S.
depends on whether minimum wage changes are anticipated (i.e. announced several
months before their implementation) and whether the minimum wage is indexed to
inflation (i.e. permanent in real terms). I find that minimum wage increases result in
substantial negative employment effects when they are unanticipated and no employ-
ment effects when they are anticipated. The effects of unanticipated increases are
further exacerbated when the increases are indexed to inflation.
I then develop an equilibrium search and matching model that features a time-varying
real minimum wage. I use the model to quantify the role of policy expectations in the
employment effects of minimum wages. In the model, workers and firms are forward
looking and form rational expectations with respect to the future evolution of the
minimum wage. Minimum wages may increase some workers’ wages by allocating a
larger share of the surplus to the worker. Minimum wages may also destroy some
jobs by rendering them unprofitable from the perspective of the firm. Policy expec-
tations shape the employment response to minimum wage increases, because workers
and firms are forward looking. While parsimonious, the model can account for a
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variety of outcomes related to changes in the minimum wage policy, such as effects
on employment, the share of workers in minimum wage jobs, and various moments of
the wage distribution.
I estimate the model using indirect inference by targeting difference-in-differences
estimates from increases in the federal minimum wage between 2007 and 2009. These
increases in the federal minimum wage are particularly useful for the identification and
estimation of the model, because the initial increase in 2007 was a surprise, whereas
the second and third increases in 2008 and 2009 were announced far in advance.
In the estimation, I feed policy expectations consistent with the actual staggered
implementation of the 2007—2009 federal minimum wage increase into the model
and then estimate the structural parameters of the model.
The estimated model allows me to disentangle the role of the minimum wage rate and
expectations thereof. Anticipation effects can result in the complete absence of any
employment effect at the time of the minimum wage increase. Indexation can result
in vastly larger employment effects. For the 2007 federal minimum wage increase,
I find that the disemployment effect would have been twice as large if the increase
had been indexed to inflation. The results in this paper indicate that researchers
and policy makers need to account for firms’ and workers’ policy expectations when
assessing the impact of minimum wage increases on employment.
Both papers in this dissertation study labor market policies. While the policies are
very different from each other, both papers have many methodological commonali-
ties. In both papers, I develop structural equilibrium models of the labor market with
search frictions that are consistent with the stylized facts obtained from individual-
level data. Both models feature some degree of worker-level heterogeneity. Both
models are equilibrium models, because they feature both labor supply and job
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creation. Furthermore, both models feature aggregate dynamics. In the case of
short-time work, the reason for aggregate dynamics comes from allowing for aggre-
gate productivity shocks, which is a necessary ingredient to study recessions. In the
case of minimum wages, the reason for aggregate dynamics comes from allowing for
a time-varying minimum wage path. I estimate both models using indirect inference
by matching moments obtained from the real data with moments obtained from the
model.
The papers differ in the questions they ask and the implications that can be drawn
from them. The paper on short-time work answers both positive and normative
questions. On the positive side, the paper assesses the employment effects of short-
time work in Germany during the 2008–2010 recession. On the normative side, the
paper determines the welfare implications of the policy and discusses the optimal
generosity of short-time work and unemployment insurance benefits. As a result, the
paper contains direct policy implications. In contrast, the paper on minimum wages
merely asks a positive question and uses a structural model to perform a measurement
exercise. Nonetheless, the paper also has relevant policy implications as it highlights
the importance of accounting for policy expectations when assessing the effects of
minimum wage increases on the labor market.
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Chapter 2: Employment and Welfare Effects of Short-Time Work1
2.1. Introduction
During the recession between 2008 and 2010, a large fraction of Germany’s labor force
took up short-time work, reaching as much as 6.5% in 2009.2 Short-time work is a
government program that subsidizes part-time work in recessions. When employers
cut their workers’ hours and — in proportion — earnings, the government partially
compensates workers for this reduction in earnings. Short-time work is based on
the premise that during recessions, some productivity declines are temporary. It
provides financial incentives to prevent workers from being laid off in response to
such temporary declines. In this paper, I study Germany’s experience with short-
time work.3 Using worker-level administrative data, I document which workers take
up short-time work and then develop and structurally estimate an equilibrium search
model to determine the effects of short-time work on employment and welfare.
I assemble a new administrative dataset of the universe of workers in the metropolitan
area of Nuremberg that includes detailed information on short-time work.4 I docu-
1Kilian Niedermayer collaborated on the data work presented in this chapter.
2I report the share of short-time workers relative to the attached labor force, i.e. individuals who
are currently or were recently employed in full-time jobs subject to social security contributions. As
a point of reference, there were 1.4 million short-time workers and 3.6 million unemployed workers
in Germany in April 2009.
3Germany is not the only country with widespread take-up of short-time work during the recession
following the financial crisis in 2008. See Cahuc and Carcillo (2011) and Hijzen and Venn (2011) for
an overview of short-time take-up during that time across OECD countries, Messenger and Ghosheh
(2013) for case studies of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Turkey, and
Uruguay, and Aricò and Stein (2012) for a comparison between short-time work schemes in Germany
and Italy. Even though 17 U.S. states were operating short-time work schemes during the recession,
take-up was very small (Abraham and Houseman, 2014).
4In the usual administrative datasets for Germany, short-time workers cannot be identified,
because they appear as if they are working their regular working hours. I am not the first to
notice this. Scholz (2012) uses a precursor of the data used in this paper. Other papers rely on
firm-level data, e.g. Boeri and Bruecker (2011), Kruppe and Scholz (2014), Balleer et al. (2016),
Cooper et al. (2016).
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ment three facts. First, short-time work take-up is increasing in experience and
tenure. Second, almost all short-time workers return to full-time work when their
short-time work spell ends. Third, short-time workers do not experience long-term
effects on earnings or employment. In contrast, I document that laid off workers
experience a long-term loss in earnings and that this loss is largest for workers who
are experienced and have high tenure at the time of the layoff.5
I develop and structurally estimate an equilibrium life-cycle model that is consistent
with these facts. The model features search frictions, aggregate and match-specific
shocks, general- and firm-specific human capital, and an intensive margin. Using my
estimated model, I find that short-time work substantially reduced job loss during
the recession. The welfare gains are modest, because workers who would have been
laid off without short-time work are workers for whom the earnings loss associated
with unemployment is low.
Worker-firm matches are hit by productivity shocks that differ in magnitude and
duration. During recessions, productivity shocks tend to be worse in magnitude but
shorter in duration than in normal times. Each period, workers and firms observe
the magnitude and expected duration of their current productivity shock. Firms
then decide whether to keep the worker employed and for how many hours. Workers
decide whether to stay employed or quit. Ordinarily, the firm’s ability to reduce
working hours is limited, because the worker can quit, in which case she receives
unemployment insurance benefits and searches for a different job. With short-time
work, working reduced hours becomes more attractive to workers.
Workers with substantial firm-specific human capital are unlikely to quit or be fired
5These findings are in line with the extensive literature on the effects of worker displacement on
future employment and earnings, e.g. Jacobson et al. (1993), Davis and von Wachter (2011).
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in response to a temporary shock. This explains why short-time take-up is increasing
in tenure and why these workers experience severe earning losses when they do lose
their jobs (e.g. due to a persistent adverse match productivity shock). Workers with
little firm-specific human capital have little to lose from unemployment. When hit by
an adverse temporary productivity shock, these workers separate from their employer
instead of waiting for their current match productivity to improve. For these workers,
the earnings loss associated with unemployment is small.
Since I study how firms and workers respond to temporary productivity shocks,
I explicitly allow for temporary unemployment as in Fujita and Moscarini (2016)
and Fernández-Blanco (2013). When a firm lays a worker off, the firm can subse-
quently recall the unemployed worker and resume the employment relationship if the
worker did not find a different job and the worker and the firm did not lose contact for
other reasons. This feature of the model — which is supported by the data in which
about 11% of all unemployed workers return to their previous employer — implies
that short-time work is not the only way for workers and firms to respond to tempo-
rary downturns. In my model, there are important differences between short-time
work and a temporary layoff. First, short-time workers do not lose human capital,
whereas unemployed workers do. Second, short-time workers are less likely to search
and find alternative jobs than unemployed workers (if not only because the latter
have more time to search). Third, short-time workers do not lose contact with their
employer for exogenous reasons, whereas recall of temporarily unemployed workers is
uncertain.
I assume that the hourly wages of incumbent workers cannot flexibly respond to
temporary productivity shocks. I deem this a realistic restriction on the contract space
for the German labor market, where many employment relationships are governed by
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collective bargaining agreements.6 This restriction ensures that in the model — as in
the data — the main response to the recession is in hours worked, not in the hourly
wage.7
Even though the model features aggregate dynamics and rich worker-level hetero-
geneity, and search on- and off-the-job, it is tractable, because search is directed as
in Menzio and Shi (2011). My model admits a unique recursive equilibrium and this
equilibrium is block recursive, i.e. it can be computed independently of the distribu-
tion of workers across states.8
I estimate the model using indirect inference. According to my estimated model,
short-time work was responsible for decreasing the unemployment rate by 1.3
percentage points in 2009, i.e. about one in five short-time workers (short-time take-
up equalled 6% in 2009) would have been unemployed. The welfare benefits of the
policy are modest. Measured in consumption equivalents, the average worker values
the policy at about 1.0% of her annual income in 2009. The combined cost to the
government and firms totals about 0.7% of the average worker’s annual income.
I use the estimated model to study what combination of unemployment insurance
benefits and short-time compensation (i.e. benefits paid to workers who take up short-
time work, which is proportional to their reduction in earnings) maximizes the average
6Note that some of these arrangements are more flexible than implied by my assumption. See
for instance Dustmann et al. (2014).
7This fact is otherwise difficult to square with more flexible contractual arrangements. When
hours and wages can flexibly respond to productivity shocks, a change in working hours should also
coincide with a change in the hourly wage. Note that other than contractual obligations, there are
many institutional features in the German labor market that make wages rigid, e.g. the fact that
the level of wages have immediate consequences for future generosity of unemployment insurance
benefits and pension benefits. I do not seek to provide micro foundations for the origin of wage
rigidity. Also, I ignore that in reality, some short-time work arrangements coincide with temporary
wage reductions (called Lohnverzicht in German) since I find that this only applies to a relatively
small number of short-time workers.
8See also Guo (2015) and Menzio et al. (2016) for papers that incorporate directed search in
life-cycle models.
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worker’s welfare. I take into account that the government needs to adjust payroll taxes
to balance its budget. I find that the optimal replacement rate of unemployment
insurance equals 55%. The optimal replacement rate of short-time compensation is
close to 100%. Thus, the optimal replacement rate for the unemployed is just a little
bit lower than the actual replacement rate that equals 60% (or 67% if the recipient
has children). The optimal replacement rate for short-time workers is considerably
higher than the actual replacement rate, which is the same as for the unemployed.
I estimate my model from observational data alone. However, since my ultimate goal
is to assess the employment and welfare implications of a particular labor market
policy, I corroborate the findings from my structural model by estimating the imme-
diate effect of short-time work on job destruction rates.9 I exploit the fact that
Germany’s short-time work program was expanded in January 2009, at which point
the policy became more generous, less restrictive, and easier to use. I compare job
destruction rates between industries that were adversely affected by the recession
before short-time work was expanded and industries that experienced the recession
afterwards. My direct estimates are in line with the model implied effect of short-time
work on job destruction rates.
My view on short-time work in this paper is purposefully narrow. I exclusively focus
on the dynamic implications that temporary shocks may have on workers’ careers and
how short-time work interacts with human capital. My detailed treatment of worker-
level heterogeneity comes at a cost. I treat all productive activity as resulting from
single-worker firms. I ignore interaction effects between workers at the same firm and
9Studying short-time work in Germany provides a formidable identification challenge, because
there is no obvious counterfactual. Short-time work is a federal policy (as opposed to state-wide)
that is only available during recessions. Therefore, I cannot use time-variation to study the effects
of short-time work on employment, because by construction the availability of short-time work is
correlated with the aggregate state of the economy. I also cannot use geographic variation, because
the policy is available nationwide.
11
how firms allocate work between workers. As a result, my paper has a different focus
than much of the existing literature on short-time work (e.g., Burdett and Wright
(1989), Van Audenrode (1994), Braun and Brügemann (2017), Cooper et al. (2016)).
However, the existing literature largely considers models with homogeneous workers.
My approach to modeling the effect of short-time work on workers’ careers is related
to the extensive literature on the effects of job loss on the evolution of employment and
earnings. My model shares features with Huckfeldt (2016), Jung and Kuhn (2016),
and Jarosch (2016) who study how job loss results in long-term earning losses. These
papers have in common that layoffs interact with human capital and thereby result in
persistent earning losses. However, these papers also have in common that the main
reason for layoffs is exogenous. My model differs from these papers along various
dimensions. Most importantly, in my model, the layoff of a worker is a choice — not
an exogenous event that is outside of the firm’s or the worker’s control. In particular,
workers can prevent being laid off by tolerating a temporary reduction in hours. The
role of short-time work is to make this reduction in hours and earnings more attractive
to workers. That in turn implies that if layoffs have severe negative consequences for
the worker, then the worker will do everything in her power to prevent being laid off.
This bounds the potential benefits from a government policy such as short-time work.
Three papers have studied short-time work using equilibrium search models. Cooper
et al. (2016) and Balleer et al. (2016) study the take-up of short-time work in Germany
between 2008 and 2010, and Osuna and García-Pérez (2015) study the counterfactual
introduction of short-time work in Spain while emphasizing the distinction between
long-term and temporary employment contracts. Neither of these papers explicitly
models human capital.
Most of the theoretical research on short-time work has focused on how firms allocate
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work between different workers abstracting from search frictions, aggregate shocks,
and human capital. Burdett and Wright (1989) study the welfare and employment
effects of regular unemployment insurance vis-à-vis short-time work. They find that
an environment that features only regular unemployment insurance induces ineffi-
cient layoffs. In contrast, an environment with short-time work does not, but it
leads to inefficiently chosen working hours. Van Audenrode (1994) and Braun and
Brügemann (2017) build on the work by Burdett and Wright (1989). Van Auden-
rode finds that short-time compensation must be proportionally more generous than
traditional unemployment insurance systems to induce workers into accepting vari-
able hours. If short-time compensation is too low, it may result in both inefficient
employment and inefficient choice of hours. Braun and Brügemann include a distinc-
tion between insurable and uninsurable risk. There are some shocks, for which the
firm will stop producing and will lay off all workers. Against all other shocks, the
firm can obtain perfect insurance. When firms can insure well, then short-time work
can be welfare improving by reducing inefficient layoffs that are caused by the unem-
ployment insurance system. If firms are poorly insured, then short-time work cannot
improve welfare.
Previous empirical studies on short-time work in Germany usually find little to no
effect of short-time work on employment. Most of these studies either rely on cross-
country comparisons (e.g. Cahuc and Carcillo (2011) and Hijzen and Venn (2011)) or
firm-level data with relatively coarse measurements of short-time take-up (e.g. Boeri
and Bruecker (2011), Bellmann and Gerner (2011), Crimmann et al. (2010)). Two
papers on short-time work in Germany, Scholz (2012) and Kruppe and Scholz (2014),
use detailed worker-level and firm-level data, respectively. Scholz (2012) uses a
precursor of my dataset and investigates whether short-time workers differ from full-
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time workers based on characteristics such as education and seniority and finds no
such differences. Kruppe and Scholz (2014) investigate whether firms with short-time
work exhibit different employment behavior than firms without short-time work and
also find no such differences.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, I provide background on the
German short-time work scheme. In Section 2.3, I introduce my dataset and develop
several stylized facts on short-time work. In Section 2.4, I introduce my model.
Section 2.5 discusses how to estimate the model. Section 2.6 presents the effects
on employment and welfare. In Section 2.7, I study the optimal policy design of
short-time compensation and unemployment insurance benefits. In Section 2.8, I
corroborate the results from my estimated model with more direct empirical evidence.
Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2. Background
Germany’s current system of short-time work was introduced in 1957.10 There are
several types of short-time work. Throughout I will focus on what is called “short-
time work for economic reasons,” the most prominent type of short-time work. Other
types include seasonal short-time work for workers in industries that are adversely
affected by weather conditions and restructuring short-time work for workers in firms
that undergo restructuring. Before the recession between 2008 and 2010, there were
several episodes of extensive short-time use. These episodes include the second half
of the 1960s, during the oil crisis in the 1970s, and the early 1980s.11 In the two
economic downturns in the years 1996–1997 and 2001–2004, there was no large scale
10Precursors of the current system date back to the early 20th century.
11In the years after the reunification, there was large-scale take-up of restructuring short-time
work.
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use of short-time work. Between 2008 and 2010, several policy changes made short-
time work more attractive to firms and workers, which I outline below.
Short-time work makes it easier for employers to reduce their workers’ hours during
downturns. When an employer reduces a worker’s working hours and — in proportion
— earnings, the worker receives short-time compensation from the Federal Employ-
ment Agency on the foregone earnings. Short-time compensation is equal to the
unemployment insurance benefits the worker would have received if unemployed pro-
rated by the reduction in working hours. Essentially, short-time work can be thought
of as hourly unemployment insurance. The replacement rate equals 60% for workers
without children and 67% for workers with children. Unemployment insurance bene-
fits and short-time compensation are assessed on the worker’s after tax salary. Both
types of government transfers are not subject to income taxes.
I refer to a worker’s full-time salary before a short-time spell as “regular earnings”
and to a worker’s wage earnings during short-time work as “prorated earnings.” A
short-time worker’s total compensation is the sum of prorated earnings and short-
time compensation. I refer to the difference in regular earnings and prorated earnings
as “foregone earnings.”
Short-time work also has implications for employers’ social security contributions. In
Germany, social security contributions are split between the worker and the firm.
The worker’s share of the social security tax is approximately equal to the firm’s
share. A short-time worker’s social security contributions are paid in full on the
worker’s regular earnings. However, the worker is only responsible for her share of
social security contributions on the prorated earnings. The employer is responsible
for the entire remainder, i.e. the firm’s share of social security contributions on the
regular earnings as well as the worker’s share of social security contributions on the
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foregone earnings. Because of this, a firm’s cost of employing a worker is not linear
in hours. The more a firm reduces a worker’s hours, the higher the per-hour cost of
employing the worker. These tax implications of short-time work are non-negligible,
because in Germany, the social security tax can amount to as much as 40% of a
worker’s regular earnings. The social security tax is so high, because it includes,
among others, contributions to the public pension system, health insurance, long-
term care insurance, and unemployment insurance system.
There are several preconditions for a worker to receive short-time compensation. First,
the worker and the firm need to jointly agree on the reduction in hours. In smaller
firms, employers and workers negotiate short-time work on a case-by-case basis. In
larger firms, where workers’ interests are represented by a workers’ council or some
form of union representation, these representatives of the workers need to agree to the
reduction in working hours. Second, employers have to seek approval for short-time
work from the Federal Employment Agency. Approval requires that employers demon-
strate that they face temporary and unavoidable financial difficulties that necessitate
layoffs. Citing the adverse consequences of a recession is usually satisfactory to obtain
approval. Once an employer’s request for short-time work is approved, the employer
can freely make use of short-time work and does not need to get separate approvals
for additional short-time workers or additional months of short-time work. Third,
other means of reducing working hours must have been depleted. In particular, if a
worker has accrued overtime in a working-time account, the worker must first take
compensatory time off, before she can receive short-time compensation.
Employers have to report each worker’s reduction in hours to the Federal Employment
Agency on a monthly basis. The agency then pays the total amount of short-time
compensation to the firm, which disburses the funds among its employees. These
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monthly reports will serve as my data source as I outline in Section 2.3.
Beginning in January 2009, several rules that govern short-time work were changed.
All policy changes aimed to make short-time work more attractive. I highlight three
major policy changes.12 First, in January 2009, the maximum duration for which
a worker may receive short-time compensation was increased from 12 months to 18
months. In July 2009, the duration was further extended to 24 months. Second,
in February 2009, the social security tax burden on firms was reduced. Instead of
being responsible for the entire remainder of social security contributions, firms were
now only responsible for half of the social security contributions on their workers’
foregone earnings. In July 2009, these rules were further relaxed. For all short-time
spells exceeding six months, the government covers the entire share of social security
contributions on workers’ foregone earnings. Third, in February 2009, one additional
restriction on short-time work was removed. Ordinarily, firms can only apply for
short-time work if they reduce the number of working hours by an average of at least
10% for at least 30% of their workforce. This equal treatment provision is meant to
make short-time work more equitable and share the burden across the workforce. In
February 2009, this rule was removed. Firms were now able to apply for short-time
work on an individual worker-level basis as long as the reduction in hours exceeded
10%. All in all, these statutory changes that occurred in January and February 2009
made short-time work more attractive for employers.13
In Table 2, I illustrate how short-time work affects workers’ income and firms’ total
costs under two different social security tax provisions. I consider a worker with a
gross full-time income of EUR 3, 000. For my example, short-time work entails a
12Table 1 shows the entire list of policy changes.
13There were additional policy changes that I do not discuss in detail. For instance, the government
covers 100% of social security contributions on foregone earnings for workers who received training
during the reduced working hours. Also, short-time work was made available to temporary workers.
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Date Duration Eligibility Cost
Before
December
2006
6 months Reduce hours of at least
33% of staff by at least 10%
(“33/10 rule”)
Firms pay all social secu-
rity contributions.
January 2007 15 months 33/10 rule Firms pay all social secu-
rity contributions.
July 2007 12 months 33/10 rule Firms pay all social secu-
rity contributions.
January 2009 18 months 33/10 rule Firms pay all social secu-
rity contributions.
February 2009 18 months Reduce hours of at least
one employee by at least
10%. Firms that satisfy
the 33/10 rule can make
use of short-time work
provisions for all workers
for any reduction in hours.
Firms that do not satisfy
the 33/10 provision can
make use of short-time
work only for workers with
a 10% reduction in hours.
Firms pay 50% of social
security contributions
July 2009 24 months As above. As above. As of the
seventh month, the Federal
Employment Agency pays
100% of social security
contributions
January 2010 18 months As above. As above.
January 2011 12 months As above. As above.
January 2012 6 months 33/10 rule Firms pay all social secu-
rity contributions.
January 2013 12 months 33/10 rule Firms pay all social secu-
rity contributions.
Table 1: Timeline of Policy Changes 2006–2013
Note: The table contains a list of the main policy changes to short-time work before, during, and
after the recession. The main changes include an extension of benefit duration, a switch to an
individual-worker- based system, and payroll tax relief for firms.
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Full-Time Short-Time
before Feb. 2009
Short-Time
after Feb. 2009
Layoff
Gross Earnings 3,000 1,500 1,500 -
Payroll Tax Employer 570 885 585 -
Total Cost Employer 3,570 2,385 2,085 -
Payroll Tax Worker 630 315 315 -
Income Tax Worker 480 240 240 -
Prorated Net Earnings 1,890 945 945 -
Government Transfer - 567 567 1,134
Net Income 1,890 1,512 1,512 1,134
Table 2: Illustration of Effects of Short-Time Work and Unemployment Insurance
Benefits on Worker’s Earnings and Firm’s Costs.
Note: In this example, I work with a payroll tax of 19% for firms, a payroll tax of 21% for workers,
and an income tax of 16% that is levied on workers. Unemployment insurance benefits and short-
time compensation are assessed on a worker’s after-tax earnings. In this example, short-time work
refers to a 50% reduction in working hours. Before February 2009, the employer was responsible for
the worker’s social security contributions on foregone earnings. As of February 2009, the government
covers 50% of the social security contributions on foregone earnings.
50% reduction in hours. I use a 19% social security tax for employers, a 21% social
security tax for workers, and a 16% income tax.14
In the first column of Table 2, I compute the firm’s cost and the worker’s income
resulting from full-time employment. A full-time wage of EUR 3, 000 translates into
a payroll tax burden on the firm of EUR 570. The firm’s total cost of employing this
worker equals EUR 3, 570. The worker pays EUR 630 in social security taxes and
EUR 480 in income taxes. The worker is therefore left with net earnings equal to
EUR 1, 890.
Before I turn to the case of short-time work, I consider the earnings of an unemployed
worker in the last column of Table 2. An unemployed worker with net income of EUR
1, 890 prior to the unemployment spell receives unemployment insurance benefits
14This illustration simplifies some of the exact provisions. In practice, the Federal Employment
Agency provides tables where workers and firms can look up unemployment insurance benefits and
short-time compensation based on a worker’s regular earnings, family status, and tax class.
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equal to EUR 1, 134 under a replacement rate of 60%.
Next, I consider the case of short-time work before February 2009 with no payroll
tax relief (second column in Table 2). The firm’s social security tax equals EUR 885,
which is the sum of the firm’s social security tax on the worker’s regular earnings
plus the worker’s social security tax on foregone earnings. This means the firm’s
total cost of employing this worker at half her full-time working hours equals EUR
2, 385 or about 67% of the full-time cost. The worker’s gross earnings decline to EUR
1, 500, on which the worker pays social security tax and income tax. The worker’s net
earnings equal 945 or exactly half the net earnings under full-time work. Short-time
compensation equals 50% of unemployment insurance benefits or EUR 567, leaving
the worker with a total net income of EUR 1, 512 or 80% of her regular earnings.
Last, I consider the case of short-time work after February 2009 with a 50% payroll
tax relief on foregone earnings (third column in Table 2). The worker’s net income
remains as before. The cost to the employer decreases substantially. The firm pays
payroll taxes on the worker’s prorated earnings at 19% (which equals EUR 285) plus
half of the total payroll taxes levied on the worker’s foregone earnings at a rate of
19% for the firm and 21% for the worker (which equals EUR 300). The total payroll
tax obligations amount to EUR 585, which means that the total cost of employing
a short-time worker equals EUR 2, 085 or 58% of the cost of employing a full-time
worker. In this illustration, the partial payroll tax relief reduces the firm’s costs of
employing a short-time worker from 67% to 58% of the full-time cost.
Besides the various statutory changes, there were also changes in the approval process.
Throughout the 2008–2010 recession, the Federal Employment Agency approved
almost all requests for short-time work. In 2009, only 0.45% of short-time work
requests were denied. In addition, there was substantial political will to expand the
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short-time work program and funding was allocated accordingly.
Short-time work does not exist in a vacuum. There are several other institutions and
policies that govern the German labor market and affect how flexibly workers and
firms can respond to downturns. These institutions include collective bargaining and
firm-level agreements. Policies include firing restrictions and different contracting
regimes (permanent vs. temporary positions). Some of these institutions and policies
are discussed in Burda and Hunt (2011) and Dustmann et al. (2014).
2.3. Data
2.3.1. Data Sources
The Institute for Employment Research (IAB), the research unit of Germany’s Federal
Employment Agency, makes detailed administrative labor market data available to
researchers. However, studying short-time work in Germany is difficult, because
the usual administrative data sources do not contain any information on short-time
work. German administrative data sources solely collect data that are relevant for
social security purposes. Short-time work has no impact on worker’s social security
contributions as a short-time worker’s social security contributions are paid in full
on the worker’s regular earnings.15 Therefore, short-time workers appear in the data
based on their regular employment status (full-time or part-time) and their regular
earnings. I overcome this difficulty by assembling a new dataset based on three
different data sources that I describe below.
The first data source consists of the short-time work take-up decisions for the universe
15Throughout, I will refer to a short-time worker’s “regular earnings” as the earnings that are
used to assess the amount of short-time compensation a worker receives. Similarly, I will refer to
a short-time worker’s “regular hours” as the number of hours that this worker worked prior to the
short-time work spell.
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of short-time workers in the Nuremberg metropolitan area. Employers with short-
time workers send monthly reports to the office of the Federal Employment Agency
in their district.16 These reports contain a list of the firm’s short-time workers in the
previous months, their names and social security numbers, their reduction in working
hours, their regular earnings, and the amount of short-time compensation that each
worker is entitled to.17 Some larger employers report their short-time work take-up
electronically, but the majority of employers send typewritten reports. See Figure 1 of
such a typewritten report including handwritten annotations. All typewritten reports
submitted to the Nuremberg district of the Federal Employment Agency between June
2008 and December 2010 were digitized. These digitized reports and the electronically
submitted lists from larger employers make up my first dataset.18
This dataset contains information on each individual worker’s short-time work take-up
including the number of reduced hours, regular earnings, and short-time compensation
received. The dataset does not contain information on workers’ regular working hours.
However, I infer each short-time worker’s regular hours based on the amount of short-
time compensation assessed, the number of reduced hours worked, and the worker’s
regular earnings.19
In the raw data, I have information on 58, 181 short-time workers and 391, 801 months
of short-time work. In total, I observe 1, 905 employers with at least one short-time
16The Federal Employment Agency has divided Germany into 178 districts and firms interact with
the branch of the Federal Employment Agency in their district.
17Based on these reports, the Federal Employment Agency then transfers the total amount of
short-time compensation to the employer and workers receive their pro-rated earnings and short-
time compensation through their employer’s payroll system.
18This dataset was previously used in Scholz (2012). See Scholz for more information on how the
data were collected.
19I consider this measure to be a fairly accurate approximation of the worker’s regular hours. It
may not be fully correct, because it is possible that some workers may have agreed to a temporary
reduction in total compensation as part of a short-time work arrangement, in which case I would
overstate regular working hours.
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Figure 1: Example of Raw Data
Note: The figure shows one of the typewritten reports (with handwritten annotations and correc-
tions) that employers submit to the Federal Employment Agency to receive short-time compensation.
These lists were digitized manually. Each row corresponds to a worker. The columns contain (among
other things) the number of hours reduced, regular earnings, actual earnings, and the amount of
short-time compensation paid to the worker.
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worker between June 2008 and December 2010. This dataset includes all monthly
short-time work reports submitted to the Federal Employment Agency in Nuremberg.
However, it does not necessarily include the records for every short-time worker who
lived or worked in the Nuremberg area. Firms that manage their payroll outside of
Nuremberg may have submitted these reports to a different branch of the Federal
Employment Agency. I address this potential shortcoming of my dataset below.
The second data source consists of the universe of German social security records
made available by the IAB in its Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB).20 The
IEB contain information for all individuals who are employed subject to social secu-
rity contributions (which excludes civil servants and the self-employed) and individ-
uals who receive unemployment insurance or social assistance. From the universe of
German social security records, I select every individual with at least one employment
or unemployment spell in the Nuremberg area between January 2000 and December
2014. For each individual, I observe the entire employment biography starting in 1975
up until 2014. For any given month between 2000 and 2014, approximately 750,000
individuals show up in the data as residing in the Nuremberg metropolitan area.
The employment biographies are spell data and can contain multiple spells per person.
I observe all work and unemployment spells, wages, age, gender, industry, occupation,
vocational training, and education. Earnings data are reported before taxes and
capped at the social security contribution threshold (which corresponds to monthly
earnings of EUR 5, 950 in 2014). Since the employment biographies go back to 1975,
I can construct a measure of labor market experience for each worker. For employed
workers, I observe an employer identifier (at the establishment level), which allows
me to create a measure of tenure. The employment biographies notably do not
20The IEB are the source of the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (SIAB), the 2%
sample of German social security records commonly used by researchers.
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contain any information on short-time compensation or — more generally — on hours
worked.21
I transform the spell data into a monthly panel. For each month, I classify individuals
as full-time employed, part-time employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force.
For workers who have multiple concurrent spells, I use the spell that accounts for the
majority of the worker’s earnings to assess the employment status. I link workers’
employment biographies to my first dataset of short-time workers in the Nuremberg
area. The merged dataset contains all workers in the Nuremberg metropolitan area
with each worker’s full employment biography and detailed information on short-time
work take-up between June 2008 and December 2010.
The third data source contains establishment-level data collected and maintained by
the Federal Employment Agency.22 It contains the entire population of German firms
with data on the number of short-time workers at the establishment level and the
average reduction in hours due to short-time work. This information is recorded
on a monthly basis and covers the time period from January 2009 to March 2011. I
merge this dataset with my other data sources using a unique establishment identifier.
I use this employer-level information to address measurement error concerns. As
mentioned previously, the Nuremberg worker-level data underreport the short-time
status of workers if their employers reported short-time work take-up to a branch of
the Federal Employment Agency outside of Nuremberg.
Combined, these three data sources contain the universe of workers and firms in the
metropolitan area of Nuremberg with detailed information on short-time compensa-
21The only information on hours that I observe is a part-time dummy, whose exact definition
varies over time.
22Kruppe and Scholz (2014) also use this data source and then merge it with the Establishment
Panel, a firm-level survey dataset.
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Figure 2: Metropolitan Area of Nuremberg
Note: The figure on the left shows a map of Germany with the metropolitan area of Nuremberg
shown in red. The state of Bavaria is shown in blue. The figure on the right shows a map of the
metropolitan area of Nuremberg as I define it.
tion utilization at both the individual worker and the firm level. The dataset used in
this paper is unique as it is the only dataset for Germany that combines information
on short-time work with individual-level employment and earnings data.
2.3.2. The Nuremberg Labor Market
The Nuremberg district of the Federal Employment Agency is predominantly urban
and is composed of the city of Nuremberg, the city of Erlangen, the city of Fuerth, and
surrounding areas, which I show in Figure 2. In 2009, this district had a population of
about 1.2 million.23 About one third of the work force is employed in manufacturing.24
23These districts are redrawn on a regular basis. I use the geographic definitions from 2009
throughout this paper. The Nuremberg district includes Nuremberg, Erlangen, Fuerth, Schwabach,
and some parts of Roth. For my analysis I exclude the county of Roth. Employment agency districts
were redrawn in January 2013. Today’s Nuremberg district is substantially smaller.
24Items manufactured in the Nuremberg area include electrical equipment, mechanical and optical
products, and motor vehicle parts.
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Mean SD p25 p50 p75 N
Experience 13.57 9.40 5.33 12.08 20.75 4,541,738
Tenure 7.10 7.37 1.50 4.33 10.33 3,983,728
Occupation Tenure 8.28 8.10 1.83 5.42 12.83 3,983,728
Earnings 3,109.65 1,347.36 2,124.72 2,904.01 4,023.51 3,984,362
Age 40.63 11.15 31.00 41.00 49.00 4,541,738
Female 0.38 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 4,541,738
Manufacturing 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,974,890
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Note: The summary statistics refer to a snapshot taken at January 1 for each year between 2000
and 2014. The sample is restricted to individuals who live in the Nuremberg area and are ages 19
to 65. By construction, the sample does not include civil servants or the self-employed.
I select all individuals with their main place of residence in the Nuremberg
metropolitan area.25 I restrict the data to individuals with at least one full-time
employment spell in the previous 24 months. I thereby exclude individuals who are
not attached to the labor force. I further exclude individuals who are younger than
25 and those who are older than 60. By 25, the vast majority of individuals have
completed schooling. As of age 60, many individuals begin to retire. Since both
— schooling and early retirement — are not central to my paper, I choose to avoid
dealing with these issues.26 After this selection, I am left with about 300,000 individ-
uals on a monthly basis. Throughout the time period that I consider, people enter
and leave the Nuremberg area. For individuals who enter the Nuremberg area, I
observe their full employment biography prior to entering the Nuremberg area, which
I use to construct workers’ employment histories including experience and tenure. For
individuals who leave the Nuremberg area, I continue following these workers when
I report long-run outcomes. More details on the data processing are relegated to
25Alternatively, I could have selected individuals based on their place of work. However, using
the place of residence allows me to use the same clearly defined sample definition for unemployed
and employed workers. This avoids changes in the composition of the data due to changes in labor
supply.
26Even though I drop observations for individuals younger than 25, I still use data on these spells
to inform my measures of work experience and tenure.
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Appendix A1.
Table 3 contains summary statistics from 2000 to 2014. For each of the 15 years in
my data, I take a snapshot on January 1. The average person is approximately 41
years old with 12 years of work experience and 7 years of tenure. Median earnings
before taxes equal about EUR 2,904 (inflation adjusted with base year 2010).
In Figure 3, I show the unemployment and short-time rates for Germany and Nurem-
berg. I construct the unemployment and short-time rates by dividing the total number
of unemployed and short-time workers, respectively, by the total number of individuals
who are attached to the labor force. The time series for the Nuremberg data is based
on the data sources described above. The time series for Germany are constructed
using the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB), a 2% sample of the
IEB for the entire country. I obtain the total number of short-time workers from the
aggregate short-time work statistics published by the Federal Employment Agency.27
Short-time work take-up in Nuremberg closely mirrors that of the rest of the country.
Short-time work begins to increase in late 2008, then peaks at about 7.5% in the
first half of 2009, and subsequently decreases to almost zero by the end of 2010.
Even though the information on short-time work in my dataset is limited to the time
period between June 2008 and December 2010, the aggregate data suggest that my
dataset covers the relevant time period. While the short-time rates for Germany
and Nuremberg look very similar, the Nuremberg unemployment rate is consistently
lower than the nation-wide average. The make up of the Nuremberg labor force differs
from Germany as a whole, as Nuremberg relies more heavily on manufacturing and
its labor force tends to be slightly younger and more educated than the rest of the
27This number is based on firm-level aggregates and includes all types of of short-time work, not
just short-time work for economic reasons. For instance, take-up of seasonal short-time work during
the winter months is visible in the graph.
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Figure 3: Unemployment and Short-Time Rates in Germany and Nuremberg
Note: The left panel shows the unemployment and short-time rates for Germany. The unemploy-
ment rate is based IAB, the 2% sample of the Integrated Employment Biographies. The short-time
rate is based on the aggregate number of short-time workers as published by the Federal Employ-
ment Agency divided by the attached labor force that is taken from the SIAB. This aggregate
short-time rate includes both seasonal and business cycle short-time work. The right panel shows
the unemployment and short-time rates for Nuremberg as reported in the data. The short-time
series excludes seasonal short-time work and underreports the true extent of short-time take-up,
because some firms report their short-time workers to branches of the Federal Employment Agency
other than Nuremberg. In the Nuremberg data, I only observe short-time status between June 2008
and December 2010.
country. See Appendix A1 for more details.
Short-time work predominantly affected workers in manufacturing. In manufacturing,
10% of the entire workforce took up short-time work in the first half 2009. However,
even among workers in manufacturing, there exists substantial heterogeneity in short-
time work utilization. In Table 4, I list the top ten industries and occupations by
short-time work take-up using four-digit industry and occupation codes. Within
manufacturing, I observe a wide range of industries including industrial machinery,
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Number Industry
1 152,066 Installation of industrial machinery and equipment
2 8,203 Casting of light metals
3 7,628 Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles
4 6,704 Repair of electronic and optical equipment
5 4,979 Manufacture of other electrical equipment
6 3,774 Activities of head offices
7 3,693 Other transportation support activities
8 3,538 Repair of other equipment
9 2,755 Other publishing activities
10 2,591 Engineering activities and related technical consultancy
11 83,094 Other
Number Occupation
1 34,441 Office clerks and secretaries
2 33,991 Occupations in machine-building and -operating
3 19,992 Occupations in electrical engineering
4 14,369 Occupations in technical research and development
5 14,177 Occupations in warehousing and logistics
6 13,154 Occupations in metalworking: cutting
7 12,387 Occupations in metalworking
8 10,144 Occupations in tool making
9 8,327 Machine and equipment assemblers
10 8,296 Technical occupations in the automotive industries
11 105,014 Other
Table 4: Top 10 Industries and Occupations by the Number of Short-Time Worker-
Months
Note: The table at the top shows the top 10 industries by the number of short-time worker-months
using a four-digit industry code. The table at the bottom shows the top 10 occupations by the
number of short-time worker-months using a four-digit occupation code.
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metal production, motor vehicle parts, electrical equipment, transportation, infor-
mation technology and computer services. In addition, I observe a wide variety of
occupations that are affected by short-time work including production workers and
white collar back office staff.
Figure 31 in the Appendix shows the distribution of durations for both short-time
work and unemployment spells that started between June 2008 and December 2010.
Short-time work spells tend to be shorter than unemployment spells. Figure 32 in
the Appendix shows the distribution of weekly short-time hours, i.e. the number of
hours for which workers received short-time compensation. The average reduction in
hours equals a little over 10 hours per week.
In my worker-level data, short-time take-up is underreported. I only have short-time
records for employers in the Nuremberg area that reported short-time utilization to
the Nuremberg district of the Federal Employment Agency. Some employers that
do their payroll processing outside of Nuremberg may have reported their short-time
utilization to a different district. Therefore, some of the workers I classify as full-
time employed may in fact be short-time workers. To quantify the extent of the
measurement error I rely on an additional establishment-level data source that covers
the period from January 2009 to March 2011. This dataset has an accurate count of
short-time workers (and the average reduction in hours) at the establishment level. I
find that between January 2009 and December 2010, the true number of short-time
worker-months is about 15% higher than reported in my worker-level dataset. See
Figure 30 in the Appendix for additional details.
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2.3.3. Facts about Short-Time Work
I proceed by documenting three facts about short-time work. Throughout I focus on
2009, the year that accounts for the vast majority of short-time take-up. First, short-
time take-up is increasing in experience and tenure — even after accounting for a large
number of other observables. Second, the vast majority of short-time workers return
to full-time work with their current employer. Third, short-time workers experience
a temporary but not a long-term loss in earnings.
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Figure 4: Short-Time and Unemployment Hazard as a Function of Experience and
Tenure
Note: The left panel shows the month-to-month transition probability from full-time work to short-
time work for 2009 as a function of experience and tenure. The right panel shows the month-to-month
transition probability from full-time work to unemployment for 2009 as a function of experience
and tenure. Short-time work is positively correlated with experience and tenure; unemployment is
negatively correlated with experience and tenure.
In Figure 4, I plot the unconditional month-to-month transition probabilities of
moving from full-time work to short-time work and from full-time work to unem-
ployment for 2009. Short-time work is strongly increasing in experience and tenure.
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In the data, individuals with less than two years of experience have a month-to-month
transition probability into short-time work of about 0.005. For individuals with two
to five years of experience, that probability doubles to about 0.010. For individuals
with more than 20 years of experience, that probability doubles again to about 0.020.
Similar patterns emerge for different lengths of tenure. Workers with less than two
years of tenure have a transition probability into short-time work of about 0.006.
Individuals with 10 to 20 years of tenure have a transition probability of 0.020. Indi-
viduals with more than 20 years of tenure have a transition probability of short-time
work of 0.028. In contrast, transitions into unemployment are strongly decreasing in
experience and tenure.28
What happened to workers after a short-time work spell? In the left panel of Table 5,
I show the destinations of all short-time workers in the data once their short-time
spell ends. I focus on workers’ initial short-time spell in the data. The vast majority
of short-time workers, 95.7%, return to full-time work without switching employers.
On average, these workers spend 5.65 months in short-time work. Only 2.1% of
short-time workers switch jobs from short-time work to employment with a different
employer. A negligible fraction (0.6%) of short-time workers transitions from short-
time work into unemployment. The number of short-time workers who either leave
the dataset (i.e. leave the labor force or accept a job that is not subject to social
security contributions) or switch to part-time employment is 1.6%.
28The transition probabilities in Figure 4 are unconditional and may thereby conflate the effects of
experience and tenure with each other and with additional explanatory variables. I regress transition
dummies into short-time work on yearly experience and tenure dummies as well as a host of worker-
and firm-specific characteristics. In Figure 33, I plot the estimated coefficients of the experience and
tenure dummies and their confidence intervals. In the left panel, I include no worker- or firm-specific
controls. In the middle panel, I control for worker-specific characteristics such as a polynomial in
age, education dummies, and gender, as well as a rich set of industry dummies. In the right panel
I also control for occupation. Regardless of the specification, short-time take-up remains strongly
increasing in tenure. In Figure 34 in the Appendix, I show the analog of Figure 33 for transitions
from full-time work into unemployment.
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Total
Full-Time (Same Firm)
Full-Time (Switch)
Part-Time
Short-Time
Layoff
Leave Data Temporarily
Leave Data Permanently
Short-Time Workers
Count % Duration
51,803 100.0 5.64
49,562 95.7 5.65
1,108 2.1 5.02
287 0.6 7.94
315 0.6 4.38
440 0.8 5.62
91 0.2 7.41
Unemployed Workers
Count % Duration
124,313 100.0 6.82
14,117 11.4 4.73
68,142 54.8 6.46
15,224 12.2 7.89
88 0.1 5.90
19,544 15.7 7.70
7,198 5.8 9.78
Table 5: Transition Out of Short-Time Work and Unemployment
Note: The left panel of the table breaks down the destination of short-time workers in the data.
The rows refer to the destination after the end of the initial short-time spell between June 2008 and
December 2010. The table on the right breaks down all initial unemployment spells by destination
for the same time period. In both panels, the duration column refers to months spend in short-time
work or unemployment before the destination was reached.
In contrast, the picture looks very different for workers who were laid off. In the right
panel of Table 5 I show the destinations of all laid off workers in the data once their
unemployment spell ends. I limit my attention to unemployment spells that began
between June 2008 and December 2010. Among the laid off, about 11% return to a
previous employer to work in full-time employment. Workers who are recalled spend
on average 4.7 months in unemployment. About 55% of laid off workers transition
into full-time employment with an employer for whom they have not worked before.
Such a transition occurs after an average of about 6.5 months. Among the laid off
workers, a large fraction (12.2%) switch to part-time employment, while 21.5% leave
the data. Table 5 indicates that short-time work presents only a temporary — though
non-negligible — interruption to a worker’s career.
I now turn to the longer-run consequences of short-time work. I select all individuals
who are employed full-time in January 2009 with at least six months of tenure in
their current job. I then follow these individuals over time and compare how full-
time employment and earnings evolve in response to an initial transition into either
short-time work or unemployment. As in much of the literature on scarring effects, I
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drop all individuals who have not returned to full-time work for at least six months
by December 2014. I focus on two different measures of earnings. The first measure
is gross labor earnings, which I set to zero for individuals who are unemployed. The
second measure is imputed after-tax earnings plus transfers, which are equal to after-
tax labor earnings for the full-time employed, equal to after-tax labor earnings plus
short-time compensation for short-time workers, and equal to unemployment insur-
ance benefits for the unemployed.29
I index calendar time by t, where t = 0 refers to January 2009. I define the variables
τSi and τUi to refer to the time period when individual i initially transitioned from
full-time work to short-time work and from full-time work to unemployment. When
no such transition occurred between January 2009 and December 2014, I set the
respective variable to negative one.
To capture the long-run consequences of short-time work and unemployment on future
full-time employment, I estimate the statistical model
yit =
T∑
s=0
αs × 1{t− s = τUi }+
T∑
s=0
βs × 1{t− s = τSi }+X ′itµ+ γt + ξi + εit,
where yit equals one if worker i works full-time in period t and equals zero otherwise.
The coefficient αs captures the effect of a transition to short-time work at time t− s
on full-time employment at time t. Similarly, βs captures the effect of a layoff at
time t − s on full-time employment at time t. The coefficient γt refers to monthly
calendar time dummies. Xit is a vector of time-varying worker-specific covariates. ξi
29When I compute after-tax earnings I use a conservative approach and treat every person as a
single household with labor earnings as the only source of income. The reason I compute after-tax
earnings is that short-time compensation and unemployment insurance are assessed on a worker’s
after-tax income. Therefore, to assess the impact that a short-time or unemployment spell has on
a worker’s total earnings, I need to use consistent measures for earnings in the labor market and
government transfers such as unemployment insurance benefits and short-time compensation.
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is a person fixed effect.
In the left panel of Figure 5, I show the coefficient estimates for αs and βs. Initially,
both a transition into short-time work and a transition into unemployment are asso-
ciated with a large decrease in the probability of full-time employment. The esti-
mates for αs and βs only diverge after about five months. Short-time workers return
to full-time work faster. After ten months, short-time work only reduces the proba-
bility of full-time employment by about 20 percentage points, whereas unemployment
reduced the probability of full-time by more than 30 percentage points. After about
18 months, there is no detectable effect of short-time work on full-time employment.
In contrast, unemployment has a long-lasting effect on full-time employment even
after 48 months.30 In the long-run, the gap in full-time employment between workers
who were laid off at time zero and those who transitioned to short-time work at time
zero is about 15 percentage points.
I observe similar patterns for individuals’ after-tax earnings. To assess the effects on
earnings, I employ the following statistical model of earnings:
logwit =
T∑
s=0
αs × 1{t− s = τUi }+
T∑
s=0
βs × 1{t− s = τSi }+X ′itµ+ γt + ξi + εit,
where wit is the sum of an individual’s after-tax earnings and transfers at time t.
For short-time workers, wit refers to the sum of after-tax wage earnings and total
short-time compensation received. For unemployed workers, wit refers to the amount
of unemployment insurance that workers receive.31
30Notice that for short-time workers, the coefficient estimates for αs turn positive after about
22 months implying that short-time workers have a higher probability of working full-time than
individuals who were not put on short-time work or laid off at time 0.
31For workers who ran out of unemployment insurance benefits, wit refers to an imputed measure
of social assistance.
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Figure 5: Evolution of Full-Time Employment by Experience
Note: The graphs show the probability of full-time work for individuals who transitioned from
full-time employment to short-time work or unemployment at time zero.
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Figure 6: Evolution of Earnings
Note: The graphs show the change in earnings for individuals who transitioned from full-time
employment to short-time work or unemployment at time zero.
37
In Figure 6, I plot the estimates for αs and βs. The initial drop in after-tax earnings
plus transfers for short-time workers is about 15%, while the initial drop in after-
tax earnings plus transfers for unemployed workers is about 45%. Short-time workers
catch up with their peers after approximately 18 months and subsequently outperform
them. Even four years after the initial layoff, unemployed workers do not catch up.
The results look qualitatively similar when I use gross earnings without accounting
for transfers. The results indicate that short-time workers do not face negative long-
term consequences from the short-time spell. However, the initial loss in earnings is
substantial.
2.4. Model
In this section, I introduce an equilibrium life-cycle model with search frictions that
is consistent with the facts presented in Section 2.3. The labor market in the model
is subject to search frictions. The unit of analysis is the firm-worker match. The
benefit of ignoring the interaction between workers at the same firm is that my model
allows me to focus on worker-level heterogeneity and the impact of unemployment
and short-time work on individual workers’ careers.
The essence of short-time work is to provide financial support in response to temporary
productivity shocks. During recessions, some workers are temporarily unprofitable at
their current firm, but are likely to be profitable again in the future. Short-time
compensation provides financial incentives that prevent these workers from being
laid off. My model features match-specific productivity shocks that differ in expected
duration. The duration of match productivity interacts with the aggregate produc-
tivity state of the economy. In recessions, productivity shocks tend to be worse in
magnitude and shorter in duration than during normal economic times.
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Since I model how workers and firms respond to temporary productivity shocks,
I part with the usual assumption in search models that once a worker and firm
separate, they will never meet again. Instead, I follow Fujita and Moscarini (2016)
and allow unemployed workers to be recalled by their most recent employer whenever
this is mutually beneficial. This means that workers and firms can use the traditional
unemployment insurance system to deal with temporary productivity shocks by laying
workers off temporarily and then rehiring the same workers back after the recession.
In the data, unemployment insurance benefits is a function of the worker’s most
recent earnings. Short-time compensation is a function of the worker’s current earn-
ings. Workers in high wage jobs therefore receive higher benefits. Modeling these
institutional features is important to accurately reflect the trade-offs associated with
continued employment, short-time work, and unemployment. In the model a worker
receives short-time compensation and unemployment insurance benefit as a function
of her regular earnings.
I establish a notion of regular earnings in my model by introducing simple wage
contracts. Such a wage contract defines the worker’s hourly wage as a function of the
worker’s human capital. These wage contracts are otherwise fully rigid and cannot
be changed throughout an employment relationship. Most importantly, the wage
contracts cannot be flexibly adjusted in response to temporary productivity shocks.
Restricting the contract space in this way is motivated by the casual observation that
wages for ongoing matches do not downward adjust in recessions; see, e.g., Bewley
(1999) for a general treatment that focuses on the U.S., and Franz and Pfeiffer (2006)
for a survey on the German labor market in particular. Many theories have been put
forward to understand why wages do not flexibly adjust during downturns (Ramey
and Watson (1997), Fehr and Falk (1999), Menzio and Moen (2010) and others). I
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make no attempt to generate wage rigidities endogenously. Instead, I impose the
mere constraint that wage contracts of existing matches cannot be a function of the
current productivity state. The only flexible form of adjustment that I allow for is a
change in working hours. My notion of rigidity only applies to existing contractual
relationships. Wages of new hires can adjust flexibly and are lower in recessions than
during normal times.
I allow workers to differ along three dimensions: age, general human capital, and
firm-specific human capital. All three components are important to understand how
workers and firms respond to temporary productivity shocks. All three components
also shape a worker’s life-cycle employment and earnings profile. Workers accumu-
late general and firm-specific human capital while working. General human capital
depreciates during spells of unemployment. Firm-specific human capital is lost the
moment a worker begins working at a different firm. Age matters because retirement
imposes an upper bound on the horizon of an employment relationship.
Aggregate shocks render my environment non-stationary. This in turn makes it
both conceptually and computationally challenging to allow for rich amounts of
worker heterogeneity, such as age and different forms of human capital. I there-
fore follow Menzio and Shi (2011) and model search in the labor market as directed.
Firms post jobs and workers — after observing all available jobs — decide where to
search. This has the benefit that workers will never apply for jobs they are unwilling
to accept. This will later permit me to characterize the equilibrium of the model
without having to keep track of the entire distribution of workers across states.
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2.4.1. Environment
Time is discrete, indexed by t, and lasts forever. There is an aggregate productivity
shock zt that can take on one of two values Z = {z, z}, where z refers to recessions
and z to normal economic times. The evolution of z follows a Markov process, the
distribution of which I denote by Λ(zt+1|zt). When there is no ambiguity, I drop the
subscript t and denote variables that refer to a subsequent period by a prime.
The economy is populated by A ≥ 2 overlapping generations of workers. Every
period, a new generation of workers is born. Each worker lives for A periods and
then retires. Each worker is endowed with one divisible unit of labor. Workers have
per-period preferences over consumption, c, and hours worked, h, given by u(c, h),
where u : R+ × [0, 1] 7→ R is strictly increasing in c and strictly decreasing in h.
Workers discount the future with discount factor β. There are no savings. In each
period, workers consume all of their income.
A worker is characterized by her type x = [xa, xg], where xa ∈ {1, . . . , A} refers to
the worker’s age and xg ∈ Xg refers to the worker’s general human capital. General
human capital, xg, is fungible and can be transferred from firm to firm. General
human capital takes on values on the discrete set Xg = [xg(1), . . . xg(K)], where
K ≥ 2 is an integer and xg(K) > xg(K − 1) > · · · > xg(1). I model Xg as a ladder.
From one period to the next, a worker can move by at most one rung along the ladder.
Transitions on the ladder are stochastic and depend on hours worked. Working more
hours make transitions up the ladder more likely. Working fewer (or zero) hours make
transitions down the ladder more likely. I denote the transition distribution function
of the worker’s entire type vector by Ωx(x′|x, h). The dependence on hours worked,
h, makes explicit that the transition of general human capital is a function of hours
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worked. For future reference, I denote the set of worker types by X = {1, . . . , A}×Xg.
The economy is populated by a positive measure of firms. Firms are risk-neutral,
maximize profits, and discount the future with factor β. To produce output, a firm
needs to be matched with a worker. I denote a firm’s type by y = [ys, ym, yp], which
consists of the worker’s firm-specific human capital ys ∈ Ys, and the magnitude
ym ∈ R and persistence yp ∈ [0, 1] of match-specific productivity. Flow output is
given by
f(xg, ys, ym)× h,
where f : Xg×Ys×R× [0, 1] 7→ R+ is strictly increasing in all of its arguments and h
refers to hours worked. From the outset, I assume that the firm’s production function
is linear in hours worked. To simplify notation, I refer to f(xg, ys, ym) as f(x,y).
In contrast to general human capital, firm-specific human capital cannot be trans-
ferred from one firm to the next. The evolution of firm-specific human capital, ys,
is modeled in a similar fashion as the evolution of general human capital. Firm-
specific human capital takes on values on the discrete set Ys = [ys(1), . . . , ys(L)],
where L ≥ 2 is an integer and ys(L) > ys(L − 1) > · · · > ys(1). Transitions on the
ladder are stochastic and depend on hours worked.
One of the model’s key ingredients is a theory of temporary fluctuations, in which
productivity shocks differ in magnitude and duration. The magnitude of match-
specific productivity, ym, follows a jump process. With probability yp, the vector of
match productivity [ym, yp] remains unchanged from one period to the next. With
probability 1 − yp, the firm-worker pair draws a new vector of match productivity
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[y˜m, y˜p] from the distribution Γ(y˜m, y˜p|z). Formally, I assume that
[ym′, yp′] =

[ym, yp] with probability yp
[y˜m, y˜p] with probability 1− yp.
(1)
The aggregate productivity state does not affect match productivity directly.
This jump process is an important ingredient of the model. The productivity process
introduces heterogeneity in the persistence of shocks. Some matches are hit by
productivity shocks that are almost permanent, which means that short-time work is
not an interesting option. Others are hit by productivity shocks that are temporary,
making short-time work an attractive option. The productivity process also implies
that firms and workers are aware of the persistence of the shock they are experiencing
at any given point in time. This is important, because otherwise firms and workers
would not be able to act on it. Furthermore, the persistence of productivity shocks
may differ in normal times and recessions, which will allow the model to capture the
incidence and duration of short-time work. Another feature of the assumed produc-
tivity process is that recessions do not necessarily affect all workers directly. It is
only when a firm-worker pair draws a new productivity shock — which happens with
probability yp — that the worker experiences the immediate consequences of the
recession. The model allows for a share of the workforce to not experience the direct
consequences of the recession, simply because they do not draw a new productivity
shock during the time period when z = z.
For future reference, I denote the set of firm types by Y = YS ×R+ × [0, 1]. I denote
the transition distribution function of the firm’s entire type vector by Ωy(y′|y, h, z).
I refer to the distribution from which initial values are drawn by Γ(y|z).
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Firms and workers need to determine wages and hours. I assume that an employment
relationship is governed by a simple contract that I denote by w : Xg × Ys 7→ R+.
I define the set of wage contracts as W . This contract specifies the hourly wage as
a function of the worker’s human capital. To simplify notation, I refer to the wage
implied by a contract w as w(x,y) = w(xg, ys). As the worker’s general or firm-
specific human capital changes, compensation may change as well. I assume that
hours are unilaterally determined by the firm.
While the wage contract is fixed and cannot be changed, workers are free to quit
at any time and firms are free to lay workers off at any time. My simple contracts
are by no means optimal. However, they provide a reasonable approximation, fit the
data well, and allow me to precisely model the generosity of short-time work and
unemployment insurance.
Workers search for jobs on and off the job. Search is directed and the labor market
is segmented by worker type. Firms post wage contracts w that target a particular
worker type. A worker observes all posted wage contracts for her type and then
decides which wage contract to search for. The probability that a searching worker
meets a firm depends on the market tightness in the submarket in which the worker
is searching.
Both unemployed and employed workers search for jobs, but they differ in their search
efficiency. I assume that workers’ efficiency units of search depend on hours worked.
The more time a worker spends at work, the less efficient she is at searching. I denote
the efficiency units by λ : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1], which is a monotonically decreasing function
that maps hours worked into search efficiency units. I normalize the efficiency units
of an unemployed worker by imposing that λ(0) = 1.
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Let the total measure of efficiency units of search exerted in a particular submarket
be given by U ≥ 0 and the total measure of vacancies posted in this submarket
by V ≥ 0. Searching workers and vacancies are brought together by a matching
function, M : R+ × W 7→ R+, that maps the measure of efficiency units of search
and the measure of vacancies into meetings. I assume that M is strictly increasing
in both arguments and equals zero if one of its arguments is zero. Furthermore, I
assume that M exhibits constant returns to scale. Therefore, the total measure of
meetings per efficiency unit of search is given by
1
UM(U ,V) = M(1,
V
U ).
The total measure of meetings generated only depends on the ratio VU , which is the
tightness of the submarket and I refer to it as θ. I define p(θ) = M(1, θ), where
p : R+ 7→ R+ and p inherits its properties from M . As mentioned above, a worker’s
efficiency units of search depend on the worker’s hours worked. The probability that
a worker who works h hours meets a firm in this particular submarket is given by
λ(h)p(θ).
The total measure of meetings per vacancy is given by
1
VM(U ,V) =
U
VM(1,
V
U ).
I define q(θ) = M(θ)/θ, where q : R+ 7→ R+ and q inherits its properties from M .
The measures of searching workers and posted vacancies are endogenous objects that
I characterize below.
In the model, there are two types of unemployment. Some workers are permanently
unemployed. The only way for these workers to return to full-time work is by finding
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a new employer. Some workers are temporarily laid off. These are workers for whom
the employer has chosen zero working hours. These workers may — in addition
to searching for jobs with other firms — be recalled by their previous employer
whenever this is mutually beneficial to the worker and the firm. For the purpose
of modeling temporary layoffs, I treat these workers as employed at zero working
hours. While temporarily unemployed, match productivity keeps evolving. Also, the
worker’s general and firm-specific human capital keeps evolving. Recall is not perfect.
A worker who is currently working h hours loses contact with her employer for exoge-
nous reasons with probability δ(h), where δ(h) is decreasing in h. When a temporarily
laid off worker loses contact, the worker becomes permanently unemployed.
When a worker and a firm initially meet, the worker’s firm-specific human capital is
initialized at the bottom rung of the human capital ladder. Furthermore, I assume
that the initial values of [ym, ys] are only a function of the aggregate productivity
state z. I denote the initial value by y0(z). Workers are perfectly aware of the match
quality when they search for a job. Therefore, workers will accept all jobs they search
for. The benefit of making this assumption is that firms need not keep track of the
distribution of workers when they compute the value of posting a vacancy. Firms
know that any worker they meet will accept the offer. Alternatively, I could assume
that matches are experience goods, an assumption entertained in Menzio and Shi
(2011), in which workers only learn the quality of a match after accepting it.
I consider two labor market policies: unemployment insurance and short-time
compensation. With unemployment insurance, a worker receives a fraction of her
most recent full-time compensation. An unemployed worker’s consumption level is
therefore equal to her most recent full-time compensation multipled by a replacement
rate. I denote the most recent full-time compensation by r. I allow unemployment
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insurance benefits to expire at a fixed rate at which point the reference wage r drops
to r. With short-time compensation, a worker receives a fraction of her contractu-
ally agreed full-time compensation for any hours not worked, i.e. a worker’s total
consumption equals
w(x,y)× h︸ ︷︷ ︸
paid by firm
+ replacement rate× w(x,y)× (1− h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
short-time compensation
I consolidate both policy instruments, unemployment insurance and short-time work,
into a benefit function b : R+ × [0, 1] × [z, z] 7→ R+, which maps the current or
most recent hourly wage, hours worked, and the aggregate productivity state of the
economy into the amount of benefits paid to the worker. I allow this function to
depend on the aggregate productivity state to reflect that short-time compensation
is only available in recessions.
Short-time compensation and unemployment insurance are funded through a payroll
tax that is levied on firms. I denote the tax function by τ : R+× [0, 1]× [z, z] 7→ R+,
which maps the hourly wage, hours worked, and the aggregate productivity state of
the economy into the effective tax rate. I keep the function general and allow it to
condition on the aggregate productivity state of the world.
2.4.2. Equilibrium
I now characterize the equilibrium of my economy. I denote the aggregate state of
the economy at time t by ζt = [zt, g0t (x, r), g1t (x,y, w)], which consists of aggregate
productivity state zt, the distributions of unmatched workers, g0t : X × R+ 7→ [0, 1],
and the distributions of matched workers, g1t : X ×Y ×W 7→ [0, 1]. The distribution
of unmatched workers keeps track of worker types x and their most recent full-time
compensation r. The distribution of matched workers keeps track of worker types, x,
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firm types, y, and wage contracts, w. I denote the endogenous transition distribution
function of the entire state vector ζt by Λ(ζt+1|ζt). To simplify the exposition, I drop
the subscript t hereafter. Consider the value function of a permanently unemployed
type-x worker with x ∈ {1, . . . , A− 1} ×Xg whose most recent full-time wage equals
r,
U(x, r, ζ) = max
w˜
u(b(r, 0, z), 0) (2)
+(1− p(θ(w˜,x, ζ)))βE
[
U(x′, r′, ζ ′)|h = 0,x, ζ
]
+p(θ(w˜,x, ζ))βE
[
W (x′, w˜,y0, ζ ′, h′)|h = 0,x, ζ
]
.
This unemployed worker consumes unemployment insurance benefits b(r, 0, z) and
works zero hours, resulting in flow utility u(b(r, 0, z), 0). The worker chooses which
wage contract w˜ to search for. The market tightness in each submarket is given
by θ(w˜,x, ζ). If the job search is unsuccessful, which occurs with probability
1 − p(θ(w˜,x, ζ)), the worker will remain unemployed. The worker’s state evolves
to x′ as the worker gets older and her human capital stock evolves. Also, the worker’s
most recent full-time wage may evolve to r′ to account for the possibility that unem-
ployment insurance benefits will expire. I simplify the notation by using the generic
expectation operator E to integrate over the various state variables. I provide details
in Appendix A2.1.
If the job search is successful, which occurs with probability p(θ(w˜,x, ζ)), the worker
enters the next period matched to firm y0 in wage contract w˜. In this case, the
continuation value is W (x′, w˜,y0, ζ ′, h′), where h′ refers to the firm’s hours policy
function h(x′, w˜,y0, ζ ′) that I specify below. A worker who meets a firm will always
form a match. Workers with different values of r will likely search for different wage
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contracts as they receive different amounts of unemployment insurance benefits. A
worker with more generous unemployment insurance benefits may be more willing to
search for higher wage contracts that entail a lower probability of meeting a firm.
Consider the value function of a type-x worker who works at a type-y firm in contract
w. Furthermore, suppose that the firm has set hours worked to h. The worker’s value
from working is given by
W (x, w,y, ζ, h) = max
w˜
u(w(x,y)h + b(w(x,y), h, z), h) (3)
+(1− λ(h)p(θ(w˜,x, ζ)))βE
[
(1− δ(h))W (x′, w,y′, ζ ′, h′)
+ δ(h)U(x′, r′, ζ ′)|h,x,y, ζ
]
λ(h)p(θ(w˜,x, ζ))βE
[
(1− δ(h))W (x′, w˜,y0, ζ ′, h′)
+ δ(h)U(x′, r′, ζ ′)|h = 0,x, ζ
]
.
The continuation value depends on whether the worker’s on-the-job search is
successful. The worker chooses which wage contracts w˜ to search for. The probability
that search is successful equals λ(h)p(θ(x, w˜, ζ)), where λ(h) refers to the efficiency
units of search. If search is successful, the worker will be matched to the new firm
in the subsequent period with initial match quality y0. I assume that for switchers,
general human capital evolves as if these individuals work zero hours. On the one
hand, this is a technical assumption that allows me to simplify the computation of the
equilibrium later on, because firms that post vacancies need not distinguish between
workers who are currently employed and those who are not. On the other hand, this
assumption has economic content and can be interpreted as the direct cost the worker
incurs when switching jobs.
If search is not successful, which happens with probability 1−λ(h)p(θ(x, w˜, ζ)), then
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the worker will remain matched to her current firm with probability 1 − δ(h) or
become unmatched with probability δ(h). For future reference I denote the search
policy function of the worker by s(x, w,y, ζ, h), which returns the wage contract w˜
that the worker is searching for.
Next, consider the value functions of the firm. A type-y firm’s value from employing
a type-x worker for h hours in contract w equals
J(x, w,y, ζ, h) = [f(x,y)− w(x,y)]h− τ(w(x,y), h, z) (4)
+(1− λ(h)p(θ(w˜,x, ζ)))βE [(1− δ(h))J(x′, w,y′, ζ ′, h′)|h,x,y, ζ] ,
where w˜ refers to the wage contract that worker x is searching for on-the-job, i.e.
w˜ = s(x, w,y, ζ, h). The firm’s value is the flow payoff, output minus wage bill and
tax obligations, plus the continuation value.
I have yet to define the terminal value functions for workers and firms. The value
function of an unemployed type-x worker with x ∈ {A} × Xg whose most recent
full-time wage equals r is given by
U(x, r, ζ) = u(b(r, 0, z), 0) + U(x), (5)
where the worker’s terminal value U is a function of the worker’s human capital at
the end of her working life. The value function of a type-x worker with x ∈ {A}×Xg
is of the same form,
W (x, w,y, ζ, h) = u(w(x,y)h+b(w(x,y), h, z), h) +W (x), (6)
where the worker’s terminal value W is a function of the worker’s human capital at
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the end of her working life. The employed worker receives flow utility that depends
on the wage contract, hours worked, and short-time compensation plus an expected
terminal value that depends on the worker’s general human capital and most recent
full-time wage. For the firm, I assume that the terminal value is zero, i.e. it will only
earn its flow profits in the terminal period.
J(x, w,y, ζ, h) = [f(x,y)− w(x,y)]h− τ(w(x,y), h, z). (7)
The firm chooses the hours worked h, where a choice of h = 0 denotes a (temporary)
layoff. Initially, all layoffs are temporary, but they become permanent with probability
δ(0). The hours choice is given by
h ∈ argmax
h˜∈[0,1]
J(x, w,y, ζ, h˜) s.t. W (x, w,y, ζ, h˜) ≥ W (x, w,y, ζ, 0). (8)
A solution to this equation always exists, because an hours choice of 0 gives the worker
at least the value of unemployment and thereby satisfies the constraint.
There is an infinite number of potentially entering firms. These firms can post vacan-
cies at cost χ(x) and when they do, they can target a particular type of worker x.
The firm’s value from posting a vacancy is given by
V (ζ) = max
w,x
−χ(x) + q(θ(w,x, ζ))E [J(x′,y0, w, ζ ′) | h = 0,x, ζ] , (9)
where q(θ(w,x, ζ)) is the probability that the firm meets a worker in submarket
(w,x) when the aggregate state equals ζ. For each submarket (w,x), the free-entry
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condition
χ(x) ≥ q(θ(w,x, ζ))E [J(x′,y0, w, ζ ′) | h = 0,x, ζ] (10)
holds with complementary slackness, i.e. if θ(w,x, ζ) is non-zero, then the above
condition must hold with equality.
Given that the model admits aggregate productivity shocks, my economy is non-
stationary. Since the distributions of workers across states depend on initial conditions
and the entire history of productivity shocks, I can only characterize the law of motion
for the aggregate state ζt = [zt, g0t (x, r), g1t (x,y, w)]. I do so in Appendix A2.2.
Definition (Recursive Equilibrium). A recursive equilibrium consists of an aggregate
state ζ, value functions for employed and unemployed workers, value functions for
firms, search policy functions for workers, an hours policy function for firms, and a
law of motion for the aggregate state such that (i) ζ evolves according to its law of
motion, (ii) θ satisfies the free-entry condition, (iii) value functions for the workers
and firms are satisfied, and (iv) the hours policy function solves (8).
The object ζ is very high dimensional. Therefore, computing the recursive equilibrium
directly is computationally infeasible. However, my model admits a block recursive
equilibrium.
Definition (Block Recursive Equilibrium). A block recursive equilibrium consists of
a market tightness function θ, value functions for employed and unemployed workers,
value functions for firms, search policy functions for workers, hours policy functions
for firms such that (i) all functions only depend on ζ through z, (ii) θ satisfies the
free-entry condition, (iii) value functions for the workers and firms are satisfied, and
(iv) the hours policy function solves (8).
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A block recursive equilibrium is a recursive equilibrium in which all value functions
and policy functions only depend on the aggregate state of the world, not the distri-
butions of workers across firms.
Proposition (Existence, Uniqueness, Block Recursiveness). There exists a unique
recursive equilibrium. This equilibrium is block recursive.
The proof of this proposition closely follows Menzio et al. (2016). Existence and
uniqueness follow from backward induction. I can compute the worker’s and firm’s
value and policy functions in the terminal period using (6), (7), and (8). For each
of these three equations, there exists a unique solution. Whenever the worker or
the firm are indifferent between different values for hours worked, h, I break this
indifference by choosing the outcome with the largest value of h.32 With the value and
policy functions for the terminal period in hand, I can compute the market tightness
of submarkets that target workers of age A − 1 using (10). Again, existence and
uniqueness are guaranteed. With the market tightness in hand, I compute the value
function for a worker age A−1 using (2) and (3). As a byproduct, this step also yields
workers’ search policy functions. Similarly, I can compute the firm’s value function
using (4). Again, to each of these equations, there exists a unique solution. Iterating
backwards establishes the existence and uniqueness result for all a = A,A− 1, . . . , 1.
The fact that the resulting equilibrium is block-recursive can also be shown by back-
ward induction. Take a worker age A— regardless of whether this worker is employed
or unemployed — her value functions do not depend on the aggregate state of the
economy. The same holds for a firm that employs a worker age A. Next, consider
a worker age A − 1. This worker needs to decide in which submarket to search for
a job. The market tightness of each submarket is pinned down by the free-entry
32For instance, if the firm is indifferent between employing a worker or laying the worker off, this
assumption implies that the firm keeps the worker employed.
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condition (9). The firm’s expected value from posting the vacancy only depends on
aggregate productivity z and the market tightness θ, not the entire vector ζ. There-
fore, the market tightness θ can only be a function of z. Consequently, the workers
value and policy functions are only functions of z not the entire vector ζ. Iterating
backwards establishes the result for all a = A,A− 1, . . . , 1. This result is important,
because it permits me to compute the equilibrium of the model without having to keep
track of the evolution of the entire vector ζ. Therefore, despite featuring aggregate
dynamics and rich amounts of worker-level heterogeneity, the model is very tractable
and its equilibrium can be computed quickly.
2.4.3. Implications
I assumed that the firm chooses working hours (8) unilaterally. The main reason for a
firm to reduce a worker’s hours is when the cost of employing the worker exceeds the
benefits from doing so. The firm will not necessarily reduce the hours all the way to
zero for two reasons. First, the firm needs to ensure that the worker’s participation
constraint is satisfied, i.e. that the worker receives at least as high a value from
employment as from unemployment. Second, there are dynamic considerations that
may prevent the firm from cutting hours all the way to zero. These involve the
potential loss of human capital as well as increasing the likelihood that the worker
will switch to a different firm while working reduced hours.
In Figure 7, I show the worker’s value from working h hours in an environment with
and without short-time compensation. The dashed line shows the worker’s outside
option. Short-time compensation pushes the value function upward for all values
h < 1. In the graph, a worker would not be willing to work half her regular hours,
h = 0.5, without short-time compensation. This worker would rather be unemployed.
With short-time compensation, the worker would be willing to work half her regular
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hours, because the additional compensation, pushes her value function above the
outside option.
In Figure 8, I decompose the firm’s value function from employing a worker into
the firm’s flow profits and continuation values as a function of the magnitude of the
productivity shock and hours worked. In the left panel, I show the flow value from
employing a worker at h hours as a function of the magnitude of the productivity
shock, ym. Since I assumed that firm’s output is a linear function in hours, when
hourly output is larger than the hourly wage, the firm maximizes its flow profits by
setting h to as large a number as possible. When hourly output is less than the hourly
wage, the firm maximizes flow profits by setting h to as small a number as possible.
When hourly output is less than the hourly wage, the firm maximizes flow profits by
setting h to as small a number as possible. Therefore, the firm’s flow profits rotate
around the point where hourly output equals the hourly wage. If the firm only cared
about flow profits, workers would either be laid off and work zero hours or workers
would work full-time. There would be no interior solution. However, the firm also
cares about its continuation value with the worker. The continuation value is shown
in the middle panel of Figure 8. The continuation value is an increasing function
in the magnitude of productivity (strictly increasing when productivity is persistent
with yp > 0) and working more hours shifts the continuation value upwards. The
upward shift happens for two reasons: First, human capital accumulation is faster
when a worker works more hours. Second, a worker who works more hours is less
efficient at search and therefore less likely to switch to a different firm. The right
panel of Figure 8 shows the firm’s value function from employing a worker — i.e. the
sum of the left and the middle panel. In the example, there are some realizations of
ym, for which the firm is only willing to employ the worker at reduced hours. The
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role of short-time compensation is then to ensure that the worker is willing to work
reduced hours as illustrated in Figure 7.
Worker’s Value From Working
0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Hours (h)
Va
lu
e
without STC with STC
Figure 7: Worker’s Value from Working
Note: The graph shows the worker’s value from working h hours in an environment with short-time
compensation and in an environment without. Short-time compensation pushes the value function
upward for all values h < 1.
What makes reducing working hours attractive from the perspective of the firm?
One of the key factors that make short-time work an attractive option for firms
and workers is that productivity shocks differ in expected durations. In Figure 9,
I illustrate how the firm’s employment policy function depends on the magnitude
and persistence of the productivity shock. The left panel refers to an environment
without short-time compensation — i.e. firms can reduce their workers’ hours, but
this is not subsidized — and the right panel refers to an environment with short-time
compensation. The magnitude of productivity shocks is plotted along the x-axis, the
persistence along the y-axis. Realizations of ym and yp in the top-left corners of both
panels are objectively bad. Productivity is low and persistent. Realizations of ym
and yp in the top-right corners are objectively good, because productivity is high and
persistent. Realizations of productivity in the bottom-left corner are low in magnitude
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Figure 8: Firm’s Choice of Hours
Note: The graphs show the firm’s flow value, the firm’s expected value in the subsequent period,
and the sum of the two as a function of today’s magnitude of the productivity shock from employing
a worker at different levels of working hours h1, h2, and h3. When hourly output is larger than the
hourly wage, the firm maximizes flow profits by setting h to as large a number as possible. When
hourly output is less than the hourly wage, the firm maximizes flow profits by setting h to as small
a number as possible. But hours also have dynamic implications as they affect the evolution of
human capital and the likelihood that the worker and firm will not separate. The firm’s expected
value of being matched with this worker in the subsequent period is increasing in the hours worked
today. Combining both flows and expected values, the graph on the right-hand side shows that there
may be realizations of ym for which the firm is willing to continue only if it is possible for the firm
to reduce working hours. The firm’s ability to reduce a worker’s hours depends on the amount of
short-time compensation the worker receives.
57
and transitory; realizations in the bottom-right corner are high in magnitude and
transitory.
The graph shows how the firm’s policy function varies in the magnitude and persis-
tence of productivity. For realizations in the top-left corner, workers are laid off
with and without short-time compensation. For realizations in the top-right corner,
workers work full-time with and without short-time compensation. For realizations
that are relatively transitory, short-time work is used when reduced hours are subsi-
dized. For a given level of persistence, firms are more likely to use short-time work,
when the magnitude of productivity declines. Comparing the two panels illustrates
the effect of short-time compensation on employment. Some short-time workers would
have been laid off without short-time compensation, while some short-time workers
would have worked full-time without short-time compensation.
In addition, the take-up of short-time work depends on the following: (i) the expected
productivity of the worker after the short-time spell, which depends on the worker’s
current levels of general and specific human capital and the speed at which the worker
accumulates or loses human capital while working reduced hours; (ii) the likelihood
that a worker switches firms while working reduced hours. This likelihood is affected
by the job finding probability of the worker, which in turn depends on the worker’s
general human capital and the worker’s age; (iii) the age of the worker, which affects
the duration of potential employment after the short-time spell.
I summarize the main trade-offs in the model in Figure 10.
The model I introduce exhibits some severe inefficiencies. First, by imposing the
restriction that wages cannot be renegotiated in response to a temporary shock, I
force workers and firms to separate even if it was in both parties best interest to stay
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Figure 9: Firm’s Policy Function as a Function of ym and yp
Note: The graphs show the firm’s policy function — which includes full-time, short-time, or a layoff
— as a function of the magnitude ym and persistence yp of the productivity shock. The graph on
the left shows the firm’s policy function in a policy environment without short-time compensation
(i.e. the generosity of benefits equals zero). The graph on the right shows the firm’s policy in a
policy environment with short-time compensation.
Full-Time Work
produce output
human capital ↑
keep contact ∼
leisure ↓
time to search ↓
Short-Time Work
some benefits/output
human capital ∼
keep contact ∼
leisure ∼
time to search ∼
Unemployment
receive benefits
human capital ↓
keep contact ↓
leisure ↑
time to search ↑
Figure 10: Main Trade-offs in the Model
Note: The above illustrates the main trade-offs associated with full-time employment, short-time
work, and (temporary) unemployment.
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matched, albeit at a different wage. Second, workers are risk-averse. This introduces a
need for unemployment insurance, which in turn results in a fiscal externality. Short-
time work makes it easier for workers and firms to renegotiate contracts by adjusting
hours. When it reduces unemployment, it reduces the fiscal externality caused by
the unemployment insurance system. However, there is no guarantee that short-time
work is welfare improving in this setup. First, short-time work by itself creates a
fiscal externality. Second, short-time work distorts the firm’s choice of hours.
2.5. Estimation
2.5.1. Parametric Assumptions
A period in the model corresponds to one month. I choose a discount factor of 0.95 112
that corresponds to a 5% annual interest rate. I assume that preferences are given by
u(c, h) = c
1−γc
1− γc − v(h),
where v(·) is a strictly increasing function. I fix the coefficient of relative risk aversion
at γc = 2. I specify the production function as
f(x,y)× h = xgysymh.
This production function nests a host of different assumptions. First, the produc-
tion function states that general and firm-specific human capital are complements in
production. Second, the production function is linear in hours. There is conflicting
evidence on whether output is a concave or convex function of an individual worker’s
hours.33 I choose the middle ground. Third, I assume that the different types of
33For different findings on the nexus between productivity and hours worked, see for instance
Feldstein (1967), Craine (1973), Leslie and Wise (1980), Shapiro (1986), Hart and McGregor (1988),
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human capital and that the magnitude of match-specific productivity ym enter the
production function multiplicatively.
The aggregate productivity state of the world is a two-state Markov process with z
corresponding to recessions and z to times of normal economic activity. The tran-
sition probabilities are estimated using recessionary periods in German GDP data.
The probability of entering a recession is estimated to be 0.0156, which corresponds
to an average duration between recessions of approximately 5 years. The proba-
bility of moving from a recession into normal times is estimated to be 0.1125, which
corresponds to an average duration of recessions of about 9 months.
The magnitude of match productivity ym is drawn from a normal distribution that
depends on the aggregate state. I denote the location and scale parameter of this
distribution by µym|z and σym|z for z ∈ {z, z}. I discretize Ym into 51 equidistant
points on the interval [0, 1]. I introduce persistence into the match productivity
shocks by having worker-firm matches draw a new match productivity shock with
probability yp(z). With probability 1− yp(z), match productivity remains the same.
I estimate the two parameters yp(z) and yp(z).
I model workers’ general human capital xg and firm-specific human capital ys as
ladders, each with 5 rungs on the interval [1, 2]. I estimate a curvature parameter
for both ladders that governs the extent to which lower rungs are further apart than
upper rungs. I assume that the initial value of xg at birth corresponds to the lowest
rung of the general human capital grid. The initial value of firm-specific human
capital is assumed to be equal to the lowest rung of the specific human capital grid.
While employed, workers climb up one rung on the general- and firm-specific human
Anxo and Bigsten (1989), Hanna et al. (2005), Bourlès and Cette (2007), Goldin (2014), Garnero
et al. (2014), Lee and Lim (2014), and Pencavel (2015).
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capital ladders with probabilities pˆixg and pˆiys , respectively. They stay at their current
levels with probabilities 1 − pˆixg and 1 − pˆiys . While unemployed, workers fall down
one rung on the general human capital ladders with probability pˇixg . Workers stay at
their current levels with probability 1− pˇixg .
Working hours can take on five possible values {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0}, where 1.0 corre-
sponds to full-time employment. I parameterize the disutility from labor as a piece-
wise linear function on the grid above. I allow the vacancy costs to vary in the worker’s
general human capital. I estimate a piece-wise linear function of the vacancy costs to
reduce the number of model parameters. I directly estimate the parameter for exoge-
nous separations δ(0) and assume that δ(h) = 0 for h > 0. I also directly estimate
the parameter for the search efficiency for employed workers, λ(h). I assume that
λ(0) = 1, and estimate λ(h) directly, where I assume that λ(h) is equal to constant
for h > 0.
I parameterize the matching function as
p(θ) = θ
(1 + θω)
1
ω
,
where ω is a parameter that I estimate. The probability that a firm meets a worker
is therefore given by
q(θ) = 1
(1 + θω)
1
ω
.
Thus far, I have imposed no restrictions on the wage contracts that firms post other
than that contracts are functions of xg and ys only. To solve the model, I need to
impose some parametric restrictions on the wage contracts that firms post. I restrict
all wage contracts to be linear piece rates in general human capital xg and firm-specific
human capital ys, where firms are free to choose the piece rate.
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As I outlined in Section 2.2, there were several policy changes to short-time work in
early 2009. I do not want to model each of these changes separately. Since I already
see some take-up in the data before the expansion (see Figure 3), I simplify matters
by making short-time compensation available beginning in October 2008. I model
the availability of short-time work in October 2008 as a surprise, but assume that
short-time work will be available in all recessions afterwards. I set the generosity of
short-time compensation to 60% and the payroll tax relief to 50%. I do not limit the
duration of short-time work, as this will not turn out to be a binding constraint.
For the government policy functions b and τ , I use the following parameterizations.
For the benefit function, I use a 60% replacement rate for both unemployment insur-
ance benefits and short-time compensation. Short-time compensation is only paid
when the aggregate productivity state of the economy is z. The resulting benefit
function is given by
b(r, h, z) =

0.60× r if h = 0 (unemployment)
0.60× r × (1− h) if 0 < h < 1 and z = z (short-time)
0 if 0 < h < 1 and z = z
0 if h = 1.
(11)
When hours equal zero, i.e. when the worker is temporarily laid off, tax obligations
equal zero. Under short-time work, the firm has to pay a 40% payroll tax on the actual
compensation of the worker and a 20% payroll tax on hours not worked. Without
short-time work, the firm has to pay a 40% payroll tax on the worker’s full-time salary
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regardless of actual hours worked. The resulting tax function is given by
τ(r, h, z) =

0 if h = 0 (unemployment)
0.40× h× r + 0.20× (1− h)× r if 0 < h < 1 and z = z (tax relief)
0.40× r if 0 < h < 1 and z = z (no relief)
0.40× r if h = 1.
(12)
2.5.2. Simulation, Identification, and Estimation
I estimate the model using indirect inference. For a given vector of model parameters,
I simulate data from the model and fit the same set of auxiliary models to both the
simulated and the real data. I then search for the vector of model parameters that
minimizes the distance between the estimates from the auxiliary models from the
simulated and the real data.
For the estimation of the model, I restrict my data to men between the ages of 26
and 59. By focusing on men, I can abstract from labor force participation decisions.
The age restriction permits me to abstract from schooling and retirement decisions.
I further exclude observations that belong to individuals who have not worked a full-
time job in the previous 24 months, because I consider these individuals as being out
of the labor force.
I simulate data from the model by taking the realization of the aggregate state of the
economy as given. I then start the economy in 1960 and forward simulate employment
biographies. Workers who retire are immediately replaced by young workers. In my
simulated dataset, I replicate some of the idiosyncrasies of my real data. I cap earnings
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at the social security threshold and I classify 15% of short-time workers as full-time
employed to replicate the extent of misclassification in the real data.
The model has too many latent structures to provide a constructive identification
argument of the various primitives. Instead, I will provide heuristic identification
arguments for the various model features.
To separately identify the accumulation and depreciation processes for general and
specific human capital, I rely on an identification argument similar to that in Flinn
et al. (2017). General and firm-specific human capital have similar implications for
wage growth but opposite implications for job-to-job transitions. A worker who is
rich in general human capital and poor in firm-specific human capital is more likely
to switch jobs than a worker who is rich in specific but poor in general human capital.
Therefore, I target both wage growth and transition rates as a function of age, expe-
rience, and tenure. Among the transition rates I consider transitions from full-time
work to unemployment and from full-time work to short-time work. To pin down
the extent of general human capital loss during unemployment spells, I include as
an auxiliary model, mean re-employment wages as a function of the duration of the
unemployment spell. In addition, I use a set of standard Mincer regressions as an
auxiliary model to ensure that the model-generated wage process is consistent with
the basic life-cycle properties of earnings.
The duration of short-time work is informative about the persistence of match produc-
tivity during recessions. I use transitions from full-time work into short-time work at
the onset of the recession to pin down the persistence of match productivity during
times of normal economic activity. The distributions of the magnitude of match
productivity can only be inferred indirectly, because I do not observe data on firms’
profits. The initial level of match productivity for new hires critically affects how
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many vacancies firms post during good and bad times, which in turn affects the job
finding probabilities. I therefore target the job finding rates by year and by expe-
rience, tenure, and age. Also, the distribution of match productivity for ongoing
matches is critical for the firm’s decision to lay workers off. I therefore target job to
unemployment transitions by year and by experience, tenure, and age.
The remaining set of parameters includes the relative efficiency of on-the-job search,
the elasticity of the matching function, and the vacancy posting costs. To identify
these parameters, I add one additional data source on the number of vacancies posted.
These data are collected by the Federal Employment Agency and are available at a
monthly frequency. I match the average ratio of unemployed workers to vacancies
posted. I then jointly pin down these parameters by targeting the transition rates
from unemployment into full-time employment by worker’s experience, and age, as
well as job-to-job transitions by worker’s experience, tenure, and age. I pin down
the exogenous job destruction rate δ(0) by targeting the recall rate. I capture the
disutility of work by targeting the distribution of hours worked by short-time workers.
I denote the vector of model parameters by Θ. I collect all of the model-simulated
moments into the vector Gˆ(Θ) and the data moments into the vector G. I then
minimize the objective function
[Gˆ(Θ)−G]′W [Gˆ(Θ)−G],
where W is a diagonal weight matrix. As weights, I use the inverse of the variance of
the data moments. For each evaluation of the objective function, I simulate M = 30
samples, each with the labor market histories of 50, 000 individuals.
The objective function is non-smooth, because in my simulated data, a finite number
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of individuals make discrete choices. I therefore slightly modify the model to smooth
some of the discrete decisions that firms and workers make in the model. The details
of this are relegated to Appendix A2. I then optimize the objective function using the
commercial optimizer MIDACO (Schlueter et al., 2009), which is a general-purpose
ant colony optimization algorithm that is well equipped to handle non-smooth prob-
lems and can easily be parallelized.
I obtain standard errors following Gourieroux et al. (1993). The asymptotic variance
of Θ is given by
1 +M
M
∂Gˆ(Θ)
∂Θ
′
W
∂Gˆ(Θ)
∂Θ
−1 ,
where ∂Gˆ(Θ)
∂Θ is a matrix containing the derivatives of each of the model moments with
respect to each of the model parameters. The challenge in computing the derivatives of
the simulated data moments is that these are not smooth functions in the parameter
vector. I compute the derivatives of my simulated data moments with respect to
the estimated parameter values by approximating the simulated moments with a
cubic spline. I then compute the derivative of the spline evaluated at my estimated
parameter values.
2.5.3. Estimated Parameters and Model Fit
I report the estimated parameters and their standard errors in Table 6. Some of the
model parameters can be easily interpreted and I will discuss them now in turn. The
persistence of productivity shocks in recessions is estimated at 0.67. The point esti-
mate implies that during recessions, workers draw a new productivity shock approx-
imately every four months, which is roughly in line with the average duration of a
short-time spell of approximately four months. During normal economic times, the
point estimate of persistence is 0.975, which implies that workers draw new produc-
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Estimates Standard Errors
Persistence of shocks: Low 0.671 0.004
Persistence of shocks: High 0.975 0.002
Accumulate ys 0.019 0.003
Curvature ys 0.744 0.007
Depreciate xg 0.110 0.013
Accumulate xg 0.017 0.002
Curvature xg 0.548 0.002
Mean ym for z = z 1.122 0.003
Std Dev ym for z = z 0.585 0.022
Mean ym for z = z 1.315 0.003
Std Dev ym for z = z 0.041 0.001
Share of low persistence shocks when z = z 0.976 0.004
Disutility v1 0.546 0.006
Disutility v2 0.559 0.008
Disutility v3 0.867 0.004
Vacancy cost χ1 0.259 0.017
Vacancy cost χ2 0.284 0.016
Vacancy cost χ3 0.572 0.016
Vacancy cost χ4 1.580 0.019
Matching function elasticity ω 0.371 0.002
Exogenous separations δ(0) 0.469 0.003
Relative efficiency of on-the-job search 0.346 0.004
Initial mean ym for z = z 1.466 0.004
Initial mean ym for z = z 1.373 0.003
Table 6: Model Estimates
Note: The model parameters are estimated using indirect inference. Standard errors are computed
as in Gourieroux et al. (1993), which accounts for the additional noise resulting from the simulation.
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tivity shocks approximately every three years.
The estimated parameters that govern the accumulation and depreciation of human
capital indicate that specific human capital is accumulated at about the same rate
as general human capital. Also, the curvature parameter for specific-human capital
is greater than that for general human capital, rendering the returns to the former
larger. During unemployment, general human capital is lost at about five times the
rate at which it is accumulated during full-time employment.
The point estimate for the mean of the magnitude of match-specific productivity
shocks is 1.12 during recessions and 1.32 during normal economic times. The associ-
ated variances are an order of magnitude larger in recessions than in normal economic
times (0.59 vs. 0.04). The estimates of the disutility from working result in a func-
tion that is concave in hours worked. Posting vacancies targeting the lowest levels of
general human capital is fairly cheap. It corresponds to 0.26 times an inexperienced
worker’s monthly salary. Posting vacancies targeted at worker’s with the highest level
of human capital is fairly expensive with a point estimate of 1.58 times an inexperi-
enced worker’s monthly salary. The probability that a worker who is temporarily laid
off loses contact with her previous employer is 0.47. A laid off worker loses contact
with her previous employer after an average of about two months. An employed
full-time worker’s search efficiency is 0.35 relative to 1.0 for unemployed workers.
Overall, the model fits the data well. In the left panel of Figure 11, I show that the
model captures the aggregate evolution of the short-time rate and the unemployment
rate well. The model captures both the exorbitant rise of short-time take-up in 2009
as well as its decline in 2009 and thereafter. The estimated model implies that workers
do not work reduced hours during normal times when no government funded short-
time compensation is available. The model also captures the modest increase in the
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Figure 11: Model Fit — Employment
Note: The left graph compares the aggregate short-time and unemployment rates implied by the
model to the actual rates observed in the data. The right graph does the same for the short-time
and unemployment rates broken down by experience. The graph on the right refers to 2009 only.
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unemployment rate during the recession and its subsequent decline. The right panel
of Figure 11 shows that the model can also capture short-time and unemployment
rates broken down by experience. The graphs shown refer to the year of 2009 only.
In particular, the model captures that the short-time rate is steeply increasing in
experience while the unemployment rate is steeply decreasing in experience.
I relegate all additional figures and tables that show the model fit to Appendix A2.
In Figure 37, I show the model fit of wage growth on- and off-the-job. For the wage
growth on-the-job, I annualize the monthly growth rate as a function of experience
and tenure. The model captures the decrease of wage growth exactly. For wage
growth off-the-job, I annualize the growth rate between two employment spells with
an intervening unemployment spell. The model matches the data very well.
In Table 20, I show some additional moments. The recall rate implied by the model,
i.e. the share of transitions from unemployment to full-time employment, for which a
worker is returning to a previous employer is 0.13 in the model and 0.14 in the data.
The model gets the duration of short-time work approximately right. The model
slightly overstates the reduction in hours implied by short-time work, which is 0.27
in the data and 0.34 in the model.
In Figure 38, I show the model fit for transitions from full-time work into short-time
work, full-time work with a different firm, and unemployment. Again, the model fits
these transitions very well as a function of experience and tenure.
In Figure 39, I show the model fit for the unconditional experience and tenure distri-
butions implied by the model. I fit these reasonably well, which means that the
model is suitable for studying aggregate welfare implications when investigate how
short-time work affects different groups of the population.
71
2.6. Results
In this section, I use my estimated model to investigate what effect short-time work
has on employment and welfare. I compare outcomes in my estimated model to the
counterfactual economy in which the generosity of short-time compensation equals
zero and there is no payroll tax relief for firms that employ workers at reduced hours.
In the counterfactual economy, the benefits function equals
b˜(r, h, z) =

0.60× r if h = 0 (unemployment)
0 otherwise.
and the tax function equals
τ˜(r, h, z) =

0 if h = 0 (unemployment)
0.40× r otherwise.
I use the following terminology. A worker who works reduced hours will be referred to
as a short-time worker regardless of whether she receives compensation for the reduced
income. I refer to the government transfer and the payroll tax relief collectively as
short-time compensation.
Effects on Aggregate Employment
I first consider the aggregate impact on employment. In Figure 12, I plot the evolution
of the short-time and unemployment rates with and without short-time compensation.
Without short-time compensation, the unemployment rate in 2009 is 7.1% instead of
5.8%. This means that a short-time rate of 6.0% translates into a reduction of the
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unemployment rate of 1.3 percentage points. That means that one in five short-time
workers would have been unemployed in 2009 without short-time compensation. The
unemployment rate in 2010 is 6.3% instead of 5.5% and the unemployment rate in
2011 is 3.9% instead of 4.1%.
In Table 7, I show the evolution of job destruction, job finding, and recall rates.
According to the model estimates, monthly job destruction rates in 2009 equal
0.015 without short-time compensation instead of 0.011 with short-time compen-
sation. Average job finding rates modestly decrease with short-time compensation.
Monthly job finding rates in 2009 are equal to 0.175 with short-time compensation
instead of 0.177. Without short-time compensation, firms and workers may resort
to more temporary layoffs, allowing the worker to temporarily receive unemployment
insurance benefits and then be recalled. In Table 7, I report recall rates for both
economies.34 In 2009, the economy with short-time compensation has a considerably
lower recall rate (5.3%) than the economy without short-time compensation (8.5%).
My model permits me to break down the aggregate employment effect of short-time
compensation by worker types. In Figure 13, I show the counterfactual employment
state for each short-time worker in the data, broken down by experience and tenure.
Proportionally, the number of jobs saved is largest for individuals with little experi-
ence and tenure. Among the group of most experienced workers, about 40% would
have continued to work full-time with no reduction in hours. About 45% would have
worked reduced hours without compensation for foregone earnings. The remaining
15% would have been laid off. Even though short-time work is highest for more expe-
rienced and tenured workers, job savings are predominantly coming from workers with
34I define the recall rate as the ratio of the number of transitions from unemployment to full-time
work where a worker returns to her previous employer over the total number of transitions from
unemployment to full-time work.
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Figure 12: Counterfactual — Aggregate Employment
Note: The graph on the left shows the counterfactual short-time rate if short-time compensation
had been equal to zero. Counterfactual short-time take-up refers to workers working reduced hours
without any additional compensation. The graph on the right shows the evolution of the unemploy-
ment rate if short-time compensation had been equal to zero.
Job Destruction Rate Job Finding Rate Recall Rate
with STC without STC with STC without STC with STC without STC
2008 0.012 0.012 0.175 0.178 0.132 0.139
2009 0.011 0.015 0.175 0.177 0.053 0.085
2010 0.007 0.008 0.175 0.172 0.098 0.111
2011 0.006 0.007 0.193 0.190 0.149 0.143
2012 0.006 0.006 0.199 0.196 0.175 0.176
2013 0.006 0.006 0.194 0.193 0.178 0.174
2014 0.006 0.006 0.202 0.198 0.175 0.172
Table 7: Counterfactual — Job Destruction Rates, Job Finding Rates, and Recall
Rates
Note: The table shows the monthly job destruction, job finding, and recall rates as implied by the
estimated model with short-time compensation and from the counterfactual model without short-
time compensation. The recall rate is defined as the number of transitions when an unemployed
worker returns to full-time work with her previous employer divided by the total number of transi-
tions from unemployment to full-time employment.
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Figure 13: Counterfactual — Employment of Short-Time Workers Without Short-
Time Compensation by Experience and Tenure
Note: The graphs show what would have happened to short-time workers if the generosity of short-
time compensation is equal to zero. The graph on the left breaks the counterfactual employment
state down by short-time workers’ experience, the graph on the right by short-time workers’ tenure.
Effects on Worker’s Evolution of Employment and Earnings
Next, I consider the impact of short-time work on the future evolution of employment
and earnings. Figure 14 shows the evolution of full-time employment for workers who
initially transition into short-time work after at least six months of tenure in their
current job. The graph shows the share of these workers in full-time employment as
a function of time since the beginning of the short-time spell. Time is measured in
months.
The left panel of Figure 14 shows the factual and counterfactual full-time employ-
ment paths for a worker who transitioned into short-time work at time zero in the
estimated model, but would have remained in full-time employment in the counter-
factual without short-time compensation. Short-time work does not have a lasting
impact on the evolution of employment in the long-run. After approximately 10
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months, the employment paths are identical. However, short-time work reduces full-
time employment temporarily. The middle panel shows the counterfactual full-time
employment path of a short-time worker who would have worked reduced hours in
the counterfactual environment without short-time compensation. For this worker,
the full-time employment paths hardly differ between the factual and counterfactual
environments. The right panel shows the factual and counterfactual full-time employ-
ment paths for a short-time worker who would have been laid off without short-time
compensation. These are the jobs that were truly saved by short-time compensation.
Again, the full-time employment paths are remarkably similar. This means that
workers who lose their job due to the absence of short-time compensation are workers
who have relatively high job finding rates and will not be unemployed for very long.
The reason that the job finding rates for these workers is high can be attributed to
their age, experience, and the possibility of recall.
Figure 15 shows the evolution of earnings for workers who initially transition into
short-time work after at least six months of tenure in their current job. The graph
shows earnings as a function of time since the beginning of the short-time spell.
The left panel of Figure 15 shows the factual and counterfactual earnings paths for a
worker who transitioned into short-time work in the estimated model, but would have
remained in full-time employment without short-time compensation. After approxi-
mately 10 months, the evolutions of earnings are identical. Short-time work reduces
earnings temporarily, because it allows firms to reduce their workers’ pay. The middle
panel shows the factual and counterfactual earnings paths of a short-time worker
who would have worked reduced hours at time zero in the counterfactual environ-
ment without short-time compensation. For this worker, the earnings paths hardly
differ between the factual and counterfactual environments. The right panel shows
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the counterfactual earnings path for a short-time worker at time zero who would
have been laid off without short-time compensation. For these workers, short-time
compensation does in fact have a substantial effect on earnings that only disappears
after about three years. Even though full-time employment recovers quickly for these
workers (as shown in the right panel of Figure 14), earnings do not. However, this
effect on earnings is not all that large compared to the extensive literature that finds
that unemployment results in long-term earnings losses (e.g. Jacobson et al. (1993)
or Davis and von Wachter (2011)).
Welfare Effects
Next, I consider the effects of short-time work on workers’ welfare, firms’ profits, and
the government budget. To measure the welfare effect, I simulate data from both the
estimated model and the counterfactual economy without short-time compensation.
I then compare each individual worker’s flow utilities between the two environments
and express the differences in terms of consumption equivalents. I take the sum of
discounted consumption equivalents to quantify the impact on workers’ welfare. To
measure the effect on firm profits, I compute the sum of discounted firm flow profits
under the two alternative environments. To measure the impact on the government
budget, I compute the sum of discounted tax revenues minus government expenditures
on unemployment insurance and short-time compensation. To measure the effect on
output I compute the sum of discounted flow output minus spending on vacancy
creation. Table 8 shows the results broken down by year. All quantities constitute
annual averages per worker and are measured in Euros.
Workers benefit from short-time compensation throughout. In 2008, short-time
compensation results in an average increase in worker welfare measured in consump-
tion equivalents of EUR 22. In 2009, this figure rises to EUR 352, and drops in subse-
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Figure 14: Counterfactual — Evolution of Employment of Short-Time Workers
Note: The graphs show the evolution of full-time employment of workers who initially transition
into short-time work at time zero in the estimated model. The graphs are broken down by the
counterfactual employment state of short-time workers.
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Figure 15: Counterfactual — Evolution of Earnings of Short-Time Workers
Note: The graphs show the evolution of earnings of workers who initially transition into short-
time work at time zero in the estimated model. The graphs are broken down by the counterfactual
employment state of short-time workers.
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quent years. The government budget initially declines due to additional expenses for
short-time compensation. The average cost of short-time work is EUR 141 per worker
in 2009. In subsequent years, short-time work has a positive impact on the govern-
ment budget, because workers are employed in better paying jobs and pay higher
taxes. Firms’ profits decline throughout due to short-time compensation. This can
be attributed to the fact that short-time compensation affects workers’ reservation
wages, i.e. workers search for better paying jobs. Firms’ spending on vacancy costs
decreases substantially in 2009 and 2010. Overall, while short-time compensation
results in a welfare loss per worker of EUR 105 in 2008, it results in a welfare gain of
EUR 229 in 2009, and a welfare gain of EUR 445 in 2010.
∆ Welfare ∆ Government ∆ Profits ∆ Vacancy Costs ∆ Total
2008 22 -39 0 89 -105
2009 352 -141 -55 -73 229
2010 256 69 -81 -201 445
2011 72 52 -25 -20 120
2012 36 32 -17 -1 53
Table 8: Welfare Results
Note: The table shows the effect of short-time compensation on workers’ welfare, consumption,
government expenditure, firms’ profits, vacancy costs, and output. All quantities are measured in
Euros. The average monthly salary in my data is about EUR 2, 700.
The Role of the Payroll Tax Relief
Thus far, I have considered the combined policy of providing short-time compensation
to workers and a payroll tax relief to firms. I now use my model to show what
happens to employment when the government varies the magnitude of the payroll
tax relief, while keeping the replacement rate of short-time compensation unchanged.
In Table 9, I show the effect of varying the payroll tax relief on short-time work
take-up and unemployment. Short-time work take-up decreases from 6.0% to 4.4%
under a 25% payroll tax relief and to 3.1% with no tax relief. Therefore, the payroll
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Short-Time Rate Unemployment Rate
50% tax relief 25% tax relief no tax relief 50% tax relief 25% tax relief no tax relief
2009 0.060 0.044 0.031 0.058 0.061 0.057
2010 0.034 0.027 0.022 0.054 0.056 0.058
2011 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.039 0.039 0.041
2012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.034 0.036
Table 9: Employment under Varying Degrees of Payroll Tax Relief
Note: The table shows the short-time rate and unemployment rate for different values of the payroll
tax relief. For my estimated model, the payroll tax relief is set to 50%. The payroll tax relief affects
short-time take-up substantially but has little effect on the unemployment rate.
tax relief accounts for about half the take-up of short-time work in 2009. While the
payroll tax relief has a substantial impact on short-time take-up, it does not appear
to affect the unemployment rate, which is approximately the same under the varying
degrees of tax relief.
2.7. Normative Implications
In this section, I ask what combination of unemployment insurance benefits and
short-time compensation maximizes welfare and ought to be implemented by the
government. I solve the government’s problem, i.e. I maximize welfare subject to a
government budget constraint.
My model is non-stationary and does not admit a stationary distribution, which
means I cannot simply cast the government’s problem as maximizing steady state
welfare. I choose the distribution of workers in January 2009 of the estimated model as
the initial distribution for my optimal policy exercise. I cast the government’s problem
very narrowly. I ask if the German government could have made workers better off
during and in the aftermath of the recession between 2008 and 2010 by changing the
generosity of unemployment insurance benefits and short-time compensation during
the recession. I keep government policy before and after the recession unchanged. In
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my model, workers cannot save. I do not want to overstate the government’s role
in helping workers borrow and save (through taxation in good times and tax breaks
or subsidies in bad times). Therefore, I require the government to run a balanced
budget during the recession. The government balances its budget by adjusting the
payroll taxes accordingly.
The government chooses the generosity of short-time compensation, the generosity of
unemployment insurance benefits and the payroll tax. I keep the payroll tax relief
fixed at 50%. These policies only apply to the recession between 2009 and 2010. I
denote the government’s policy functions during the recession by b∗ and τ ∗. Before
2009 and after 2010, the government’s policies are described by (11) and (12) and
denoted by b and τ .
The government uses a utilitarian welfare function with equal weight on each worker.
The per-period welfare function as a function of the aggregate state ζ and the govern-
ment’s policy functions is given by
S(ζ, b, τ) = g0t (x, r)u(b(r, 0, z), 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unmatched workers
+ g1t (x,y, w)u(w(x,y)h+ b(w(x,y), h, z), h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Matched workers
The government’s per-period budget is given by
B(ζ, b, τ) = g0t (x, r)− b(r, 0, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unmatched workers
+ g1t (x,y, w)[τ(w(x,y), h, z)− b(w(x,y), h, z)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Matched workers
The government solves
max
b∗,τ∗
t0+23∑
t=t0
∫
S(ζ, b∗, τ ∗)dΛ∗(ζt|ζt−1; b∗, τ ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
During recession
+
∞∑
t=t0+24
∫
S(ζ, b, τ)dΛ(ζt|ζt−1; b, τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
After recession
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subject to
t0+23∑
t=t0
∫
B(ζ, b∗, τ ∗)dΛ∗(ζt|ζt−1; b∗, τ ∗) ≥ B0.
where Λ∗ is the transition function of the aggregate state during the recession for the
actual realizations of zt and t0 refers to January 2009. I omit the arguments in the
hours policy function to simplify the notation, but note that h = h(x,w, y, ζ). The
government’s budget is given by B0, which corresponds to the government expenditure
on short-time compensation and unemployment insurance benefits in the estimated
model during the recession. I assume that the government can borrow and save at
the interest rate 1
β
− 1.
I parameterize the benefit function b∗ using two parameters b1 and b2 to denote the
replacement rate of unemployment insurance benefits and short-time compensation,
respectively.
b∗(r, h, z) =

b1 × r if h = 0 (unemployment)
b2 × r × (1− h) if 0 < h < 1 and z = z (short-time)
0 if 0 < h < 1 and z = z
0 if h = 1.
I parameterize the tax function using one parameter t1 that refers to the payroll tax
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levied on prorated earnings.
τ ∗(r, h, z) =

0 if h = 0 (unemployment)
t1 × h× r + 0.5t1 × (1− h)× r if 0 < h < 1 and z = z (tax relief)
t1 × r if 0 < h < 1 and z = z (no relief)
t1 × r if h = 1.
In the left panel of Figure 16, I show how the government’s objective function varies
with different choices for the replacement rates of short-time compensation and unem-
ployment insurance. Average worker welfare is increasing in the replacement rate of
short-time compensation and decreasing in the replacement rate of unemployment
insurance benefits. Changes in the generosity of unemployment insurance benefits
have a larger effect on welfare than changes in the generosity of short-time compensa-
tion. The optimal policy mix involves a replacement rate for unemployment insurance
benefits of 0.55 (instead of 0.60, which I used in the estimation) and a replacement rate
for short-time compensation of almost 1.0 (instead of 0.60). In the right panel I show
firm profits. Firm profits are increasing in short-time compensation and decreasing
in unemployment insurance benefits.
In Figure 17, I show how the replacement rates affect short-time take-up and unem-
ployment. In the left panel, I show how short-time take-up varies in the replace-
ment rates of unemployment insurance and short-time compensation. Unsurpris-
ingly, short-time take-up is increasing in short-time compensation and decreasing in
unemployment insurance benefits. In the right panel, I show how the unemployment
rate depends on the replacement rates. The unemployment rate is decreasing in the
generosity of short-time compensation and increasing in the generosity of unemploy-
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Figure 16: Optimal Policy — Workers’ Welfare and Firms’ Profits
Note: The graph on the left shows the government’s objective function for different combinations of
short-time compensation and unemployment insurance benefits. For each combination of short-time
compensation, I compute the payroll tax rate that balances the government budget. The graph on
the right shows average discounted firm profits.
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Figure 17: Optimal Policy — Short-Time Work and Unemployment
Note: The graph on the left shows the short-time rate for different combinations of short-time
compensation and unemployment insurance benefits. For each combination of short-time compen-
sation, I compute the payroll tax rate that balances the government budget. The graph on the right
shows the unemployment rate.
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ment insurance benefits.
2.8. Direct Evidence
In Section 2.6, I presented the employment effects of short-time work based on my
estimated model. In this section, I attempt to corroborate these findings with more
direct empirical evidence.
I seek to answer the following question: How many jobs would have been destroyed if
there had not been any short-time compensation? Answering this question is difficult:
Selection into short-time work depends on employer and worker characteristics that
are unobserved by the econometrician. Therefore, I cannot interpret the estimates
that I reported in Figures 5 and 6 as causal. Short-time workers are likely to substan-
tially differ from workers who are laid off even after controlling for all observable
characteristics in my data. Researchers usually overcome these challenges using vari-
ation of labor market policies across space, e.g. by using a differences-in-differences
approach as commonly done for studies on the U.S. labor market where different
states implement different policies. In my case, short-time work is a federal policy,
which implies that even if I had data on more than one geographic region, I could
not exploit variation in the policy across space, because there is none. Also, short-
time work is a policy that is only available during recessions. Therefore, I cannot
use time variation to study the effects of short-time work on employment, because by
construction the availability of short-time work is correlated with the aggregate state
of the economy.
In the absence of variation across space, I will exploit variation across time and
industry, by relying on the combination of two different sources of quasi-exogenous
variation. The first source of variation is a policy change in the beginning of 2009,
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which I outlined in Section 2.2. The second source of variation is that the recession
affected different industries at different points in time.
I estimate the effect of short-time compensation on job destruction rates by comparing
industries that experienced their largest decline in output before January 2009 when
short-time compensation was difficult to access to industries that experienced their
largest decline in output after January 2009 when short-time work was widely avail-
able.
My dataset does not permit me to measure output at the firm-level. I therefore
measure output at the industry level. Here I use data from Germany’s Federal Statis-
tical Office, which produces monthly time series of industry-level output at the three-
digit level. These data are only available for industries in the manufacturing sector,
which I will focus on in this analysis. I classify an industry as entering a recession
when the production index initially drops below its 12-month moving average by more
than a standard deviation. According to this definition, 85% of workers in manufac-
turing in my data work in an industry where such an event happened between January
2008 and December 2009.
In Figure 18, I show the raw data of the production index for various industries that
I classified as entering the recession before January 2009. In Figure 19, I show the
raw data for various industries that I classified as entering the recession in or after
January 2009. In Figure 20, I show how many industries enter the recession at a
particular point in time. I then merge this information on when industries entered
the recession with my worker-level data. For each employed worker I compute the
time until and since the beginning of the recession for the current industry. I only
include observations for workers in the manufacturing sector.
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Figure 18: Recession Begins Before January 2009
Note: The graph shows the raw data for a selection of industries that are classified as entering the
recession before January 2009.
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Figure 19: Recession Begins After January 2009
Note: The graph shows the raw data for a selection of industries that are classified as entering the
recession in January 2009 or thereafter. 87
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Figure 20: Number of Industries Entering an Industry-Specific Recession
Note: The graph shows the number of industries that enter an industry-specific recession at a
particular point in time. Industries are classified at the three-digit level. I only consider industries
that belong to the manufacturing sector.
I focus on job destruction rates around the beginning of each industry-specific reces-
sion. I introduce two simple linear probability models for workers’ transitions from
full-time employment to unemployment and short-time work. Individual workers are
indexed by i and calendar time by t. I denote the point in time when worker i’s
industry enters the industry-specific recession by τ(i). I denote the left-hand side
variable by yit, which refers to either a job destruction or a transition to short-time
work. I focus on the initial response to the onset of the industry-specific recession by
considering the first six months (I denote the offset by s for s = 0, 1, . . . , 5).
yit =
5∑
s=0
α1{τ(i) + s = t}Dbeforei +
5∑
s=0
β1{τ(i) + s = t}Dafteri +X ′itµ+ γt + εit,
The coefficients γt are calendar time dummies, Dbeforei is a dummy that equals one
if i experienced the recession before a particular cutoff date, and Dafteri is a dummy
that equals one if i experienced the recession after the cutoff. Xit is a vector of
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Unemp. Unemp. Short-Time Short-Time
Before 0.0018 0.0017 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000)
After -0.0013 -0.0013 0.0108 0.0120
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Covariates no yes no yes
Calendar time dummies yes yes yes yes
Table 10: Coefficient Estimates for α and β
worker-specific covariates. α and β are my coefficients of interest. α is the change in
job destruction rates at time s for industry i with short-time compensation relative
to all other industries at the same time. β is the change in job destruction rates
at time τ(i) + s for industry i without short-time compensation relative to all other
industries at the same time. I include monthly calendar time dummies to control
for seasonal effects and aggregate developments. The data also include workers who
work in industries that did not enter the recession.
I report the estimates for α and β in Table 10. I find that the average job-destruction
rate is about a third of a percentage point higher for workers in industries that were
affected by the recession before the cutoff than for workers in industries that were
affected by the recession after the cutoff. As to be expected, transition rates to short-
time work are zero for workers who were affected by the recession before the cutoff
(when short-time was difficult to access) and are large for workers who were affected
by the recession after the cutoff.
This is approximately in line with the impact short-time compensation has on the job
destruction rates implied by my model, as reported in Table 7. In my model, short-
time work decreases job destruction rates from 0.015 to 0.011, implying a difference
of 0.004 — very close to the direct estimate of 0.003 that I obtain from the data.
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2.9. Conclusion
I present a novel micro dataset of Germany’s experience with short-time work during
the recession between 2008 and 2010. The dataset shows that short-time take-up is
increasing in work experience and tenure, short-time work is not associated with a
long-run loss in earnings, and the vast majority of short-time workers return to work
full-time at the same firm. I develop a model that is consistent with these facts. In
the model, firms and workers face productivity shocks that differ in magnitude and
duration. Short-time work is an instrument that allows firms to reduce working hours
in response to a negative productivity shock instead of laying workers off.
The estimated model indicates that short-time work can considerably reduce unem-
ployment during recessions. However, the welfare gains of the policy are small. This
is not surprising. In the model — and in the real world — a worker who suffers a
long-term earnings loss due to a layoff will not be laid off in response to a temporary
productivity shock. Instead, this worker is willing to tolerate a considerable reduc-
tion in hours and earnings while staying employed, even in the absence of short-time
compensation. The notion that short-time work prevents layoffs that would have
devastating consequences on workers’ careers is not supported by my theory.
In my analysis, I assume that for ongoing employment relationships, working hours
are the only way for workers and firms to respond to productivity shocks. I argue
that this is consistent with German labor market institutions and supported by the
data. In particular, I do not observe that firms and workers renegotiate hours and
wages during the recession. However, this assumption has major implications for
the usefulness of short-time work. When employment contracts are fully flexible
and permit permanent renegotiation of hours and wages, short-time work will have a
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considerably smaller impact on employment. Further empirical work that investigates
the degree of contractual flexibility that firms and workers have during temporary
downturns is important to evaluate the efficacy of programs such as short-time work.
Furthermore, I have omitted two important aspects of short-time work. First, I have
not considered how short-time work interacts with other labor market institutions,
such as firing restrictions, overtime rules, or working time accounts (i.e. mechanisms
that allow firms to smooth working hours over time). Second, I have not considered
how short-time work affects a firm’s workforce as a whole. My model is centered on
one-worker firms, a necessity for tractability. However, it is conceivable that when a
firm reduces its wage bill by reducing hours for some workers using short-time work,
it enables the firm to keep other workers employed whom it would have otherwise
fired.
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Chapter 3: Minimum Wages and Policy Expectations
3.1. Introduction
Economists have tirelessly studied the employment and welfare consequences of
minimum wages (Kennan, 1995; Card and Krueger, 1995; Neumark and Wascher,
2008). Usually, researchers compare employment outcomes for individuals affected by
a minimum wage increase with individuals who are not by exploiting variation across
jurisdictions.35 The existing literature reports a range of results from no detectable
effect at all (Allegretto et al., 2011, 2013) to sizable disemployment effects for young
and inexperienced workers (Neumark et al., 2013). Differences often hinge on the data
used, sample selection, research design, or the particular minimum wage increases that
are studied.
In this paper, I show that it is important to account for workers’ and firms’ policy
expectations when measuring the effect of minimum wage increases on employment.
Policy expectations matter for two reasons. First, when a minimum wage increase
is anticipated by workers and firms, the effect on the labor market at the time of
its implementation is lower than when it is unanticipated, because workers and firms
adjust to the new minimum wage ahead of time. This makes employment effects
difficult to detect with the traditional methods used in the literature. Second, when
the minimum wage is increased, its effect on employment depends on workers’ and
firms’ expectations with respect to the future evolution of the minimum wage. In
35The long list of papers that do some variation of this includes, among others, Addison et al.
(2009), Allegretto et al. (2011), Allegretto et al. (2013), Burkhauser et al. (2000), Card (1992a),
Card (1992b), Card et al. (1993), Card and Krueger (1994), Card and Krueger (2000), Couch and
Wittenburg (2001), Deere et al. (1995), Dube et al. (2006), Dube et al. (2010), Dube et al. (2011),
Katz and Krueger (1992), Meer and West (2016), Neumark and Wascher (1992), Neumark and
Wascher (2000), Neumark et al. (2004), Neumark and Wascher (2006), Neumark et al. (2013), Sabia
(2009), and Zavodny (2000).
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particular, when the minimum wage is not indexed to inflation, workers and firms
anticipate that the real value of the minimum wage will decrease steadily over time.
This renders some of the minimum wage increases temporary, dampening both their
short-run and long-run impact on the labor market.
I provide evidence from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to show that the magni-
tude of employment effects associated with recent minimum wage increases in the U.S.
depends on whether minimum wage changes are anticipated (i.e. announced several
months before their implementation) and whether the minimum wage is indexed to
inflation (i.e. permanent in real terms). I consider nine recent minimum wage increases
in the federal minimum wage and state minimum wages in the U.S. and exploit vari-
ation across states using a traditional differences-in-difference estimator. I find that
minimum wage increases result in substantial negative employment effects when they
are unanticipated and no employment effects when they are anticipated. The effects
of unanticipated increases are even larger when the increases are indexed to inflation.
I then develop an equilibrium search and matching model that features a time-varying
real minimum wage. I use the model to quantify how policy expectations affect the
employment effects associated with minimum wage increases. In the model, which
is an extension of the model used in Flinn (2006), workers and firms form rational
expectations with respect to the future evolution of the minimum wage. Unemployed
workers are homogeneous. Employed workers differ in their match-specific produc-
tivity. Wages are determined using Nash bargaining subject to a minimum wage
constraint. Minimum wages may increase wages for some workers by allocating a
larger share of the surplus to them. Minimum wages may also destroy some jobs by
rendering them unprofitable from the perspective of the firm. In the model, policy
expectations shape the employment response to minimum wage increases, because
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workers and firms are forward-looking and adjust to changing minimum wages ahead
of time. While parsimonious, the model can account for a variety of outcomes related
to minimum wage increases. It captures the effects on employment, on the share of
workers in minimum wage jobs, and on the wage distribution.
I estimate the model using indirect inference by targeting difference-in-differences
estimates from increases in the federal minimum wage between 2007 and 2009. These
increases in the federal minimum wage are particularly useful for the identification
and estimation of the model, because the initial increase in 2007 was a surprise,
whereas the second and third increases in 2008 and 2009 were announced in 2007 and
therefore known in advance. In the estimation, I feed policy expectations consistent
with the actual staggered implementation of the 2007–2009 federal minimum wage
increase into the model and then estimate its structural parameters.
The estimated model allows me to disentangle the role of the minimum wage rate
and expectations thereof. In the estimated model, anticipation effects can result in
the absence of any measurable employment effect at the time of the minimum wage
increase. Indexation can result in vastly larger employment effects. For the 2007
federal minimum wage increase, I find that the disemployment effect would have been
twice as large if the increase had been indexed to inflation. The results in this paper
indicate that researchers and policy makers need to account for firms’ and workers’
policy expectations when assessing the impact of minimum wages on employment.
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the role that policy expectations can have
on the employment effects associated with minimum wage increases. I employ a
model to perform this exercise, because in the model, I can characterize and control
workers’ and firms’ policy expectations. The purpose of this paper is not to study
the welfare implications of minimum wages. In the setup that I choose, the welfare
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effects of minimum wages are ambiguous due to a search externality (see Flinn (2006)
for a discussion). Minimum wages may increase welfare if the Hosios (1990) condi-
tion is violated and workers’ bargaining power is lower than socially optimal. In
that case, the minimum wage effectively raises workers’ bargaining power and may
improve welfare. I ignore welfare implications, because if minimum wages are welfare
improving in the model, then minimum wages should always be indexed to infla-
tion. If minimum wages are not welfare improving, then they should be set to a
value that renders them non-binding. Regardless, absent additional factors, a time-
varying minimum wage policy is never optimal. This also renders the discussion of
anticipation effects moot from a normative perspective.36
This paper is related to a large body of minimum wage research. However, the
minimum wage literature is largely silent on the role of policy expectations. Almost
all empirical estimates for the U.S. refer to changes in the nominal minimum wage,
yet are often interpreted as if they refer to permanent changes in the minimum wage.
The “modern” minimum wage literature begins with a series of papers that exploit
variation in state minimum wage laws across the U.S., e.g. Card (1992a,b), Neumark
and Wascher (1992), Katz and Krueger (1992), and Card and Krueger (1994). The
most influential among these papers is Card and Krueger (1994), who investigate the
effects of a 1992 increase in the New Jersey minimum wage by surveying fast food
restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania before and after the policy change took
effect. Card and Krueger estimate that the increase in the New Jersey minimum wage
from $4.25 to $5.05 increased employment with an elasticity of approximately 0.7. The
difference-in-differences methodology applied by Card and Krueger has subsequently
36Along the transition path as the economy moves from no minimum wage to the “optimal”
minimum wage, the welfare implications may be more subtle. However, such an analysis would
also need to focus on the distributional aspects of minimum wages, which arguably requires a more
sophisticated model of worker heterogeneity than what I employ in this paper.
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emerged as the defacto standard in this line of research, often applied to survey
datasets such as the CPS (e.g. Deere et al. (1995), Burkhauser et al. (2000), Sabia
(2009), Zavodny (2000), Couch andWittenburg (2001), Neumark et al. (2004), Abowd
et al. (2000)). Neumark and Wascher (2006) review the literature and conclude that
there is a negative yet small employment effect for young workers. Subsequent work
has raised various issues that seem noteworthy given the objective of this paper.
First, minimum wages may only affect the labor market with a delay. Even in indus-
tries where adjustment costs are considered to be minimal (e.g. because of significant
turnover), adjusting non-labor inputs may be costly (Hamermesh, 1993). Similarly,
firms may not be able to freely respond to a changed policy environment because
of sunk investment costs (Aaronson et al., 2017). It is thus important for empirical
studies to allow for minimum wage effects with delay (Baker et al., 1999; Burkhauser
et al., 2000; Keil et al., 2001). In addition, not only do firms respond slowly to new
policies, it may also take a considerable amount of time for the labor market to tran-
sition from one equilibrium to another, as theoretically argued by Diamond (1981).
Meer and West (2016) investigate this hypothesis. They find that since adjustments
take time, employment effects are more visible in net job creation than in employment
levels.
Second, the difference-in-differences methodology heavily rests on a common trend
assumption. Difference-in-differences estimators are only appropriate if states with
and without the minimum wage change were otherwise subject to the same set of
economic shocks. This assumption is not uncontested. Dube et al. (2010) try to
reduce potential confounding effects from a failure of the common trend assumption
by estimating a difference-in-differences specification using contiguous counties that
are on opposite sides of the border of two adjacent states with different minimum wage
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laws. They find that traditional approaches that do not account for local economic
conditions tend to produce spurious negative effects due to spatial heterogeneity in
employment trends that are unrelated to minimum wage policies. Using their local
identification strategy, they find employment effects that are indistinguishable from
zero. Allegretto et al. (2011) address similar concerns by including region-specific
time trends in an otherwise standard differences-in-difference estimator and come to
the same conclusion. Other papers include state- and county-specific time trends
(Addison et al., 2009) or business cycle conditions (Orrenius and Zavodny, 2008) to
account for spatial heterogeneity.
There is relatively little research that considers the role of policy expectations in
the labor market in general or with respect to minimum wages in particular.37 A
notable exception is Pinoli (2010), who uses a search and matching model in the
tradition of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) to show that the observed employment
effect of a minimum wage increase is large for unanticipated changes and low for
anticipated changes. While Pinoli’s and my paper answer a similar question using
similar modeling approaches, there are important differences. First, in her model, all
workers earn the minimum wage, whereas in my model, wages are determined using
Nash bargaining. Importantly, in my framework, the minimum wage coverage rate
is an important variable that I attempt to explain. Second, I explicitly account for
the real value of the minimum wage (which may depreciate over time) and I use my
framework to study the effect of indexing minimum wages to inflation. In Pinoli, all
minimum wages are set in real terms. Third, Pinoli considers an environment with
only two possible minimum wages. In contrast, my model admits a rich set of possible
37Various papers focus on policy expectations in the context of social security, e.g. Skinner (1988),
Alm (1988), Luttmer and Samwick (2015), Giavazzi and McMahon (2012), and Stiglitz (1982). There
is a large literature in macroeconomics that studies the role of expectations regarding monetary
policy (Levin et al., 2005; Gertler and Karadi, 2015).
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minimum wage policies, allowing me to study staggered minimum wage increases as
commonly observed in the data.
Papers that explicitly study the indexation of minimum wages include Brummund
and Strain (2016). Their results are largely consistent with my findings. Using data
and variation from U.S. states, they find that the disemployment effect of indexing
the minimum wage to inflation is more than 2.5 times the magnitude of the effect of
a nominal minimum wage increase. They do not account for whether minimum wage
changes are anticipated or unanticipated.
Methodologically, this paper is closest to Flinn (2006). The model that I introduce
extends Flinn’s by introducing a stochastically evolving minimum wage. Several other
papers estimate structural economic models with search frictions to study the effects
of minimum wages. However, none accounts for policy expectations or the fact that
the real value of the minimum wage depreciates over time. These papers include
Eckstein and Wolpin (1990), Van den Berg and Ridder (1998), and Mabli and Flinn
(2009). Dube et al. (2011) develop a model in the tradition of Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) and Bontemps et al. (1999) and use a set of reduced-form estimates obtained
from variation in the minimum wage between contiguous counties that are separated
by a state border to estimate their model. Their estimated model suggests that an
increase in the minimum wage from $5.15 to $7.25 leads to a 3.4% increase in the
average wage and a 0.5 percentage point reduction in employment.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, I provide background on minimum
wages in the U.S. and recent developments in indexing minimum wages to inflation.
In Section 3.3, I study the impact of minimum wages on employment using data from
the CPS and develop a set of stylized facts. In Section 3.4, I develop a structural
model that accounts for time-varying minimum wages. In Section 3.5, I bring that
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model to the data and in Section 3.6, I present my empirical findings. Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2. Background on Federal and State Minimum Wages
In the U.S., since its introduction as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938, the
federal minimum wage has been set at a nominal rate. Any change of the statutory
rate requires an act of Congress. As a result, the nominal federal minimum wage
rate only adjusts infrequently. After the federal minimum rate was raised from $4.25
to $5.15 in two steps between 1996 and 1997 during the Clinton administration, it
remained unchanged for the following ten years. In 2007, the Fair MinimumWage Act
gradually raised the federal rate to $7.25 over a time horizon of two years. While the
nominal value of the federal minimum wage only changes infrequently, the real value
declines with inflation, rendering many of the minimum wage increases essentially
temporary.
Figure 22 compares the nominal federal minimum wage with its real valuation in 1990
dollars, where I use the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical
Workers (CPI-W) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics as the deflator. The figure
indicates that most raises in the federal minimum wage were eventually eroded by
inflation before Congress enacted another minimum wage increase.
In addition to the federal minimum wage, many states have chosen to enact their own
minimum wage laws.38 State minimum wages are either passed by the legislature or
result from referendums. When both the state and federal minimum wage apply to a
worker, the higher of the two is binding.
38In addition, cities may elect to enact their own minimum wage laws. Among the cities with
separate minimum wage laws are San Francisco (see for instance Dube et al. (2006)), Seattle, and
New York City.
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Figure 21: Real Minimum Wages in the United States
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Notes: The first panel shows the real state-level minimum wages for all states. The second panel
shows the real state-level minimum wages for states that had indexed their minimum wages to
inflation by 2013. Dashed lines refer to the state-level real minimum wage before they were indexed
to inflation. Solid lines refer to the state-level real minimum wage after the state passed an indexation
law. The nominal minimum wages are deflated using the seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index
for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). The base year is 1990. The thick black line
refers to the federal minimum wage and provides a floor for all effective state-level minimum wages.
The graph captures the following federal minimum wage changes (in nominal terms): Apr 1, 1990
to $3.80, Apr 1, 1991 to $4.25, Oct 1, 1996 to $4.75, Sep 1, 1997 to $5.15, Jul 24, 2007 to $5.85, Jul
24, 2008 to $6.55, and Jul 24, 2009 to $7.25.
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Figure 22: Federal Minimum Wage
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Notes: The nominal minimum wage is deflated using the seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index
for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). The base year is 1990. The graph captures
the following federal minimum wage changes (in nominal terms): Apr 1, 1990 to $3.80, Apr 1, 1991
to $4.25, Oct 1, 1996 to $4.75, Sep 1, 1997 to $5.15, Jul 24, 2007 to $5.85, Jul 24, 2008 to $6.55,
and Jul 24, 2009 to $7.25.
Federal Minimum Number of States
Wage Binding
January 1, 1978 $2.65 ·
January 1, 1979 $2.90 ·
January 1, 1980 $3.10 ·
January 1, 1981 $3.35 ·
April 1, 1990 $3.80 39
April 1, 1991 $4.25 46
October 1, 1996 $4.75 45
September 1, 1997 $5.15 45
July 24, 2007 $5.85 20
July 24, 2008 $6.55 26
July 24, 2009 $7.25 37
Table 11: Changes in the Federal Minimum Wage
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In September 1997, only five states had minimum wage laws that exceeded the
national statutory rate.39 Since then — during a decade with no federal minimum
wage increase — more and more states have passed their own minimum wage legisla-
tion. As a result, the federal minimum wage increase in 2007 only affected 20 states
(see Table 11).
Policy makers are often wary of disrupting the labor market and therefore introduce
staggered increases of the minimum wage. For instance, in August 1996, President
Clinton signed into law a federal minimum wage increase that took effect in two steps.
The first increase was in October of the same year and the second increase came in
September 1997. Similarly, the federal minimum wage increases of July 2007, July
2008, and July 2009 all resulted from a law passed in May of 2007.
As can be seen in Figure 21, there is considerable heterogeneity in minimum wages
across states and across time. Some states have chosen to remove uncertainty from
the evolution of their state minimum wage. There are ten states that have chosen to
index their minimum wages to inflation by 2014. These states raise their minimum
wages annually according to a pre-determined formula that references a version of the
consumer price index and/or a cost of living adjustment. For instance, in September
of each year, the state of Washington updates its minimum wage based on the CPI-
W. The new minimum wage then takes effect as of January 1 of the following year.
Most other states with indexation laws follow similar procedures. Table 12 lists all
states that index their minimum wages to inflation and includes information on when
the corresponding laws were passed and enacted. With the exception of Vermont,
all of these states passed the indexation legislation through ballot initiatives. With
the exception of Florida, no more than eight weeks passed between the referendums
39These states consisted of Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Oregon.
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of the indexation laws and their implementations, limiting the role of anticipation
effects. Washington, the first state to index its minimum wage to inflation, raised its
minimum wage in two steps from $5.15 to $6.50 between 1999 and 2000 and indexed
it to inflation thereafter. Oregon followed in 2003 with a minimum wage increase
from $6.50 to $6.90, which was subsequently indexed. The remaining eight states
followed suit between 2005 and 2007.
3.3. Stylized Facts
In this section, I exploit policy variation across U.S. states to estimate the employ-
ment effects of increasing the minimum wage under different policy expectations. I
distinguish policy expectations along two dimensions: anticipation and indexation.
When a minimum wage increase was passed several months before its implementation,
I will consider such an increase as anticipated at the time of its implementation. If, in
contrast, a minimum wage increase was passed only weeks before its implementation
and when secondary data sources — such as newspaper coverage — do not indicate
that this change was foreseeable, I consider such an increase as unanticipated. By
indexation, I mean whether or not firms and workers may assume that a minimum
wage increase is permanent in real terms, i.e. if it is indexed to inflation.
I exploit variation in the effective minimum wage across states to investigate the
impact of increases in the minimum wage on employment and minimum wage
coverage. I define minimum wage coverage as the share of the labor force that earns
the minimum wage. I consider nine increases of the federal and state minimum wages
between 1995 and 2011.
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Table 12: Minimum Wage Indexation Legislation
State Date New Minimum Old Minimum Legislated
Arizona January 1, 2007 6.75 − November 7, 2006 (Proposition
202)
Colorado January 1, 2007 6.85 − November 7, 2006 (Initiative 42)
Florida May 2, 2005 6.15 − November 2, 2004 (Florida
Minimum Wage Amendment)
Missouri January 1, 2007 6.50 − November 7, 2006 (Missouri
MinimumWage Act, Proposition
B)
Montana January 1, 2007 6.15 − November 7, 2006 (Montana
Minimum Wage, Initiative 151)
Nevada November 28, 2006 6.15 − November 7, 2006 (Nevada
Minimum Wage Act, Question
6)
Ohio January 1, 2007 6.85 − November 7, 2006 (Ohio
Minimum Wage Initiative)
Oregon January 1, 2003 6.90 6.50 November 5, 2002 (Oregon
Increase State Minimum Wage,
Measure 25)
Vermont January 1, 2006 7.25 7.00 Passed by the legislature in
December 2005.
Washington January 1, 1999 5.70 5.15 November 3, 1998, Washington
Minimum Wage (Initiative 688).
The measure increased the
minimum wage from $5.15 to
$5.70 in 1999 and to $6.50 in
2000 with annual adjustments
for inflation thereafter.
Notes: The information was sourced from the Departments of Labor of the respective states. A
value of − indicates that the state did not have a state minimum wage law prior to the indexation,
implying the federal minimum wage at the time was the effective minimum wage.
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3.3.1. Data
I use individual-level data from the CPS from 1994 to 2014. The CPS is a monthly
survey conducted by the United States Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics that collects information on employment, unemployment, and labor force
participation. The CPS serves as the source for official employment statistics and
contains about 60,000 households per month. Each household is interviewed monthly
for the first four months after entering the sample. Households then rotate out of the
sample for eight months, before re-entering the sample for four additional months.
Information on each of the household members’ employment status is collected in
every interview. Information on wages and hours is only collected from the outgoing
rotation groups, i.e. the fourth and eighth interview. The CPS includes survey weights
based on the decennial Census and population projections, which render the survey
results representative at the state level.
Throughout I will restrict attention to individuals age 29 or younger without a college
degree. This is the subgroup of the population most likely to be affected by the
minimum wage. I report estimates for specifications where I include the entire popu-
lation in Appendix B1.
I report summary statistics in Tables 13 and 14. For workers who report that they
are paid by the hour, I directly use their reported hourly wage. For salaried workers,
I construct the hourly wage from reported weekly earnings (including overtime, tips
and commissions) and the reported number of hours worked per week. In the data,
few workers earn exactly the minimum wage, which is in part due to measurement
error. I define the minimum wage coverage rate, i.e. the share of the population that
earns the minimum wage by including every worker who earns less than 105% of the
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Full Sample Young Sample
N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D.
Employed 24,203,698 0.618 0.486 4,675,404 0.571 0.495
Unemployed 24,203,698 0.040 0.196 4,675,404 0.077 0.267
Out of Labor Force 24,203,698 0.341 0.474 4,675,404 0.351 0.477
Age 24,203,698 44.515 18.103 4,675,404 22.045 4.303
Unemployment Duration 905,569 5.309 6.636 349,039 4.136 5.564
Minimum Wage Coverage 6,097,307 0.025 0.156 1,175,829 0.065 0.246
Table 13: Summary Statistics
Notes: The table shows summary statistics from the Current Population Survey 1994–2014. “Full
Sample” refers to all individuals in the CPS age 16 and older. “Young Sample” refers to all individuals
in the CPS age 29 or younger and without a college degree. Data are taken from the monthly CPS for
all rows except for minimum wage coverage. Minimum wage coverage is constructed using data from
the outgoing rotation groups and refers to the share of the population that earns the minimum wage.
Unemployment duration is reported as months. All statistics are weighted using the appropriate
survey weights.
N Mean S.D. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Full Sample 2,256,825 14.833 11.518 5.993 7.822 11.827 18.502 27.513
Young Sample 462,786 8.609 5.108 5.234 5.995 7.430 9.976 13.363
Table 14: Summary Statistics: Real Hourly Wages
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for the real wage distribution from the Current Popu-
lation Survey 1994–2014. Data are taken from the outgoing rotation groups. Wages are deflated
using the CPI-W with 2000 as the base year. “Full Sample” refers to all individuals in the CPS age
16 and older. “Young Sample” refers to all individuals in the CPS age 29 or younger and without a
college degree. All statistics are weighted using the appropriate survey weights.
minimum wage per hour.
3.3.2. Estimation Strategy
I exploit variation in the effective minimum wage across states. If the state minimum
wage exceeds the federal minimum wage, then the effective minimum wage refers to
the former. If there is no state minimum wage or it is lower than the federal minimum
wage, the effective minimum wage refers to the latter.
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I estimate the effects of minimum wage increases on employment and coverage using
a difference-in-differences estimator. For each of the minimum wage events that I
consider, I identify a set of states that will serve as the control group. Throughout,
I will select as control groups all states that contemporaneously did not experience a
change in their effective minimum wage between six months before and twelve months
after the minimum wage event that I consider. For the difference-in-difference esti-
mator to be valid, I need to ensure that the common trends assumption is satisfied, i.e.
that variables of interest (employment and minimum wage coverage) are evolving in
parallel for treatment and control states after controlling for observables. In the liter-
ature, Allegretto et al. (2011, 2013) argue that the parallel trends assumption is only
satisfied when controlling for Census-region (or Census-division) specific time trends,
because employment and demographics in different parts of the U.S. evolve differ-
ently over time. Neumark et al. (2013) argue that this will result in overfitting. I will
report difference-in-difference estimates for specifications with and without region-
specific time trends, which in my cases has little impact of my estimates of interest.
Throughout I am interested in two metrics, the effect of the minimum wage change
on employment and the effect of the minimum wage change on the minimum wage
coverage rate. I denote my variable of interest by yijt, which is an indicator variable
and equals one if person i in state j is employed (or earns the minimum wage) at
time t.
I estimate the following linear probability model:
yijt = αmjt + x′ijtβ +w′jtϕ+ εijt, (13)
where mjt refers to the effective minimum wage in state j at time t and xijt is a vector
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of individual-specific characteristics, such as age, gender, race, and education. wjt is
a vector with fixed effects. This vector includes state fixed effects, calendar time fixed
effects, and — in some specifications — Census region-specific time trends. Here α
is informative about the effect that a one dollar increase in the effective minimum
wage has on the dependent variable. Note that by the construction of the data, the
effective minimum wage is constant in all control states. It only varies in the treatment
states and therefore represents the difference-in-difference estimate. This specification
controls for the magnitude of the change in the minimum wage. I report results
from alternative specifications — including a specification that explicitly accounts for
anticipation effects — in Appendix B1. The results are similar.
3.3.3. Results
I consider nine different minimum wage changes. Five of these changes occurred at
the federal level. The remaining four occurred at the state level.
I include all recent changes in the federal minimum wage (see Table 11). Recall that
the federal minimum wage is not indexed to inflation. The increases in 1996 and
1997 were staggered, i.e. they were passed in August 1996 and then implemented in
October 1996 and September 1997. Similarly, the increases in 2007, 2008, and 2009
were staggered. These were passed in May of 2007 and then implemented in the
month of July in 2007, 2008, and 2009. Both in 1996 and in 2007, the minimum
wage increases were the result of short, but intense political bargaining in Congress.
I classify the increases in 1996 and 2007 as unanticipated policy changes. In contrast,
I classify the increases in 1997, 2008, and 2009 as anticipated changes, because they
were announced more than one year in advance.
In October 1996 the federal minimum wage increased from 4.25 to 4.75. The new
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minimum was binding in 45 states (see Table 11). Therefore, the number of states
that serve as the control group is very small. In fact, it consists only of Hawaii. See
Appendix B1 for a list of treatment and control states for each estimation exercise
that I report. The remaining four states had their own minimum wage increases in
1996. While I report estimates for the minimum wage change in 1996 in Tables 15
and 16 in the interest of completeness, I do not discuss these results here. The lack of
a suitable group of control states renders these estimates essentially uninformative.
In July 2007 the federal minimum wage was increased from $5.15 to $5.85. Seventeen
states were directly affected by this federal minimum wage increase and did not have
additional state minimum wage increases shortly thereafter. The list of states that did
not have an effective minimum wage change between January 2006 and December 2007
— because these states had a state minimum wage above the federal minimum wage
— includes six states. These states will serve as the control group. See Appendix B1
for complete list of treatment and control states.
I report the estimated marginal impact on employment and minimum wage coverage
in Tables 15 and 16. The point estimate for 2007 indicates that a one dollar increase
in the federal minimum wage resulted in a decline in employment by 3.44 percentage
points. This effect is statistically significant and robust to controlling for Census
region-specific time trends (see Table 23). A minimum wage increase of one dollar
raises the share of the population employed at the minimum wage by 2.82 percentage
points. This effect is also highly significant and robust to the inclusion of additional
Census region-specific time trends (see Appendix B1).
The federal minimum wage increases in 1997, 2008, and 2009 were fully anticipated.
The federal minimum wage increase in 1997 (from $4.75 to $5.15) was passed in
August 1996. Similarly, the federal minimum wage increases in 2008 (from $5.85 to
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$6.55) and 2009 (from $6.55 to $7.25) were passed in May 2007.
I report the estimates of the employment effects in Table 15. The employment effects
for 1997, 2008, and 2009 are all indistinguishable from zero. This null effect is
robust to the inclusion of region-specific time trends or alternative specifications (see
Appendix B1). Coverage increased significantly as shown in Table 16. The point
estimates indicate that coverage increased by 4.95 percentage points in 1997, 3.27
percentage points in 2008 and 2.27 percentage points in 2009.
Next, I consider the introduction of an indexed minimum wage in Washington in
1999, Oregon in 2003, and Florida in 2005. I discuss the introduction of the indexed
minimum wage in Washington and Oregon in detail in Appendix B2. My estimates
suggest that an indexed one dollar increase in the minimum wage reduced employment
by 2.06 percentage points in Washington and 4.92 percentage points in Oregon (see
Table 15). For Florida, I find no effect. However, Florida stretches my definition
of unanticipated change, because the policy change was announced six months in
advance.
Last, I consider the increase in the minimum wage in January 2011 in a number of
states that index their minimum wage to inflation. Here, I focus on Arizona, Colorado,
Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. The control group consists of 41
states — all states with no minimum wage increase between July 2010 and December
2011. I find no statistically significant effect on employment (see Table 15). However,
coverage increased substantially (see Table 16), where a one dollar increase in the
minimum wage corresponds to an increase in the minimum wage coverage by 9.89
percentage points.
Altogether, the results indicate the following. First, minimum wage increases that
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are anticipated have little or no effect on employment. This is true regardless of
whether these minimum wage increases are indexed to inflation. Second, minimum
wage increases that are unanticipated have considerable employment effects. This is
true regardless of whether these minimum wage increases are indexed to inflation.
However, employment effects are larger when the minimum wage increase is indexed
to inflation. All changes of the minimum wage have substantial effects on coverage.
I consider the evidence presented in this section as suggestive. There are at least two
shortcomings. First, classifying policy expectations as anticipated vs. unanticipated is
of course insufficient to appropriately address the role of expectations. There are some
states with very frequent minimum wage increases, which limits the extent to which
workers and firms should be surprised by a minimum wage hike, even if the increase
itself was not announced in advance. Second, I presented evidence from nine different
minimum wage increases and then provided an after the fact interpretation for these
estimates using anticipation and indexation. Clearly, anticipation and indexation are
not the only dimensions along which the various minimum wage increases differ and
there may be other explanations.
3.4. Model
3.4.1. Basics
This section extends the equilibrium search model of the labor market used by Flinn
(2006). The model features search frictions and vacancy creation to provide a mech-
anism for why minimum wage increases may have ambiguous effects on employ-
ment and welfare. The model features a bargaining mechanism to determine wages.
This modeling choice is not introduced because it realistically captures the micro-
interactions between workers and firms (see for instance Hall and Krueger (2012)).
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Rather, the bargaining solution is a useful tool to determine wages while summa-
rizing all information on the division of rents from an employment relationship in
a single parameter (that can be estimated). One of the advantages of using this
bargaining model in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) over models with
wage posting such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Van den Berg and Ridder (1998)
or Bontemps et al. (1999) is that these models have different consequences for the
left tail of the wage distribution. Models with bargaining generate a mass point at
the minimum wage, which is supported by the data. Since my goal is to capture
the role of policy expectations, the model needs to accommodate a time-varying real
minimum wage. I develop and solve a non-stationary model, which makes my anal-
ysis distinctly different from Flinn’s 2006, who characterizes the labor market in its
steady state at a constant real minimum wage.
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1, 2, . . .. There is a unit measure of workers and
a positive measure of firms. Workers and firms are both risk neutral and discount the
future with factor β. The labor market is characterized by search frictions. Individuals
can be either employed or unemployed. Unemployed workers receive a flow utility of
b ≥ 0. All unemployed workers search for jobs. When an unemployed worker and
a vacant firm meet, they draw a match productivity, x ∈ X , from a time-invariant
distribution G(x) and then decide whether they want to consummate the match. If
they choose to match, production will begin in the next period. Wages are determined
using Nash bargaining and renegotiated every period. The worker’s bargaining share
is given by α ∈ [0, 1]. New firms can enter and create new vacancies subject to an
entry cost of c > 0.
Existing matches inherit their match productivity from the previous period with prob-
ability 1− γ. With probability γ, they draw a new match value from the distribution
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G(x).40 At the beginning of the period, after observing x, employed workers may
quit or be laid off. This occurs endogenously whenever the worker or the firm does
not find it profitable to continue the employment relationship.41 When a firm-worker
match is destroyed, the worker joins the pool of unemployed workers and the firm
leaves the market with zero scrap value. The model features endogenous contact
rates, i.e. a worker’s probability of meeting a firm is endogenous and depends on the
number of vacancies and on the number of unemployed workers through a matching
function. I denote the matching function by M : R+ × R+ 7→ R+, which maps the
measure of vacancies, vt, and the measure of searching workers, ut, into meetings. I
assume thatM exhibits constant returns to scale, which implies that a worker’s prob-
ability of meeting a vacancy and a vacancy’s probability of meeting a worker only
depend on the market tightness, θt, defined as the ratio of vacancies to unemployed
workers.42 I denote the probability that a worker meets a firm by p : R+ 7→ [0, 1] and
the probability that a firm meets a worker by q : R+ 7→ [0, 1].
The policy environment features a minimum wage mt that establishes a wage floor for
40Allowing matches to redraw their match productivity is a deviation from the model in Flinn
(2006). I found this necessary to match the minimum wage coverage rate and changes thereof in the
data. If match productivity is persistent, I found it difficult to explain why so many workers work
in minimum wage jobs and why the coverage rate is so sensitive to changes in the minimum wage.
With γ > 0, minimum wage jobs become more attractive, because there is a chance that they turn
into better jobs in the future. At the same time jobs in the right tail of the productivity distribution
become (relatively) less attractive, because there is a chance that they turn into worse jobs in the
future.
41I do not include an exogenous risk of job separations in the model. Exogenous job separations
are captured by drawing a new match productivity (which happens with probability γ) that turns
out to be below the reservation productivity of the match.
42When the matching function M exhibits constant returns to scale, I can write the probability
that a worker meets a firm as
M(vt, ut)/ut = M(vt/ut, 1) ≡ p(θt).
Similarly, the probability that a firm meets a worker is then given by
M(vt, ut)/vt = M(vt/ut, 1)ut/vt = θp(θt) ≡ q(θt).
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workers and firms. When a firm is not willing to pay its worker at least the minimum
wage, this firm-worker match breaks up and the worker becomes unemployed. I
assume that mt is time-varying for two reasons. First, because mt denotes the real-
value of the minimum wage, mt depreciates over time. Second, the real value of the
minimum wage changes over time, because of policy interventions. I assume that the
evolution of the real value of the minimum wage is Markovian and captured by the
distribution F (m|mt−1). Firms and workers know this distribution F and use it to
forecast minimum wage policy.
The time-varying minimum wage renders the economy non-stationary. As long as
the minimum wage policy keeps evolving, this economy will not converge to a time-
invariant distribution of workers across states. I therefore need to condition agents’
behavior in the model on the aggregate state of the economy. I make this explicit by
introducing the following notation.
The aggregate state of the economy is denoted by ψt = [ut, et,mt] ∈ Ψ, where ut ∈ R+
refers to the measure of unemployed workers, et : X 7→ R+ to the distribution of
employed workers across firms, and mt ∈M refers to the real value of the minimum
wage at time t. I denote the expectation with respect to ψt+1 conditional on ψt
by Eψt+1 [. . . |ψ]. This expectation conditions on equilibrium behavior by all firms
and workers in the economy (which governs the evolution of ψt). I will denote the
aggregate transition function of ψt by Λ : Ψ 7→ Ψ.
To simplify the exposition, I drop the subscript t in this section and instead refer to
next period’s realization of a generic variable z by z′.
A firm’s value from being matched to a worker with match quality x in aggregate
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state ψ with wage w equals
J(ψ, x, w) = x− w + βEψ′,x′ [(1− d(ψ′, x′))J(ψ′, x′, w(ψ′, x′))|ψ, x] , (14)
where w(ψ′, x′) refers to the wage policy function. The job destruction policy func-
tion, d(ψ′, x′), which I define below, captures endogenous separations. J(ψ, x, w)
refers to the firm’s value at the beginning of the period right after endogenous job
destructions. I take expectations with respect to ψ′ and x′. The expectation with
respect to x′ is conditional on x. Recall that with probability 1 − γ, next period’s
match productivity x′ simply equals x. With probability γ, x′ is drawn from the
distribution G(x).
The firm’s value from posting a vacancy is given by
V (ψ) = −c+ q(θ(ψ))βEψ′,x′ [(1− d(ψ′, x′))J(ψ′, x′, w(ψ′, x′))|ψ] , (15)
which states that a firm incurs the cost of posting a vacancy c and then meets a
worker with probability q(θ(ψ)), where I denote the ratio of vacancies, v, to unem-
ployed workers, u by θ(ψ), which is an equilibrium object that I characterize below.
When the firm meets a worker, it draws match quality x′ from the unconditional
distribution G(x′). When this new match does not immediately separate — sepa-
rations occur when d(ψ′, x′) equals one — the firm receives a continuation value of
J(ψ′, x′, w(ψ′, x′)). Otherwise, the firm’s continuation value is zero.
A worker’s value from being matched to a firm with match quality x in aggregate
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state ψ with wage w equals
W (ψ, x, w) = w + βEψ′,x′ [(1− d(ψ′, x′))W (ψ′, x′, w(ψ′, x′)) + d(ψ′, x′)U(ψ′)|ψ, x] .
(16)
A worker who is matched receives wage w in the current period. In the subsequent
period the worker receives continuation value W (ψ′, x′, w(ψ′, x′)) when the match
stays together. When the worker and firm separate at the beginning of the subsequent
period, the worker’s continuation value is U(ψ′).
The value from being unemployed when the aggregate state of the economy equals ψ
is given by
U(ψ) = b+ βEψ′,x′ [U(ψ′) + p(θ(ψ))(1− d(ψ′, x′))[W (ψ′, x′, w(ψ′, x))− U(ψ′)]|ψ] .
(17)
An unemployed worker receives flow payoffs b. The worker meets a vacancy with prob-
ability p(θ(ψ)) and then draws match quality x′ from the unconditional distribution
G(x′). When the worker does not meet a vacancy (or if the new match immediately
separates), the worker remains unemployed and receives continuation value U(ψ′) in
the subsequent period.
A match separates when either the worker or the firm is better off unmatched. This
implies that
d(ψ, x) =

1 if W (ψ, x, w(ψ, x)) < U(ψ) or J(ψ, x, w(ψ, x)) < 0
0 otherwise.
(18)
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Wages are determined using Nash bargaining subject to the time-varying minimum
wage constraint, m. Thus,
w(ψ, x) = arg max
w≥m
(W (ψ, x, w)− U(ψ))αJ(ψ, x, w)1−α, (19)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that governs the worker’s bargaining power. For an
interior solution, I take the first-order condition with respect to w and obtain
(1− α)(W (ψ, x, w)− U(ψ)) = αJ(ψ, x, w).
Since the wage enters both the firm’s and the worker’s value function linearly, I can
solve for it and obtain
w∗(ψ, x) = αx+ αβEψ′,x′ [(1− d(ψ′, x′))J(ψ′, x′, w(ψ′, x′))|ψ, x] + (1− α)U(ψ)
− (1− α)βEψ′,x′ [(1− d(ψ′, x′))W (ψ′, x′, w(ψ′, x′)) + d(ψ′, x′)U(ψ′)|ψ, x] ,
where the star indicates that this is the wage policy function for an interior solution
only.43 The actual wage policy function needs to obey the minimum wage constraint.
It is given by
w(ψ, x) =

m if w∗(ψ, x) ≤ m
w∗(ψ, x) if w∗(ψ, x) > m.
(20)
Now that I have characterized the separation policy function and wage policy function,
I close the model by imposing a free-entry condition. This free-entry condition pins
43Without the minimum wage constraint, I could simplify the expression further. However, (1−
α)(W (ψ′, x′, w(ψ′, x′)) − U(ψ′)) 6= αJ(ψ′, x′, w(ψ′, x′)) whenever the minimum wage constraint is
binding.
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down how many vacancies v are created each period. Firm entry ensures that the
value of opening a vacancy is no greater than zero in equilibrium. The cost of posting
a vacancy is equal to or greater than (if no vacancies are created) the firm’s expected
value of meeting an unemployed worker, i.e.
c ≥ q(θ(ψ))βEψ′,x′ [(1− d(ψ′, x′))J(ψ′, x′, w(ψ′, x′))|ψ] (21)
with complementary slackness. Note that the above expression implies that under
free entry, θ is only a function of m, not the entire aggregate state ψ. In particular,
knowledge of the evolution of the minimum wage and the market tightness is sufficient
for firms to forecast their value from being matched to a worker.
3.4.2. Equilibrium
I define a recursive search equilibrium for this economy given beliefs over the minimum
wage policy F (m′|m). For a realization of the minimum wage m, a recursive search
equilibrium consists of
• distributions of workers across states u and e
• a market tightness θ
• value functions J , V , W , U ,
• wage policy function w,
• separation policy function d,
• an aggregate transition function Λ : Ψ 7→ Ψ.
such that
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• value functions satisfy (14)–(17),
• the value from opening a vacancy equals zero, i.e. (21) holds,
• the separation policy function satisfies (18),
• the wage policy function solves (19),
• the aggregate transition function Λ is consistent with individually rational
behavior.
Computing the equilibrium is straightforward. I iterate simultaneously on workers’
and firms’ value functions, the wage policy function, and the market tightness. Details
are relegated to Appendix B3. With the equilibrium value and policy functions in
hand, I compute distributions of workers across states using flow equations. Note that
the model is non-stationary. Therefore, I can only compute distributions of workers
across states conditional on a particular realization of the entire minimum wage policy
path and an initial condition for the distribution of workers at some time zero.
3.4.3. Implications
In the model, the minimum wage imposes a constraint on the Nash-bargaining
problem in (19) that is used to determine wages. This means that generating a
positive surplus W (ψ, x, ·) − U(ψ) + J(ψ, x, ·) is not sufficient for the continuation
of a match (as would be the case without the minimum wage constraint).44 Consider
a firm-worker pair for whom the minimum wage binds. For this pair, two things
can happen. First, the firm cannot afford to pay the worker the minimum wage and
the worker and firm separate. In this case, the minimum wage generates involuntary
unemployment. Second, the firm can afford to pay the worker the minimum wage
44Note that the expression W (ψ, x, ·)−U(ψ)+J(ψ, x, ·) is independent of the wage paid, because
it is simply a transfer from the firm to the worker.
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Figure 23: Short-Run Employment Effects of a Minimum Wage Increase
Notes: The figure shows the short-run effect of a minimum wage change on employment under
minimum wage policy regimes that differ in their anticipation (surprise vs. anticipated) and commit-
ment (real vs. nominal). The minimum wage increases at time zero.
and the worker stays employed. In this case, the worker enjoys a wage that is higher
than what the worker would have received otherwise, i.e., the minimum wage effec-
tively increases the worker’s bargaining power. In the model, the minimum wage also
has dynamic implications, because it affects the firm’s expected value from posting a
vacancy and thereby affects vacancy creation. Similarly, it affects the worker’s value
from unemployment, because workers anticipate that future employment relationships
are governed by the minimum wage constraint.
Even though the model is simple, policy expectations may potentially play an impor-
tant role. When firms anticipate a minimum wage increase in the near future, this will
impact vacancy creation today. When the minimum wage is not indexed to inflation,
its effect on vacancy posting is smaller than when it is indexed. Similarly, firms will be
willing to tolerate a temporary loss (i.e. pay the worker more than her productivity)
in anticipation of a lower real minimum wage in the future.
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Figure 24: Model Implications under Different Minimum Wage Policy Regimes
Notes: The panels show the employment rate, the real wage, the minimum wage coverage, and the
market tightness under minimum wage policy regimes that differ in their anticipation (surprise vs.
anticipated) and commitment (real vs. nominal).
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Figure 25: Model Implications under Different Minimum Wage Policy Regimes
Notes: The panels show the real value of the minimum wage and the mean and standard deviation
of the real wage under minimum wage policy regimes that differ in their anticipation (surprise vs.
anticipated) and commitment (real vs. nominal).
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Figures 23 and 24 illustrate the various ways that minimum wage policies and expec-
tations thereof affect employment, minimum wage coverage, and market tightness.
First, I consider the short-run effect of a minimum wage increase on employment
under four different expectation regimes (see Figure 23). The minimum wage is either
anticipated and indexed, anticipated and not indexed, unanticipated and indexed, or
unanticipated and not indexed. In this illustration, the real value of the minimum
wage increases from $5 to $6 at time zero.45 Without anticipation, employment
does not adjust before time zero. With anticipation, employment adjusts by approx-
imately a percentage point in the months before the minimum wage is increased.
Under all four expectation regimes, employment decreases substantially at the time
of the increase. The decrease is larger when the increase is not anticipated (regard-
less of whether the minimum wage is indexed). The decrease is also larger when
the minimum wage is indexed (regardless of whether it is anticipated). When the
minimum wage increase is anticipated, fewer matches that would be destroyed by the
minimum wage will be created in the months before the minimum wage increase. In
the months after the minimum wage increase, employment quickly increases.
Second, I consider the long-run implications of the same minimum wage change.
Figure 24 shows the effect on employment, coverage, and tightness. As expected, an
indexed change in the minimum wage results in a persistent effect on employment. In
contrast, a non-indexed change only has temporary effects. Over time, employment
45I simulate data for a total of 161 periods (80 periods before the minimum wage increase and
80 after). When the minimum wage increase is anticipated, workers’ and firms’ expectations are
statistically degenerate up until (and including) period 0. After period 0, workers and firms have non-
degenerate expectations with respect to the evolution of the minimum wage. When the minimum
wage change is unanticipated, workers have non-degenerate expectations for all 161 periods. Workers
know whether a minimum wage is indexed and form expectations accordingly. In the illustration,
workers expect minimum wage increases to happen every 80 periods (i.e. with probability 1/80).
When a minimum wage increase happens, workers expect it to have mean one. When the minimum
wage is not indexed, workers expect it to decrease according to an annual rate of inflation of 2.5%;
when it is indexed, workers expect it to remain constant.
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will return to its original level. In both cases the long-run effects do not depend
on whether the time zero minimum wage increase was anticipated. Minimum wage
coverage before the increase depends on whether the increase is anticipated. When a
minimum wage change is anticipated, coverage increases in the months prior to the
increase. This results from the Nash bargaining assumption. Because the worker and
firm anticipate that the minimum wage will soon shift a larger share of the surplus
towards the worker, the Nash bargaining solution prescribes that the firm receives a
larger share of the surplus prior to the minimum wage increase. Coverage after the
minimum wage increase depends on whether the change is indexed. When the increase
is indexed to inflation, coverage quickly converges to its new constant level. When the
increase is not indexed, coverage slowly decreases over time (as the real value of the
minimum wage deteriorates). The evolution of the market tightness reflects both the
effect that the minimum wage has on firms’ incentives to post vacancies and the effect
on separations. When the minimum wage increase is unanticipated, market tightness
jumps at the time of the increase. When the policy change is anticipated, the market
tightness will slowly adjust in the months preceding the minimum wage change. When
the change is not indexed, market tightness slowly reverts to its original level. When
the change is indexed, the drop in market tightness is persistent and job finding rates
will be affected in the long-run.
Figure 25 shows the real value of the minimum wage and its effect on the wage
distribution. A minimum wage increases the average wage earned and decreases the
dispersion of the wage distribution. When the minimum wage change is indexed,
the effects on average wages and their standard deviation is persistent. When the
minimum wage change is not indexed, mean wages slowly decrease over time and
their standard deviation slowly increases over time. Anticipation effects result in
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higher average wages before the minimum wage is increased; once the minimum wage
is increased, wages evolve similarly regardless of whether the increase was initially
anticipated.
3.5. Estimation
Throughout, I assume that one period in the model corresponds to one month in the
data. The discount factor, β, is set to 0.9959, which corresponds to an annual interest
rate of 5%.
3.5.1. Parameterization
I parameterize the model as follows. Match productivity x follows a log-normal
distribution with location parameter µ and scale parameter σ. The matching function
per number of unemployed workers is given by
p(θ) = θ
(1 + θω)
1
ω
,
which is in line with, e.g., den Haan et al. (2000). The benefit of using this matching
function relative to others (e.g. Cobb-Douglas) is that it is guaranteed to return
a meeting probability on the unit interval. The matching function per number of
vacancies is given by
q(θ) = 1
(1 + θω)
1
ω
.
Workers and firms have rational expectations with respect to the evolution of the
real value of the minimum wage. In the model, I described the evolution of the
real value of the minimum wage by the Markov process F (m|mt−1). I will use F to
interchangeably refer to the stochastic process that governs the minimum wage as well
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as to workers’ and firms’ expectations thereof. This process itself is time invariant.
The stochastic process F may vary along three dimensions: (1) the likelihood of
a minimum wage increase from one month to the next; (2) whether the minimum
wage is indexed to inflation; and (3) the distribution from which changes in the
minimum wage are drawn.46 I parameterize F as follows. Recall that I discretized
the possible values that the real minimum wage can take,M = {m[1],m[2], . . . ,m[M ]},
where M denotes the number of elements ofM. The elements ofM are equidistant
and arranged in increasing order. F is governed by four parameters that I denote
by piF , λF , µF , and σF . The parameter piF captures the depreciation of the real
value of the minimum wage and denotes the probability of transitioning from m[i]
to m[i−1] for some i ∈ 2, . . . ,M . I calibrate piF such that the depreciation of the
real value of the minimum wage corresponds to the true depreciation of the real
minimum wage in the data measured by the seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index
for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). The parameter λF governs
the month-to-month probability of an increase in the statutory minimum wage rate.
The parameter is calibrated to match the average duration between minimum wage
increases in the data. The parameters µF and σF describe the mean and standard
deviation of a normal distribution from which minimum wage increases are drawn.
These parameters are calibrated to match the magnitude and dispersion observed in
the data.
46Based on the actual evolution of the real minimum wage policies across states shown in Figure 21,
it is clear that assuming that minimum wage policy expectations are governed by a first-order Markov
process is a simplification. However, I find that this simplification is warranted because it fits the data
well and it is sufficient to investigate the impact of policy expectations on outcomes. More realistic
minimum wage expectations would not be first-order Markov. Instead, more realistic expectations
would account for the fact that the likelihood of a minimum wage increase is increasing in the number
of months since the last increase. Minimum wage expectations also depend on factors other than
the past minimum wage, such as which party is currently in power at the state and federal level,
the aggregate state of the economy, and the evolution of minimum wages in neighboring states that
may affect public opinion.
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3.5.2. Moments
The model is purposefully kept simple. It does not feature worker-level heterogeneity
other than match productivity. It also does not allow for any variation over time
that is unrelated to the minimum wage. This rules out business cycle fluctuations,
seasonal effects, tax policy changes, or demographic changes. My model also does
not feature a labor force participation decision.47 This simplicity poses three distinct
challenges as I bring the model to the data.
First, the lack of worker-level heterogeneity beyond match productivity means that
the model will not accurately predict labor supply and earnings at the individual level.
I address this concern by estimating the model using only data from individuals who
are 29 or younger without a college degree, a relatively homogeneous subgroup for
which the model provides a reasonable fit.
Second, the model’s lack of variation unrelated to the minimum wage is clearly at
odds with the data. In the data, employment is driven by the business cycle, seasonal
effects, and demographic changes — none of which are featured in the model. To
prevent the possibility that the model attributes any changes in aggregate employ-
ment over time to minimum wage policy changes, I do not estimate the model using
raw data moments from before and after minimum wage increases. Instead, I use
indirect inference and target the difference-in-differences estimates from Section 3.3.
These estimates represent the causal effect of changing the minimum wage on employ-
ment and minimum wage coverage. In the underlying regressions, I controlled for
47Including a labor force participation decision is straightforward. I abstract from labor force
participation in the interest of keeping the model simple. To introduce a labor force participation
decision, one could include an out-of-labor-force state into the model. Unemployed workers transition
out of the labor force with a fixed probability. Workers out of the labor force transition back into
the labor force whenever their expected value from being in the labor force exceeds some stochastic
value from being out of the labor force.
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other concurrent sources of time variation. Therefore, these difference-in-differences
estimates isolate the effects of the minimum wage policy and represent the appropriate
analog for the employment effects that the model generates.
Third, minimum wages may also affect individuals’ labor force participation decisions.
If a minimum wage increase results in layoffs, some of the laid-off workers may leave
the labor force. Similarly, if a minimum wage increase raises overall wage levels, this
may induce some individuals to join the labor force. In my analysis in Section 3.3,
I was agnostic about whether changes in employment were offset by changes in the
unemployment rate or by changes in the share of the population out of the labor force.
When I bring the model to the data, I assume that the change in the employment rate
in the model (relative to the labor force) is equal to the change in the employment
rate in the data (relative to the population). For the coverage rate, I estimate the
model analog, i.e. the change in coverage relative to the labor force instead of relative
to the population (see Table 29 in Appendix B1).
In addition to the difference-in-differences moments that describe the effect of a
minimum wage increase on employment and coverage, I also use several cross-sectional
moments that describe employment, minimum wage coverage, wages, and unemploy-
ment duration.
3.5.3. Identification
Identification of the model’s structural parameters largely follows the arguments in
Flinn (2006), where my non-stationary model naturally corresponds to his case with
data from multiple cross sections.48 The observed wage distribution is informative
about the coefficients of the productivity distribution. Given my functional form
48Flinn (2006) argues that with data from a single cross section alone, I cannot pin down some of
the parameters of interest, such as the elasticity of the matching function, ω.
129
assumption (match productivity follows a log-normal distribution), the accepted wage
distribution is also informative about the reservation match value, which in turn
is informative about b. The duration of unemployment and the employment rate
are jointly informative about γ and c. The variation in the duration of unemploy-
ment under different minimum wage regimes is informative about the elasticity of the
matching function, ω. In my estimation, I explicitly use the difference-in-differences
estimates on employment and minimum wage coverage induced by an actual policy
change. This also permits me to pin down the bargaining power, α, without resorting
to additional data (such as data on firms’ wage bill to revenue ratio). For instance,
when a minimum wage increase results in large changes in the coverage rate but has
no effect on employment, this would indicate a low value for the worker’s bargaining
power, α. In contrast, small changes in coverage but large effects on employment
would indicate that α is large.
3.5.4. Estimates
My estimation is based on the staggered increase in the federal minimum wage in
2007, 2008, and 2009. I proceed in two steps. First, I estimate the parameters
piF , λF , µF , and σF that govern minimum wage expectations, F . I estimate these
parameters without solving my structural model. Second, with these estimates for
the minimum wage expectations in hand, I estimate the structural model conditional
on F .
I estimate the four parameters governing F using historical minimum wage changes
in all states that were affected by the federal minimum wage change in 2007 (see
Appendix B1 for a list of these states). Consistent with the actual roll-out of the
minimum wage increases, I assume that all workers and firms were surprised by the
initial minimum wage increase in 2007, but were subsequently fully aware of the
130
increases in 2008 and 2009. After July 2009, workers and firms again have non-
degenerate expectations that are consistent with past minimum wage increases.49 I
report the corresponding estimates for piF , λF , µF , and σF in the top panel of Table 18.
The average monthly arrival probability of a minimum wage increase is 0.018, which
corresponds to an average time of 4.5 years between minimum wage increases. When
a minimum wage increase occurs, it is drawn from a normal distribution with mean
0.528 and standard deviation 0.061. The real value of the minimum wage depreciates
at an average inflation rate of 0.027 per year.
With these estimates of the minimum wage process in hand, I proceed with the
estimation of the structural model. I estimate seven model parameters: the worker’s
bargaining power α, the cost of creating a vacancy c, the matching function elasticity
ω, the parameters that govern match productivity, µ, σ, and γ, and workers’ flow value
from leisure, b. I use cross-sectional moments from 2006 to establish baseline numbers
for the wage distribution, employment, minimum wage coverage, and unemployment
duration. I then use difference-in-differences estimates to match the impact of the
2007 minimum wage increase on employment and coverage.
These estimates are a variant of the difference-in-differences estimator that I used in
Section 3.3. In this variant, which I describe in Appendix B1, I explicitly account for
anticipation effects by estimating the average impact of the minimum wage increase
on employment and coverage between three months before and twelve months after
the minimum wage increase. The difference-in-differences estimates from this specifi-
cation are quantitatively consistent with my findings in Section 3.3 and I report them
in Tables 27 and 28 of Appendix B1. I show the entire list of moments used for the
49The minimum wage process is still Markovian. I add a deterministic sequence to the otherwise
stochastic probability transition matrix. Workers’ and firms’ expectation of transitioning to the
starting point of this deterministic sequence is zero.
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Data Model
Mean Wage 8.1380 8.3007
SD Wage 3.5720 4.0104
Wage p10 5.2135 5.0848
Wage p25 5.9492 6.1291
Wage p50 7.3443 8.4071
Wage p75 9.8032 10.9757
Wage p90 13.1493 15.4122
Employment 0.9270 0.9320
Coverage 0.0518 0.0572
Unemployment Duration 3.4140 3.1815
Employment Change -0.0210 -0.0208
Coverage Change 0.0310 0.0357
Table 17: Moments Used in Estimation
Note: The table shows the data and model moments that I match to estimate the model. The
sample is restricted to workers age 29 and below in states that were subject to the federal minimum
wage increase in 2007. The moments describing the wage distribution, employment, minimum wage
coverage, and unemployment duration refer to the year 2006 and establish a baseline. The change
in employment and change in employment refer to three months before and twelve months after the
federal minimum wage increase in 2007.
estimation in Table 17.
I estimate the model using indirect inference. I match a set of moments and reduced-
form estimates that were obtained from the real data with the corresponding analogs
from model-generated data. I avoid simulation error by computing the exact solution
to the distribution of workers across states (see Appendix B3 for details). Computing
the wage and employment moments using the model-implied distribution of workers
across states is straightforward. I obtain the model-implied causal effect of the 2007
minimum wage increase on employment and coverage by computing moments for a
counterfactual economy, which did not experience a minimum wage increase in 2007
(or thereafter). I approximate the duration of an average unemployment spell by the
inverse of the expected job finding rate, which is an imprecise approximation (because
the model is non-stationary), but it is sufficiently accurate for my purposes.
I denote the model generated moments by h(Θ), where Θ denotes the vector of model
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Estimate
Mean Increase µF 0.5284
SD Increase σF 0.0607
Arrival Increase λF 0.0183
Annual Inflation piF 0.0273
Worker’s bargaining power α 0.5360
Vacancy posting cost c 6.4708
Location of match productivity µ 1.5847
Scale of match productivity σ 0.7788
Draw new match productivity γ 0.0357
Flow value of unemployment b -4.3594
Matching function elasticity ω 0.5976
Table 18: Estimated Parameters
Note: The table shows the parameter estimates for the model. The first four estimates describe
the minimum wage expectations, which I estimate in a first step and then feed into the model. The
remaining estimates are estimated by minimizing the distance between the model and data moments
shown in Table 17.
parameters and the target moments are denoted by ĥ. I then numerically minimize
the distance between model moments and data moments, i.e. I solve
min
Θ
(
h(Θ)′ − ĥ
)
W
(
h(Θ)− ĥ
)
,
where W is a diagonal weight matrix. I choose the weights judiciously, placing more
weight on moments that I want the model to capture precisely (e.g. the employment
and coverage effects).
Table 18 reports the parameter estimates. The worker’s bargaining power is estimated
at about 0.53, which is large for this class of models. For instance, Flinn (2006)
estimates α at 0.40. In my estimation procedure, the parameter is estimated from
jointly targeting the effect of raising the minimum wage on employment and coverage.
A small value of α would require that a minimum wage increase results in large changes
in coverage and small changes in employment, which is not what I find in the data.50
50In Flinn (2006), the identification of α rests entirely on matching his model’s implied wage to
firm revenue ratio to that of McDonald’s.
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The cost of posting a vacancy is estimated to equal 6.47. The location and scale of the
match distribution are estimated at 1.58 and 0.77, respectively. The estimate of γ,
which equals about 0.03, implies that ongoing matches draw a new match productivity
after an average of 30 months. The flow value of unemployment is negative and about
equal to minus half the average wage. This implies that unemployment is worse than
just not receiving income. While uncharacteristic in the literature, this estimate of
the flow value is a direct result of my identification strategy. If unemployment was
just a little bit worse than employment, the model would not be able to explain why so
many workers work in minimum wage jobs, the wage distribution is relatively disperse,
and unemployment duration is only that short. Instead, the model would prescribe
that workers should not accept minimum wage jobs and instead wait for a better
match. If I allowed for persistent individual worker heterogeneity (e.g. heterogeneity
in workers’ outside options or their ability), I would expect the estimate of b to be
substantially larger. The estimate of ω is 0.59 and within the range of estimates used
in the literature.
The model fit is shown in Table 17. Overall, I am able to match the targeted moments
reasonably well. I compare the wage distribution implied by the model against the
observed wage distribution in Figure 26.
3.6. Results
I use my estimated model to investigate how policy expectations impact the employ-
ment effects that result from minimum wage increases. I begin by comparing the
staggered minimum wage increase (“Staggered’‘) that occurred in the data against
the counterfactual scenario with no minimum wage increase (“Baseline”). The stag-
gered minimum wage increase was announced in May 2007 and consisted of an increase
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Figure 26: Wage Distribution: Data vs. Model
Note: The left figure shows the histogram of real hourly wages in the CPS (deflated using the
CPI-W with 2000 as the base year) for 2007. The sample is restricted to workers age 29 and below
in states that were subject to the federal minimum wage increase in 2007. The right figure shows the
same for simulated data based on the model estimates, where the number of observations simulated
is equal to that in the real data.
from $5.15 to $5.85 in July 2007, from $5.85 to $6.55 in July 2008, and from $6.55
to $7.25 in July 2009. As shown in Figure 27, the staggered increase resulted in a
2.3 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate in 2007. The increase in
2008 had essentially no impact on employment and the increase in 2009 raised the
unemployment rate modestly. Since none of the increases is indexed to inflation, the
unemployment rate declines after 2009. By 2015, any effect on unemployment has
fully disappeared. Note that I estimated the model only using moments from the 2007
minimum wage increase. The model-implied effects of the 2008 and 2009 increases on
employment are consistent with my reduced-form evidence, where I could not detect
a statistically significant effect on employment.
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Figure 27: Counterfactuals: Evolution of Unemployment When Increase Is Not
Staggered
Note: The figure shows the evolution of the unemployment rate implied by the model for three
different scenarios. “Baseline” refers to the counterfactual with no minimum wage increase between
2006 and 2014. “Staggered” refers to the actual minimum wage increases as they occurred in the
data. “Not Staggered” refers to the scenario when the federal minimum wage is raised by the same
amount as in reality, but the full increase occurs in July 2007.
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I then consider the counterfactual scenario, in which the minimum wage is increased
from $5.15 to $7.25 in a single step in 2007 (“Not Staggered”), i.e. the minimum
wage is raised by the same amount as in reality, but the full increase occurs in July
2007. In this case, the initial rise in the unemployment rate is considerably larger
than under the staggered increase and equals about 6 percentage points in 2007.
However, as the newly unemployed workers begin to find new jobs, the unemployment
rate quickly declines. Notably, this increase in the minimum wage in a single step
results in considerably larger disemployment effects in the short-run. However, the
long-run implications are similar. Due to inflation, both the staggered and not-
staggered minimum wage increases are essentially temporary increases. Staggering
minimum wage increases appears to achieve the goal of raising the minimum wage
while minimizing unnecessary turbulence in the labor market.
In Figure 28, I explore the role of anticipation effects. I show the unemployment rate
under three different scenarios. As before, “Baseline” refers to the counterfactual
with no minimum wage increase. “Foresight” refers to the counterfactual when the
staggered increase in the minimum wage is announced in January 2006 (instead of in
May 2007). “Surprise” refers to the counterfactual where the 2007, 2008, and 2009
minimum wage increases come as surprise.
The “Foresight” scenario shows the importance of anticipation effects. Under this
scenario, the unemployment rate increases right after the (presumed) announcement
in January 2006. This increase is about one percentage point in magnitude. The
unemployment rate then subsequently remains constant (even as the minimum wage
goes up in 2007 and 2008) and only increases as a result of the minimum wage hike
in 2009. If I was to estimate the employment impact of the 2007 increase in this
counterfactual using a difference-in-differences estimator — in the same way as I did
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Figure 28: Counterfactuals: Evolution of Unemployment When Increase Is Unan-
ticipated
Note: The figure shows the evolution of the unemployment rate implied by the model for three
different scenarios. “Baseline” refers to the counterfactual with no minimum wage increase between
2006 and 2014. “Foresight” refers to the actual evolution of the federal minimum wage under the
assumption that it was announced in January 2006 instead of May 2007. “Surprise” refers to the
scenario when the federal minimum wage is raised by the same amount as in reality, but each increase
is a surprise and not announced in advance.
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Figure 29: Counterfactuals: Evolution of Unemployment Under Indexation
Note: The figure shows the evolution of the unemployment rate implied by the model for three
different scenarios. “Baseline” refers to the counterfactual with no minimum wage increase between
2006 and 2014. “Not Staggered” refers to the scenario when the federal minimum wage is raised
by the same amount as in reality, but the full increase occurs in July 2007. “Indexed” refers to the
scenario when the federal minimum wage is raised by the same amount as in reality, but the full
increase occurs in July 2007 and this increase is indexed to inflation.
in Section 3.3 — I would find no effect on employment. The anticipation effect is
strong enough to make the minimum wage rises in 2007 and 2008 appear to have no
employment impact.
When each of the three minimum wage increases comes as a surprise, the 2007 increase
has little impact on employment. The 2008 increase raises unemployment by half a
percentage point. It is only the 2009 increase that raises unemployment substantially
(by about 4 percentage points). This suggests that the reason for finding a sizable
disemployment effect of the staggered minimum wage increase in 2007 in the actual
data is that workers and firms anticipated the subsequent increases in 2008 and 2009.
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In Figure 29 I explore the role of indexation. I show the unemployment rate under
the previously introduced scenarios “Not Staggered” and “Baseline” as well as the
the scenario “Indexation,” which refers to the case when the federal minimum wage is
raised by the same amount as in reality, but the full increase occurs in July 2007 and
this increase is indexed to inflation. Under the scenario “Not Staggered,” unemploy-
ment rises by 6 percentage points in 2007 and subsequently declines. If this increase
is indexed to inflation, unemployment rises by more than 10 percentage points in
2007. Unemployment subsequently declines, but there remains a long-run effect on
unemployment of about one percentage point.
My counterfactuals are of importance to applied researchers and policy makers. I draw
two main conclusions. First, I show that anticipation effects can be large. Because of
anticipation effects, it may appear as if the actual increase in the minimum wage has
no discernible impact on employment, because the majority of labor market adjust-
ments have already occurred by the time the minimum wage is increased. Further-
more, when a minimum wage is known to be followed by a range of subsequent
changes, the initial change may appear to have a larger effect on employment than it
would otherwise have. Second, I show that the depreciation in the real value of the
minimum wage can undo any employment effect of the minimum wage within a few
years. When minimum wage increases are indexed to inflation, their short-run effects
on employment are considerably larger than when they are not. In addition, they
have long-run effects on employment. These results suggest that caution is advised
when interpreting traditional estimates using traditional difference-in-differences esti-
mates.
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3.7. Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate how policy expectations interact with the employment
effects associated with minimum wage increases. I provide evidence from federal and
state minimum wage increases in the U.S. that disemployment effects are larger when
minimum wage increases are unanticipated or when they are indexed to inflation. I
then develop an equilibrium search model in which workers and firms have rational
expectations with respect to the future evolution of the minimum wage. I estimate
that model and quantitatively explore the relevance of policy expectations.
Using the 2007 federal minimum wage increase, I find that anticipation effects can
be substantial and render traditional techniques to detect employment effects of
minimum wages inadequate. My estimated model further indicates that the employ-
ment effects of minimum wage increases that are not indexed to inflation are quickly
undone by the declining real value of the minimum wage. In contrast, minimum wage
increases that are indexed to inflation may decrease employment by more than twice
the amount than minimum wages that are set in nominal terms.
My results indicate that researchers and policy makers need to account for firms’ and
workers’ policy expectations when assessing the impact of minimum wage increases
on employment. Estimates obtained from case studies of minimum wage increases are
sensitive to the particular policy expectations held by workers and firms at the time
of the policy change. Therefore, researchers and policy makers should not expect that
past case studies provide accurate predictions for how future minimum wage increases
affect employment.
While I attempt to be comprehensive, my analysis has various shortcomings. In
the model, the assumption that minimum wages and expectations thereof follow a
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relatively parsimonious and time-invariant Markov process is questionable. Often,
minimum wage policy is driven by political factors. Firms and workers can update
their minimum wage expectations depending on which political party is in power. To
account for this, my analysis could be complemented by more direct measurements of
policy expectations. Such measurements could come from analyzing media coverage
of minimum wage policy (see, e.g., Baker et al. (2016)).
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A1. Data Appendix
A1.1. Details on Data Sources and Data Processing
My short-time work data span the period from June 2008 to December 2010. The
data source contains a total of 398, 857 observations from 59, 539 short-time workers.
The data contain unique person identifiers and unique establishment identifiers. An
observation corresponds to a single month of short-time work by a particular worker.
Each observation contains the worker’s regular monthly salary (German: “Sollent-
gelt”), the pro-rated salary (“Istentgelt”), the replacement rate (“Leistungssatz”),
and the total amount of short-time compensation paid (“Auszuzahlendes Kurzarbeit-
ergeld”). The short-time work data are sourced from typewritten and electronically
submitted reports that employers submit in order for their workers to receive short-
time compensation. The data are based on reports submitted to the district of the
Federal Employment Agency in Nuremberg (see Figure 2). In 2009, this district
consisted of
• Nuremberg City (“Stadt Nürnberg”),
• Nuremberg County (“Landkreis Nürnberger Land”),
• Erlangen City (“Erlangen Stadt”),
• Erlangen-Hoechstadt (“Landkreis Erlangen-Höchstadt”),
• Fuerth City (“Fürth Stadt”),
• Fuerth County (“Landkreis Fürth”),
• Schwabach (“Schwabach Stadt”),
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• and parts of Roth (“Landkreis Roth”).
Note that the short-time worker data per se do not contain a location identifier. I
remove observations with obvious typos, e.g. unreasonably large numbers of working
hours.
I then obtain labor market biographies for the universe of workers in the Nuremberg
district of the Federal Employment Agency (based on its 2009 demarcations). These
data are sourced from the universe of German social security records. I select every
individual with at least one employment or unemployment spell in one of the counties
listed above between 2000 and 2014. For each individual who fits this criterion, I
obtain the entire employment biography going back to 1975. The common restrictions
of working with German social security data apply.
(i) The data do not contain civil servants or the self-employed.
(ii) Earnings are capped at the social security threshold (which was EUR 5,400 in
2009; similar values for preceding and subsequent years).
(iii) The data contain no information about hours worked (except for a part-time
dummy).
The social security data come as spell data. For some individuals, I observe multiple
concurrent spells. That happens when a worker works multiple jobs, when a worker
receives some unemployment insurance benefits or social assistance while being
(marginally) employed, or when an employed worker is also officially registered as
a job seeker.
I transform the spell data into monthly data using the first of every month as the cutoff
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date. I assign each worker a single employment state for each month. When I observe
multiple spells for a given worker in one particular month, I classify a worker as full-
time employed, when full-time employment is the worker’s major source of income
(as long as I do not observe a part-time dummy). I classify a worker as unemployed,
when unemployment insurance or social assistance is the major source of income.
I classify a worker as a short-time worker when the employment biographical data
indicate that the worker’s main source of income is full-time employment and when
there is a corresponding observation in the short-time worker dataset that matches
the worker identifier, month, and establishment identifier.
Note that the short-time work data only cover parts of the county of Roth, while the
employment biographical data contain the entire county of Roth. My data do not
permit me to use a local identifier that is more detailed than the county level. In prin-
ciple, the administrative data sources contain more detailed location data. However,
for data privacy reasons, my dataset does not. To avoid erroneously classifying indi-
viduals in Roth as full-time employed even though they were working short-time, I
drop the entire county of Roth as indicated by my map in Figure 2.
Note that the short-time worker data are based on the location of the establishment
— not the location of the worker. In the labor market biographical data, I observe
both the place of residence and the place of work. For the majority of my analysis,
I focus on individuals who have their place of residence in one of the seven counties
listed in Figure 2. This may at times understate the true short-time rate; however,
I prefer using the place of residence over the place of work, because it allows me to
use a single, consistent selection rule for employed and unemployed workers.
In the employment biographical data, there is not one consistent classification system
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for industry. I use a procedure similar to the one outlined by Eberle et al. (2011)
to ensure that industry codes are consistent over time, which is important for my
analysis in Section 2.8.
In the employment biographical data, not all changes in the firm identifier correspond
to workers switching from one firm to another. I develop a heuristic procedure to
detect “spurious” changes in the firm identifier, e.g. due to ownership changes. This
is important to construct consistent measures of tenure.
For some parts of my analysis, I compute approximate after-tax earnings. The
employment biographical data only contain pre-tax earnings. For this exercise, I treat
everyone as being in tax class I (“Lohnsteuerklasse I”) and as having no children.
A1.2. Measurement Error
Note that my short-time worker data are missing some short-time workers. This
measurement error stems from three sources.
(i) Digitizing the large amounts of short-time worker data required manual inputs
and is therefore prone to transcription errors.
(ii) Not all employers in the Nuremberg area report their monthly short-time work
take-up to the Nuremberg district of the Federal Employment Agency. For
instance, if a firm with a Nuremberg office does all of its payroll processing
outside of Nuremberg, then this firm would not necessarily report its short-time
workers to the Nuremberg district of the Federal Employment Agency. This
firm’s short-time workers would be classified as full-time employees.
(iii) Some workers live in the Nuremberg district of the Federal Employment Agency
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but commute to work outside of Nuremberg. If these workers work short-time,
I would wrongly classify them as full-time employees.
To assess the potential measurement error resulting from (i) and (ii), I compare
aggregate short-time take-up in my worker-level data against establishment-level data
collected and maintained by the Federal Employment Agency. It contains the entire
population of German firms with information on the number of short-time workers at
the establishment level and the average reduction in hours due to short-time work.
This information is recorded on a monthly basis and covers the period from January
2009 to March 2011. I merge this dataset with my other data sources using the
establishment identifier. I report the differences in short-time take-up in Figure 30.
A1.3. Comparison of Nuremberg with SIAB
I compare my Nuremberg worker-level data to the SIAB, a 2% sample of employ-
ment biographies for the entire country. I process the SIAB in the same way as the
Nuremberg worker-level data. Table 19 shows summary statistics for the two data
sources.
Germany (SIAB) Nuremberg
Unemployment rate 0.07 0.06
Share female 0.36 0.38
Mean age 41.60 40.97
Mean monthly wage 2765.86 2964.12
Share manufacturing 0.26 0.29
Table 19: Summary Statistics
Note: The summary statistics refer to a snapshot taken at January 1 for each year between 2000
and 2014. The sample is restricted to individuals who live in the Nuremberg area and are ages 19
to 65. By construction, the sample does not include civil servants or the self-employed.
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Figure 30: Number of Short-Time Workers Reported in the Data
Note: The graph shows the total number of short-time workers who appear in my respective data
sources. The gray shaded areas refer to sections when I only have one of the data sources available.
Both data sources are only available between January 2009 and December 2010.
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A1.4. Additional Figures and Tables of Data
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Figure 31: Distribution of Durations
Note: The histograms show the duration of short-time work and unemployment. The data cover
all short-time work and unemployment spells that began between June 2008 and December 2012.
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Figure 32: Distribution of Reduced Hours
Note: The histogram shows the number of reduced working hours (i.e. the number of hours for
which short-time compensation was paid) per week.
151
Raw Industry Occupation
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0 5 10 15 0 5 10 15 0 5 10 15
Experience and Tenure in Years
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
Experience Tenure
Figure 33: Coefficient Estimates of Experience and Tenure on Short-Time Hazard
Note: The panels show the coefficient estimates of yearly experience and tenure dummies on the
month-to-month transition into short-time work when controlling for various worker- and firm-
specific characteristics. The shaded area refers to a 95% confidence interval. Short-time take-up is
still strongly increasing in tenure, but flat in experience.
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Figure 34: Coefficient Estimates of Experience and Tenure on Unemployment
Hazard
Note: The panels show the coefficient estimates of yearly experience and tenure dummies on the
month-to-month transition into unemployment work when controlling for various worker- and firm-
specific characteristics. The likelihood of transitioning into unemployment is still strongly decreasing
for the first five years of tenure and constant thereafter.
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Figure 35: Evolution of Full-Time Employment By Tenure
Note: The graph shows the probability of full-time work for individuals who transitioned from
full-time employment to short-time work or unemployment at time zero.
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Figure 36: Evolution of Earnings By Tenure
Note: The graphs show the change in earnings for individuals who transitioned from full-time
employment to short-time work or unemployment at time zero.
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A2. Model Appendix
A2.1. Expectation Operators
When I introduce the various value functions in Section 2.4, I use the expectation
operator E[. . . | . . . , H = h] to simplify the notation. Here, I define the expectation
operator for the various value functions. Note that I condition on the hours workedH,
because hours worked have implications for the human capital accumulation processes.
Worker’s Value Function from Working
An employed worker’s state is given by [x, w,y, ζ, h], where
• x refers to the worker type with transition distribution function Ωx(x′|x, h),
• w is the current wage contract,
• y refers to the firm type with transition distribution function Ωy(y′|y, h, z) and
unconditional distribution Γ(y′|z) for new matches
• ζ refers to the aggregate state of the economy with distribution function Λ(ζ ′|ζ),
• h refers to the hours worked.
For an employed worker who remains matched to the same firm, the expectation
operator is defined as:
E[. . . |x,y, ζ, H = h] ≡
∫ ∫ ∫
. . . dΩx(x′|x, h)dΩy(y′|y, h, z)dΛ(ζ ′|ζ).
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For an employed worker who switches firms, the expectation operator is defined as:
E[. . . |x, ζ, H = 0] ≡
∫ ∫ ∫
. . . dΩx(x′|x, H = 0)dΓ(y′|z)dΛ(ζ ′|ζ),
where I condition on H = 0, i.e. I assume that human capital evolves as if this
individual works zero hours. On the one hand, this is a technical assumption that
allows me to simplify the computation of the equilibrium later on, because firms that
post vacancies need not distinguish between workers who are currently employed and
those who are not. On the other hand, this assumption has economic content and
can be interpreted as a direct cost the worker incurs when switching jobs.
For an employed worker who transitions into unemployment, the expectation operator
is defined as:
E[. . . |x, ζ, H = h] ≡
∫ ∫
. . . dΩx(x′|x, H = h)dΛ(ζ ′|ζ).
Firm’s Value Function from Employment
This mirrors the worker’s value function from employment above. For a firm that
continues to be matched to a worker, the expectation operator is defined as:
E[. . . |x,y, ζ, H = h] ≡
∫ ∫ ∫
. . . dΩx(x′|x, H = h)dΩy(y′|y, h, z)dΛ(ζ ′|ζ).
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Worker’s Value Function from Permanent Unemployment
A worker who is currently unmatched — i.e. unemployed without recall option — has
the following expectation operator if the worker does not find a new match:
E[. . . |r,x, ζ, H = 0] ≡
∫ ∫
. . . dΩx(x′|x, H = 0)dΛ(ζ ′|ζ)dΞ(r′|r),
where Ξ(r′|r) reflects the probability that benefits expire, which I model as the most
recent full-time wage dropping to r. A worker who finds a new match has the following
expectation operator:
E[. . . |r,x, ζ, H = 0] ≡
∫ ∫ ∫
. . . dΩx(x′|x, H = 0)dΓ(y′|z)dΛ(ζ ′|ζ)dΞ(r′|r).
Firm’s Value Function from Posting a Vacancy
The expectation operator for a firm that posts a vacancy mirrors the expectation
operator for a worker who begins working for a new employer:
E[. . . |x, ζ, H = 0] ≡
∫ ∫ ∫
. . . dΩx(x′|x, H = 0)dΓ(y′|z)dΛ(ζ ′|ζ).
A2.2. Distributions
I denote the aggregate state of my model by ζ = [z, g0(x, r), g1(x,y, w)], which
consists of the aggregate productivity state z, the distribution of unmatched workers,
g0 : X×R+ 7→ [0, 1], and the distribution of matched workers, g1 : X×Y×W 7→ [0, 1].
The distribution of unmatched workers keeps track of worker types x and their most
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recent full-time compensation r. The distribution of matched workers keeps track
of worker types, x, firm types, y, and wage contracts, w. I denote the endogenous
transition distribution function of the entire state ζ by Λ(ζ ′|ζ).
To solve my model, I do not construct the distribution function Λ explicitly. Instead,
I rely on simulating individual workers’ employment histories, which in aggregate
evolve according to Λ. Here, I briefly outline which stochastic processes and worker
flows characterize Λ(ζ ′|ζ).
• The aggregate productivity state z follows a Markov process and evolves inde-
pendently.
• The measure of unmatched workers, g0(x, r), has the following inflows and
outflows:
– Inflows: Young workers who are born at age xa = 1. Matched workers
who are permanently separated from their employer with probability δ(h).
– Outflows: Unmatched workers retiring at age xa = A, unmatched workers
who become matched with a firm.
• The measure of matched workers, g1(x,y, w) has the following inflows and
outflows:
– Inflows: Workers who were previously unmatched and become matched
with a firm. Workers who were previously matched with a different firm.
– Outflows: Matched workers retiring at age xa = A. Workers who switch to
a different firm. Workers who are permanently separated with probability
δ(h).
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A2.3. Computation
To compute the solution to the model numerically, I need to make several minor
adjustments to guarantee that the numerical solution is smooth in the model’s param-
eters. This is important to do both estimation and counterfactual analysis. Smooth-
ness is not guaranteed because I discretize the state space and workers and firms make
discrete choices. Therefore, an infinitesimal change of one of the model’s parameters
(or the government’s policy) may result in large changes in the model’s variables (e.g.
the employment rate), because changing the parameter value moves a group of indi-
viduals in the model from one discrete state to the next. I therefore add idiosyncratic
“choice errors” from a generalized extreme value distribution to the various discrete
choices that workers and firms make.
A2.4. Estimation
Moments
I estimate the model using indirect inference. I target a total of 574 moments including
• Full-time employment, unemployment, short-time work shares over time by
experience and age
• Quantiles of unconditional earnings distribution
• Quantiles of unconditional tenure/experience/age distribution
• Wage growth on-the-job by experience, tenure, age
• Wage growth off-the-job by experience and age
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• Transition rates from full-time employment into unemployment over time by
experience, tenure, and age
• Transition rates from full-time employment into short-time work over time by
experience, tenure, and age
• Transition rates from full-time employment into employment at a different firm
over time by experience, tenure, and age
• Transition rates from unemployment into full-time employment over time by
experience and age
• Transition rates from short-time work into full-time employment over time by
experience and age
• Recall rates for unemployed workers over time
• Coefficients from a Mincer earnings regression
Estimation Algorithm
To compute the objective function of my estimator for a particular parameter vector
Θ, I proceed as follows:
1. Compute value functions W , J , U for age xa = A using (6), (7), and (5). These
terminal values can be computed directly. The market tightness for individuals
age A is equal to zero by construction. Use (8) to compute the firm’s hours and
employment policy function.
2. Then compute the market tightness θ for age xa = A− 1 by inverting (9).
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3. Use the market tightness θ for age xa = A − 1 to compute the job finding
probabilities for individuals age A−1. Then computeW , J , U for age xa = A−1
using (2), (3), and (4).
4. Compute the market tightness θ for age xa = A− 2 by inverting (9).
5. Repeat 3. and 4. until age xa = 1.
6. With all the policy functions in hand, I begin in 1960 and forward simulate
employment histories for 30 samples of 50, 000 individuals each. I then use
the years 2008 — 2014 of the simulated data to compute the set of moments
outlined above.
The state space of my model is fairly high dimensional despite the fact that my
model’s unique equilibrium is block recursive. This is because I allow for a rich
characterization of workers for whom I keep track of their age, general human capital,
and firm-specific human capital. Also, I keep track of workers’ wage contracts and
match-specific productivity that varies in magnitude and persistence. Furthermore,
since an individual worker’s short-time spell duration is often no more than a few
months, I compute the model at a monthly frequency. Computationally, this results
in very high memory demands to store the solution of the model. To reduce memory
requirements, I compute the model at a monthly frequency, but only store the solution
to the model (i.e. value functions and policy functions) at an annual frequency. During
the simulation — which I do at a monthly frequency — I then linearly interpolate the
value functions and policy functions. The benefit of keeping the memory demands
relatively low is that this allows me to perform the estimation of the model on a large
computing cluster with the optimization algorithm MIDACO (Schlueter et al., 2009)
that can easily be parallelized.
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A2.5. Additional Figures and Tables of Model Fit
Model Data
Recall Rate 0.13 0.14
Short-Time Duration (Months) 3.63 3.96
Short-Time Hours (Share of Full-Time) 0.34 0.27
Table 20: Model Fit — Duration, Hours, Recall
Note: The table shows the model fit of short-time duration, the fraction of hours reduced during
short-time spells, and the recall rate. The recall rate is defined as the share of transitions from
unemployment to full-time employment where a worker returns to the employer that immediately
preceded the unemployment spell.
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Figure 37: Model Fit — Wage Growth On- and Off-the-Job
Note: The graph on the left shows the model fit for the annualized wage growth on-the-job as a
function of a worker’s experience and tenure. The graph on the right shows the model fit for wage
growth off-the-job between two jobs as a function of a worker’s experience.
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Figure 38: Model Fit — Transition Out of Full-Time Work
Note: The graphs show the model fit for the month-to-month transition rate from full-time employ-
ment into short-time work, full-time work with a different firm, and unemployment.
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Figure 39: Model Fit — Unconditional Distributions
Note: The graph on the left shows the model fit for the unconditional experience distribution. The
graph on the right shows the model fit for the unconditional tenure distribution.
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B1. Data Appendix
I complement the results from estimating equation (13) by a different specification.
In (13) I considered the marginal effect of a change in the minimum wage on my
variable of interest. Here, I consider the absolute effect of a particular change in the
minimum wage while accounting for anticipation effects. I estimate the specification
yijt = αddjt + x′ijtβ +w′jtϕ+ εijt, (22)
where djt is equal to 1 for all states and months no more than three months before and
no more than twelve months after a minimum wage increase. For all other states and
months, djt is equal to zero. xijt is a vector of individual-specific characteristics, such
as age, gender, race, and education. wjt is a vector with fixed effects. This vector
includes state fixed effects, calendar time fixed effects, and — in some specifications
— Census region-specific time trends. In this specification, αd is informative about
the absolute effect of a particular minimum wage change, regardless of the magnitude
of the policy change. Also, the specification explicitly allows for anticipation effects.
I provide various additional estimation results. In Tables 21 and 22 I show estimates
for the effect of the minimum wage on employment and coverage for the same spec-
ification that I used in the main text. Here, I do not restrict the sample to young
workers without a college education. Instead, I show estimates for all workers in the
CPS. As expected, the magnitude of estimates is now smaller, because the general
population is less likely to be affected by the minimum wage. However, the general
patterns hold.
In Tables 23 and 24 I show estimates for the same specification as in the main text,
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but this time I include Census region-specific time trends. Again, I focus on young
workers without a college degree. The estimates are comparable. In Tables 25 and
26 I report the estimates for the entire CPS.
I now turn to the estimates obtained from the specification introduced in this
Appendix. Instead of estimating the marginal effect of increasing the minimum
wage, I now estimate equation (22), where my coefficient of interest now captures
the employment effect of the entire minimum wage increase (regardless of its magni-
tude). These are the coefficients that I target in the estimation of my structural
model.
I report estimates for young and inexperienced workers in Tables 27 and 28. Overall,
the estimates are comparable.
Since my structural model does not feature a labor force participation decision, I do
not want to target the effect of minimum wage increases on coverage relative to the
entire population. Instead, I want to focus on coverage relative to the labor force
(“net coverage”). I report the corresponding estimates in Table 29.
In Tables 30 and 31 I list all states affected by the various minimum wage increases
that I study in Section 3.3. Table 30 makes apparent that the estimates for the 1996
federal minimum wage increase are likely to be unreliable, because the difference-in-
differences estimator lacks a suitable control group. It includes only Hawaii.
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Federal Minimum Wage Change in 1996
Treatment States Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming
Control States Hawaii
Federal Minimum Wage Change in 1997
Treatment States Alabama Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, NewMexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming
Control States Arkansas, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Rhode Island
Federal Minimum Wage Change in 2007
Treatment States Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Wyoming
Control States Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island
Federal Minimum Wage Change in 2008
Treatment States Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming
Control States California, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Rhode Island
Federal Minimum Wage Change in 2009
Treatment States Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming
Control States California, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hamp-
shire, Rhode Island, West Virginia
Table 30: List of Treatment and Control States for Federal MinimumWage Increases
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Minimum Wage Change in Washington in 1999
Treatment States Washington
Control States Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming
Minimum Wage Change in Oregon in 2003
Treatment States Oregon
Control States Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming
Minimum Wage Change in Florida in 2005
Treatment States Florida
Control States Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wyoming
Minimum Wage Change in Several States in 2011
Treatment States Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont,
Washington
Control States Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming
Table 31: List of Treatment and Control States for State Minimum Wage Increases
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B2. Case Study of Washington and Oregon
Simply comparing unemployment and labor force participation statistics around
minimum wage events is bound to be confounded by other events, the business cycle
and measurement error. Not many states with indexation events have an easily
identified control group, i.e. a group of other states that are nearby and of similar
economic and demographic characteristics, such that a change in employment or labor
force participation could in fact be attributed to a change in minimum wage policy
alone. However, among the states listed in Table 12, Washington and Oregon are two
ideal candidates for a head-to-head comparison, because both states are fairly similar
in terms of economic and demographic characteristics, have always had a similar
minimum wage level and, most importantly, have indexed their minimum wages at
different points in time (see also Figure 21).
Figure 40 shows the seasonally adjusted unemployment and labor force participation
rates for three groups of individuals in Washington and Oregon: all individuals, indi-
viduals ages 16 to 25, and individuals without a college degree (from top to bottom).
The latter two subgroups are more likely to be directly affected by minimum wage
provisions than the population at large. The first vertical line refers to January
1999 when Washington increased its minimum wage from $5.15 to $5.70 and subse-
quently indexed it to inflation. Also in January 1999, Oregon increased its minimum
wage from $6.00 to $6.50 (yet without indexing it). The second vertical line refers
to January 2003, when Oregon increased its statewide minimum wage from $6.50
to $6.90 and indexed it to inflation. Also in January 2003, due to inflation index-
ation, Washington increased its minimum wage from $6.90 to $7.01. Visually, the
business cycle clearly dominates the unemployment rate. However, it appears to
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Figure 40: Unemployment Rates in Washington and Oregon
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Notes: The unemployment rate is computed using the Current Population Survey and seasonally
adjusted. The numbers indicate the difference between Oregon’s and Washington’s unemployment
(or labor force participation) rate at the given point in time. The first vertical line refers to January
1999, when Washington increased and indexed the state minimum wage. The second vertical line
refers to January 2003, when Oregon increased and indexed its minimum wage.
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affect both states roughly in parallel. All three groups exhibit similar patterns; after
Washington increased and indexed its minimum wage in 1999, within the following
year, its unemployment rate increased relative to the unemployment rate in Oregon
(by 1.18 percentage points for the full population). Similarly, when Oregon intro-
duced and indexed its minimum wage in 2003, within a year, its unemployment rate
increased relative to that of Washington (by 0.81 percentage point). The differ-
ences are most pronounced among young workers. The labor force participation rate
exhibits a similar pattern. Indexation events also coincided with a decrease in the
labor force participation rate for the full population and for workers without a college
degree, yet not for young workers.
B3. Model Appendix
The equilibrium computation is simplified by the fact that value and policy functions
only depend on the aggregate state through the minimum wage policy m. Therefore,
I drop the dependence on ψ in this section.
I compute the equilibrium value functions (W (m,x), U(m), J(m,x)), the wage and
separations policy functions (w(m,x) and d(m,x)), and the market tightness (θ(m))
using value function iteration, where I define W (m,x) = W (m,x,w(m,x)) and
J(m,x) = J(m,x,w(m,x)). The algorithm works as follows. Recall that x ∈ X
and m ∈M take on a finite set of values.
1. Guess initial values for θ(m), W (m,x), U(m), J(m,x), w(m,x), d(m,x)
2. Set dist = 1
3. Iterate while(dist > tolerance)
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(a) Compute update for U(m) using (17) and call it Uˆ(m)
(b) Compute update for θ(m) using (15) and call it θˆ(m)
(c) Compute update for W (m,x) using (16) and call it Wˆ (m,x)
(d) Compute update for J(m,x) using (14) and call it Jˆ(m,x)
(e) Compute update for w(m,x) using (20) and call it wˆ(m,x)
(f) Compute update for d(m,x) using (18) and call it dˆ(m,x)
(g) Set dist equal to
max
m
(|U(m)− Uˆ(m)|) + max
m
(|θ(m)− θˆ(m)|)
+ max
m,x
(|W (m,x)− Wˆ (m,x)|) + max
m,x
(|J(m,x)− Jˆ(m,x)|)
+ max
m,x
(|w(m,x)− wˆ(m,x)|) + max
m,x
(|d(m,x)− dˆ(m,x)|)
(h) Set U(m), θ(m), W (m,x), J(m,x), w(m,x), d(m,x) equal to their respec-
tive updates denoted by hats.
With the value functions, market tightness, and policy functions in hand, computing
distributions of workers is straightforward. Take a sequence of minimum wage real-
izations {mt}Tt=0. Initialize the distribution of matched workers at time zero,
e0 : {X} 7→ R+,
and
u0 = 1−
∑
x
e0(x).
179
Then compute the distribution at time t > 0 as follows. For all x ∈ X ,
et(x) = [1− d(mt, x)] (et−1(x)(1− γ) + (1− ut−1)γG(x) + ut−1p(θ(mt−1))G(x)) .
The measure of unemployed workers is simply
ut = 1−
∑
x
et(x).
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